



NACTA WATCH

2020 - 2021

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1. Understanding The Dynamics of Baloch Militancy

We have to take into account the sensitivities of the Baloch, in particular the youth

Syed Akhtar Ali shah

Published in the Express Tribune July 07th, 2020

The act of terror on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) in Karachi was vehemently condemned by national leaders of all shades and the heroic response of the security guards, police and other security forces was applauded. However, the abortive attack on the PSX demonstrates and reaffirms the fact that terrorist sleeper cells are not only present in Karachi but also in other parts of the country. The resurgence of armed Taliban groups can be seen clashing with each other as well their opponents, now a regular feature in North and South Waziristan.

There is no doubt that the security guards and the police exhibited extraordinary valour and presence of mind in neutralising the attack within eight minutes, and we as a nation are immensely proud of them. However, this success was only at the tactical level. Having said this, we have to examine and address the problem at the strategic level. If we take a closer look at this attack, it had a different dimension, not motivated by religion but by Baloch nationalism. The fundamental question yet again at the strategic and policy level remains the same: What motivated the Baloch youth to carry out such a daredevil attack and how did it happen? These are some of the serious questions which need to be pondered over and answered.

The genesis and nature of this violent attack had many dimensions, which if studied

deeply would tend to make us sad. While their act of terror cannot be condoned, we must remember that they hailed from the very same soil which we take great pride in. They, along with their partners, are termed misguided, playing the games of foreign hands. The question that boggles the mind here again is that what led them to become misguided, especially when many amongst them are highly educated.

A cursory glance even at the manifestos of many mainstream Baloch political parties reveal deep seething feelings of deprivation and helplessness. For instance, the Balochistan National Party headed by Akhtar Mengal believes in greater autonomy for Balochistan through peaceful and democratic means and aims to continue the cause of the Baloch National Movement. The Party also aims to eradicate economic exploitation in Balochistan, as well as promote equal employment opportunities for people in the region. Additionally, they intend to set up a secular Baloch national state which respects all faiths, religions, and cultural traditions. Unanimously, the Baloch constantly complain of being deprived of their natural endowment and lament usurpation of the right to self-rule. Most of them seek autonomy within the given constitutional scheme to run their affairs independently. But due to political engineering and excessive intrusion of extra constitutional forces, artificial leadership is being imposed.

The Baloch claims for national identity dates back 2,000 years. The available research literature suggests that after the creation of Pakistan, the non-fulfilment of Baloch grievances resulted into nationalist



movements on four occasions — in 1948, 1958, 1962 — and most vigorously from 1973 to 1977 and onwards.

These feelings of deprivation are further augmented due to the fact that Balochistan accounts for nearly half of Pakistan's land mass, which is immensely rich in natural resources, including oil, gas, coal, copper and gold but despite immense mineral wealth, and is one of the poorest and underprivileged provinces. Much of the population is malnourished and illiterate and living with no electricity or clean drinking water which is further compounded with the highest infant and maternal mortality rate, the highest poverty rate, and the lowest literacy rate and the highest rate of unemployment in Pakistan. Young girls are dropping out of school at an alarming rate. Nine out of every 10 girls are out of school in rural Balochistan, making girls and women the biggest victims of illiteracy in the territory.

The general perception that developed amongst the youth, which may be wrong, is that ever since 2013, enforced disappearances have increased followed by “kill and dump” operations considered as a method to silence dissenting voices. They complain that the due process of law is not being followed, further increasing the yawning gap between the state and Baloch youth.

Together with this has erupted the phenomena of globalisation and development in the form of CPEC versus nationalism as has happened in the US. The

sense of marginalisation due to the migration of outsiders without being taken into confidence and due regard to the indigenous Baloch people adds fuel to the fire.

When all is said and done, the question arises: can the state not remove the drivers of militancy, extremism and radicalisation that is propelling the youth to take up arms for gaining rights?

Yes, the state can. If it has happened in Ireland, Scotland and in Afghanistan, it can also be done here. We have to take into account the sensitivities of the Baloch, in particular the youth. Brushing aside the sensitivities will only be at the peril of further sense of alienation leading to bigger trouble. The mere use of kinetic energy of the state may temporarily quell the problem but will be counterproductive in the long run. It is high time to invest in the socio-economic sector in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals; ensure political participation of the genuine leadership in mainstream politics; ensure due process of law; and above all assuage the feeling of marginalisation by ensuring employment to the local population, and with that there should be promotion of Baloch art, culture, music and literature.

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2. Baluch Nationalism

Tariq Khosa

Published in the DAWN, July 20th, 2020

TO understand Baluch nationalism, it is important to know Baluchistan's history and culture.

A confederacy of 44 tribes was formed in the 12th century under Mir Jalal Khan. By the 15th century, a powerful and the largest Baluch confederacy existed under Mir Chakar Rind, stretching from Kirman in the west to the Indus in the east. Political unity dissipated after his death. In 1666, Mir Ahmad Khan was elected as Khan of Kalat, establishing the first Kalat confederacy, which included Kandahar, Bandar Abbas, Dera Ghazi Khan and Karachi. Under his grandson Mir Nasir Khan, a unified army and administrative system was raised. Kalat was divided in two units: Sarawan under Raisani and Jhalawan under the Zehri chiefs. Thus began Baluch rule through a council of Sardars. From 1805 until British intervention in 1939, Nasir Khan's successors remained nominally independent.

Russia's advance into Central Asia led to Britain's involvement in Baluchistan. Maharaja Ranjit Singh refused the invading army the northern route to Kabul via Peshawar and Khyber Pass, so the British signed a safe passage agreement in 1838 with the Khan of Kalat Mehrab Khan to use Bolan Pass. However, citing violations, the British attacked Kalat and killed Mehrab Khan. His son Mir Nasir Khan II was installed as head of the confederacy. The First Afghan War was a military disaster for the British. In 1875, they signed a treaty undertaking to respect Kalat's independence, formally

establishing the sardars' rule and raising the tribal Levies for internal security.

Baluchistan's division followed as an adjunct to the design of keeping Russia away from India by parcelling large chunks of Baluch land. The Baluch suffered dearly under 'The Great Game'. By drawing the Goldsmid Line in 1871, one-fourth of Baluchistan was given to Persia, with further border adjustments in 1896 and 1905 under the Anglo-Persian Joint Boundary Commission. In 1894, a significant strip of land was handed to Afghanistan under the Durand Line agreement. It was only after accession to Pakistan that Jacobabad was transferred to Sindh and D.G. Khan to Punjab.

Baluchistan suffers from many missed opportunities and unfulfilled promises.

In 1927, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Master Pir Baksh started the newspaper Baluchistan in Delhi. But if a date were to be given to the emergence of Baluch nationalism, it would be 1929, when Mir Muhammad Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi and Abdul Aziz Kurd set up Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchistan, marking the beginning of a secular, non-tribal nationalist movement. In November, Magsi published an article demanding: (i) unification and independence of Baluchistan; (ii) a democratic, socialist system guided by Islamic universalism; (iii) abolition of the sardari system; (iv) free, compulsory education for the Baluch, and equality for Baluch women; (v) promotion of Baluch culture. This was nothing short of revolutionary compared to the sardars' obscurantist tribal traditions.

The first successful nationalist movement was launched that year against army



BALUCH NATIONALISM

recruitment, which led to an armed mutiny. In 1930, the Quit Balochistan movement was launched. The Balochistan and All-India Baloch Conference was held in Jacobabad in 1932, and the next year in Hyderabad. In 1934, armed struggle was proposed to obtain Kalat's sovereignty after the British left, but postponed. Magsi died in the 1935 Quetta earthquake. The Anjuman was renamed the Kalat State National Party in 1937. It agreed with the Khan of Kalat that, like Nepal, Kalat state should have direct treaty relations with London. It did not support the Muslim League, which stood for an independent homeland for Indian Muslims.

Understanding Balochistan's languages is important to gauge their alienation. The British replaced Persian as the official language with Urdu and English, isolating Balochistan from Iranian Balochistan. Balochi has 10 vowels while there are six in Arabic script. In the 1970s, an influential group of writers led by Gul Khan Nasir, then education minister, tried to change it to Roman script. They cited the Turks' example: does using Roman script affect their faith? In 1990, the provincial assembly passed the Balochistan Mother Tongue Use bill, making Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto compulsory mediums of primary-level instruction in their respective rural communities. In 1992, without consultation, the PML-N government discontinued its implementation through a cabinet decision.

Balochistan suffers from many missed opportunities and unfulfilled promises. In 1948, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan signed the instrument of accession with Pakistan, ending the 227-day-old independent Kalat state and 300-year-old confederacy. His

brother Abdul Karim declared a revolt in Jhalawan. In 1955, Iskandar Mirza made Balochistan part of West Pakistan under One Unit, leading to the second insurgency led by Nawab Nauroz Zehri. Both Abdul Karim and Nauroz Khan were duped into surrendering on the promise of safe passage. Instead, they faced long prison sentences through military courts. Nauroz Khan's son and companions were hanged.

The provocation for the third Baloch insurgency came when, following the 1962 elections in which several nationalists like Khair Baksh Marri and Ataullah Mengal were elected, Ayub Khan dismissed them and, like Musharraf later, threatened them with extinction if they opposed him. In 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised provincial autonomy in return for Baloch support for a consensus constitution. He then dismissed Ataullah Mengal's government, leading to the fourth insurgency. The current fifth insurgency began in 2005 following a rape allegation against an army officer by a female doctor in Sui. Nawab Akbar Bugti took up her cause, but his unfortunate death in a cave near Kohlu in 2006 caused further alienation.

Festering wounds need to be healed. The speaker of the National Assembly has done well to revive the parliamentary committee on Balochistan. The path of reconciliation as recommended by CT NAP in December 2014 must be pursued. These sentiments expressed by late Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo deserve attention: "You cannot create brotherhood by means of bayonets, butchery, death and destruction. You cannot create a united nation by force."

The writer is former IG of Balochistan Police and author of *The Faltering State and Inconvenient Truths*.



3. Baluch Militancy Trends

Tariq Pervez

Published in DAWN, July 25th, 2020

ON June 29, 2020, at 10.02 am, four terrorists of the Majeed Brigade, a faction of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) in Karachi with weapons and grenades. They had with them dried ration packs, indicating they intended to take over the place and hold people hostage before killing them. But by 10.12 am, within 10 minutes, before they could enter the premises all four were killed by three well-trained police commandos.

Two pointers here. One, the civilian police exhibited the capability to neutralise desperate, well-armed terrorists, on their own, efficiently and effectively. Two, the Baluch sub-nationalist terrorists demonstrated a greater degree of commitment and sophistication in attacks than before. These two dimensions have an important bearing on understanding the latest trends in Baluch sub-nationalist militancy and the state's response.

The most noticeable trend is that there has been a consistent, significant reduction in the number of terrorist attacks by Baluch sub-nationalist groups (BSNGs) since 2015. According to one estimate, terrorist attacks by BSNGs between 2015 and 2019, came down from 194 in 2015 to 51 in 2019. This is a reduction of 74 per cent in terms of terrorist attacks in the last five years. This is no mean achievement and, to an extent, speaks volumes for the effectiveness of the government's CT measures. But one would hasten to add that there is much criticism of the heavy-handed tactics adopted to achieve the reduction in

terrorism, e.g the policy of enforced disappearances and 'kill-and-dump-the-militants' approach.

Changes in the nature of Baluch militancy call for a review of our CT strategy.

Is this reduction in attacks sustainable using the present tactics? I guess not. The paramilitary forces have played their role in reducing attacks, but continuing to use them is likely to lead to a situation of diminishing returns, because they have become a symbol of oppression for Baluch youth. We must start moving towards a response which gives a greater role to civilian institutions mandated to maintain law and order in society. The rapid response to the PSX attack shows that police can develop the capability to deal with such attacks, if provided due resources and training.

This brings us to the second new trend in Baluch militancy ie a fundamental change in modus operandi in terrorist attacks. Earlier, BSNGs used to plant IEDs on railway tracks/roadsides or carry out kill-and-run tactics. Suicide bombing, the most common tactic of religiously inspired militants, was never adopted by Baluch militants. This has changed as Baluch militants have not only resorted to suicide bombings but also conducted more sophisticated attacks aimed at holding hostages, as in the attacks on the Chinese consulate (Karachi, 2018), PC Gwadar (2019) and PSX (2020).

It started in 2011 when the Majeed Brigade declared itself a fidayeen group, carrying out only suicide attacks. The first suicide attack they claimed was in 2011 against Naseer Mengal, killing 13 persons. Such attacks may not have caused much damage till now but are likely to continue, and



BALUCH MILITANCY TRENDS

though less in number, attract a lot of media attention here and abroad. Some say the adoption of suicide bombing by Baluch militants is the direct outcome of the alleged policy of enforced disappearances and killing militants and then dumping their bodies by LEAs, besides reliance on excessive force. That is not to deny that this fault line is exploited by India, Afghanistan and Iran who provide support to these militants.

To counter this, besides neutralising the external factor, we must have a phased programme of Baluchistan's civilianising internal security by going for capacity building of police, ultimately replacing the Frontier Corps. Also, there's a need for a shift in our security paradigm so that non-kinetic measures form the main thrust of our approach to dealing with Baluch alienation, and kinetic measures are scaled back over time.

The third significant recent trend involves the effective leadership of BSNGs shifting from tribal sardars to the educated middle-class youth. We see this happening in the two most dangerous Baluch organisations, ie BLA and the Baluch Republican Army. While the former is formally being headed by London-based Harbiyar Marri, the latter is led by Brahmdagh Bugti based in Switzerland. The de facto leadership of these organisations, which is leading the fight from Afghanistan, are two militants, Bashir Zeb and Gulzar Imam. Both are former leaders of the Baluch Students Organisation and belong to the middle class.

The third important Baluch militant organisation is the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) headed by Dr Allah Nazar Baluch, a middle-class doctor (MBBS). The main fallout of this 'non-sardarisation' of Baluch militant organisations has been seen, for the first time in the militants'

history, in the form of an alliance between four major groups of militants ie BLA, BRA, BLF and the Baluch Republican Guard, called the Baluch Raaji Aajoi Sangar. Earlier, the egos of tribal sardars were a major obstacle in the setting up of any united platform of militants. The creation of BRAS, is likely to deprive CT forces of a major advantage they had over the militants, ie tackling a fragmented insurgency. This calls for a strategic and tactical rethink by the state, one which focuses more on the Baluch youth and educational institutions. Nacta can play a lead role here.

The fourth trend in Baluch militancy is the increased focus on targeting Chinese premises and personnel, besides Pakistani state institutions and personnel. The reasons given for the attack on the PSX by Majeed Brigade spokesman Jeehand Baluch was that they wanted to target the Pakistani economy as well as Chinese financial interest which has 40pc ownership in PSX. This not only calls for a more proactive, integrated and sustained intelligence collection but also hardening of the likely targets, especially those with Chinese involvement.

These changes in Baluch militancy are fundamental in nature and call for a review of our CT strategy. The status quo may lead to a reduction in terrorist attacks in the short run but would also add to the alienation of Baluch youth, driving them, in the long term, into the fold of those advocating lethal tactics. The sooner we realise this simple fact, the better.

The writer is a former police officer and NACTA's first National Coordinator.



4. FATF Restrictions and Economic Terrorism

Senator Rehman Malik

Published in the Nation July 27th, 2020

FATF sanctions via the Grey List are in fact economic restrictions and it is a well-known internationally-recognised fact that economic restrictions are basically applied only to cripple the economy of a country. Pakistan has experienced direct economic sanctions/restrictions by the USA in the past. History reveals that the US has abruptly changed its policy towards Pakistan and has imposed sanctions with ill-motives. The attitude of America can easily be understood from 1988 to 2001, which revolved around the sanctions on Pakistan. During that era, the US imposed many sanctions on Pakistan to bring it under pressure. Pakistan's nuclear programme, missile proliferation, the saga of the Kashmir issue, and continuing bilateral nuclear standoff all became the cause of Pak-US strained relations from 1988-2001. In 1974, the US imposed an embargo and sanctions on Pakistan to interrupt its nuclear weapons programme. In 1990 again, right after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US banned the delivery of military equipment worth \$368 million and 28 F-16 air-crafts to Pakistan for which the country had already paid. During the President Clinton era, the Symington Amendment was imposed on Pakistan which states that uranium enhancement technology and nuclear weapons are not allowed to acquire or develop. This amendment was imposed due to the 1998 nuclear tests of Pakistan. Currently, Pakistan is under strict visa restrictions by the US under the Trump administration. The other countries under

US Visa restrictions include Guyana in 2001, the Gambia in 2016, Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra Leone in 2017, Burma and Laos in 2018. The United States has currently imposed commercial, economic, and financial embargo against Cuba. The United States has also applied economic, trade, scientific, and military sanctions against Iran. In 2019, these sanctions led to a sharp downturn in Iran's economy, pushing the value of its currency to record lows, hiked inflation rate, reduced foreign investments, and triggering public protests.

When in 2006, North Korea conducted its nuclear test, this attracted global attention, and as a result, sanctions were imposed on the country from the United Nations and many of its members, including the United States. The sanctions were aimed purely at destabilisation of the economy of North Korea and to stop its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This time, the US, with the active connivance of India, managed to implement indirect sanctions via FATF by bringing Pakistan in the grey list. I term it a tactic to first put Pakistan on the grey list and then make efforts to put it on the blacklist, which means heavy sanctions on Pakistan.

Successive governments of ours failed to get out of it as the right strategy is not adopted with effective international countermeasures. Basically, it was a deliberate attempt to prove our status as a terrorism-sponsoring state by attempting to establish our abetment in money laundering and then linking it to terrorism. As a nation, we must know that this is being done with ulterior motives to destabilise Pakistan by further crippling our economy.



The term economic terrorism is strictly defined to execute an attempt at economic destabilisation of a country, region, or a group by a certain group and it could be even a hostile country. Economic terrorism has been commonly used by state or non-state actors to secretly manipulate a nation's economy. In fact, this is part of the modern fifth generation warfare through proxy wars. In pursuit of political aims, the economic terrorism targets civilians of nations, developing countries and emerging economies is the prime target of the hostile states and groups. This is how sanctions derail the economies of the country as they are the most affected by it because the slowing of exports and imports collapses the country's ability to combat poverty. Sometimes the developed nations deliberately put sanctions on developing nations in order to use political moves against them by bringing their economy to the level of disintegration. Hence, the increase in poverty and destabilisation can cause revolts among the population and possible political destabilisation which results in an even more deteriorating situation just like we are gearing into it by hostile elements. On one side we are under pressure by the IMF/World Bank and USAID, and now, the final economic bouncer has come our way by FATF.

When FATF blacklists any country, it is extremely likely that it will be subject to economic sanctions and other prohibitive measures by FATF member states and other international organisations. It is now an established fact that money laundering is a trans-international crime and hence only Pakistan cannot be singled out and blamed for money laundering whereas India, despite international money laundering

reports has not been reprimanded for their crimes against FATF and UN charters.

In this context, Pakistan has fought the 'War on Terror' at the frontline as an ally of the US and UN, and our country has suffered heavily in terms of economy and loss of human life. As an ally, Pakistan has the right to expose countries or state-actors, who have tried to undermine the struggle against terror by indulging in money laundering in pursuit of their hidden agendas across the globe. I had earlier written an article wherein I had stated that it is unfortunate that we sacrificed more than 70,000 of our troops and civilians and yet we are facing FATF. This is despite the fact that Pakistan has been taking numerous legal and administrative measures against terrorism. The trend and the anti-Pakistan signals demonstrated in the report clearly show that FATF is not going to take Pakistan out of the grey list unless Pakistan and the US come to terms on pending matters. Pakistan will have to make extra efforts for its economic survival. The continuity of Pakistan being in the FATF's Grey List will bring huge financial problems for Pakistan which is already passing through the financial crisis. I hope the Government of Pakistan will take some sensible, pragmatic, and evidence-based measures before the FATF with the help of China which has already warned member countries not to politicise FATF and not to use the forum against Pakistan. China has clearly stated, "China does not want the FATF to be politicised by any single country. There are some countries which want to include Pakistan in the blacklist. They have political designs which China is against."



FATF RESTRICTIONS AND ECONOMIC TERRORISM

Pakistan must know that this is not FATF which needs to be satisfied but it is the USA that needs to be handled diplomatically by sorting our side issues with it. The higher ups in government must have a meeting at the highest level with the US, otherwise we will continue to make amendments in our laws but FATF will keep fattening its list of demands and we may find ourselves land in the blacklist over some minor compliance. Hence, we should handle the US, FATF, and the international community through our closely associated countries. We have messed up on our international matters before including on the Kulbhushan issue.

The US has complete hold over FATF, therefore, whatever measures or compliance are being taken by the government will not work unless we resolve the issue of Afghanistan. India and the US have a common agenda to get Pakistan into the FATF blacklist.

I pray and wish that FATF accepts our efforts and removes Pakistan from its grey list.

Note: Opinions expressed are solely my own and not necessarily to reflect the views or opinions of my party.

The writer is a former Minister of Interior Pakistan.



5. The Reincarnation of Terrorism

Imran Malik

Published in the Nation August 04th, 2020

India's futile and senseless efforts to weaken and subordinate Pakistan continue relentlessly. Its state-sponsored export of terrorism to Pakistan from Afghanistan and Iran persists. Its proteges, the various terrorist groups and their sleeper cells in Pakistan persevere as potent, latent threats.

India's foremost strategic objective was to establish its hegemony in the region. Pakistan was to be reduced to the status of a vassal state. It was to be isolated diplomatically, browbeaten into submission militarily, destroyed economically and forced into unrelenting internal turmoil. To that end, the disruption, delay and/or destruction of the CPEC-BRI too, acquired critical urgency for India.

India has historically adopted an unremitting multidimensional approach to harm Pakistan. On the internal (and economy) front it succeeded in motivating some unscrupulous political elements into opposing the indispensable Kalabagh Dam. Had it been constructed at the planned time it would have massively boosted Pakistan's economy and prosperity of the people. However, some of our so-called political stalwarts fell for the Indian guile and intrigue and opposed it on pseudo-nationalist grounds. It hurt Pakistan economically.

An even more dangerous ingress was made by India into Pakistan's body-politic through its patronage of an avowed political party raised on linguistic basis, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement. Apart from India's intelligence agency RAW's support, it also had the tacit backing of some western intelligence agencies. Although its India-sponsored leadership was headquartered and based in London, yet it exercised a violent, cruel, harrowing, suffocating and unsparing control over Karachi, the

economic centre of Pakistan. On cue from London (and on India's instigation) life in Karachi would be instantly paralysed through its militant wing and its gangs of hitmen. It pitilessly exploited its excruciating hold, political and militant power to destabilise Karachi and ruin Pakistan's economy. Karachi was maintained in a fitful state of perpetual panic and fear for years. This state of affairs continued till the party and its India-sponsored leadership was totally neutralised by decisive, synergetic and proactive operations by the Pakistan Army, Rangers, LEAs, intelligence agencies etc in Karachi.

In addition, India engaged the fringe and extremist elements of Pakistani society. Instead of joining the global War on Terror it mustered the so-called Islamic fundamentalists to its ranks to wage their concept of "jihad" against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. India thus joined cause and ranks with the terrorists, the international movement of Islamic fundamentalists, by supporting their agents wreaking havoc in Pakistan. Their terrorist activities in Pakistan caused more than 70000 casualties and a loss of US\$150-200 billion to the economy. Through its military operations, Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, Pakistan compellingly drove groups like the Al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jammāt-ur-Ahraar (JuA), ISIS, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and others out of Pakistan, under threat of extermination. They found welcome refuge in Afghanistan with their patrons, the India-controlled RAW-NDS combine! Thus, 'Terrorism Central' relocated to Afghanistan to continue its nefarious activities against Pakistan from across the Pak Afghan border.

In its efforts to further destabilise Pakistan and divert its attention away from Kashmir and the LOC, India further activated



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Pakistan's western front. It had ostensibly invested in Chabahar Port and other projects in Iran to create an alternative trade corridor to Afghanistan and the CARs bypassing Pakistan. However, the cover of Chabahar Port was exploited to establish its spy and terrorism networks against Pakistan. Kulbhushan Yadav, a serving Indian Navy Commander, was settled in Chabahar as the spymaster to organise terrorist activities in Balochistan to target CPEC-BRI and Karachi to threaten Pakistan's economy. He was picked up by Pakistani intelligence on one of his forays into Balochistan. The Indians are also sponsoring dissident elements like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Republican Army, (BRA) etc to carry out terrorist activities in Balochistan. Their operations are controlled from New Delhi. Of late, an ostensible Sindhudesh Army has also sprung up. Its appearance has all the tell-tale signs of India's RAW.

However, the activities of Afghanistan-based, India-sponsored and RAW-NDS-controlled terrorist groups against Pakistan continue unabated. The TTP, JuA, LI, IS, BLA, BRA etc are the main groups involved. Of late they have targeted Chinese projects and interests in Pakistan to scare Chinese investment away. They regularly lay ambushes against Pakistan Army patrols along the Pakistan-Iran and Pakistan-Afghanistan borders and try to disrupt the fencing of these borders too. However, this does indicate that the terrorists are now largely restricted to the bad-lands of the border areas.

The UN's 26th Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning ISIS, Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities clearly states that these terrorist groups based in Afghanistan

are carrying out terrorist activities in Pakistan. It should have also identified that this "terrorist onslaught" against Pakistan is actually state-sponsored terrorism by India. It should also have highlighted that the RAW-NDS combine is the main instigator, perpetrator, organiser, supporter, supplier, financier and controller of these terrorist activities into Pakistan. It should have also stressed that this Indian financing, sponsorship and export of terror into Pakistan needs to attract relevant international laws and covenants like the FATF and invoke pertinent sanctions. The western powers are overwhelmed by their economic interests in the Indian market and have thus forsaken all values and ethics of justice, fair play and morality. Ironically, their approach to the financing of terrorism is overtly duplicitous with deep strategic connotations. They find the freedom struggle in Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IOJ&K) as Pakistan sponsored terrorism but are oddly mum and even condescending of the Indian financed and sponsored terrorism emanating from Afghanistan and Iran into Pakistan! This duplicity is unfathomable. India should have been held responsible and accountable for its repugnant state sponsored terrorism in IOJ&K and against Pakistan.

Paradoxically, there is an inevitable convergence of interests between India and the US-led West in the total disruption/destruction of the CPEC-BRI. Could the readily-available 'Terrorism Central' then be reincarnated and mustered for this express purpose and to spread unmitigated terror anew in the region?

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6. Hate Against Islam

Malik Muhammad Ashraf

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Needless to emphasize that mutually hostile sentiments between Muslims and Christians, the major religious entities and civilisations of the world, have always been there in one form or the other. But these feelings were never manifested in an extremist ferment. Different societies had accepted multifarious cultural co-existence as a way of life and modern-day reality. However, 9/11 has changed the global scenario most radically. There has been a phenomenal rise in the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiment—also called Islamophobia—in western societies. Islam has come to be identified with violence provoking angry and catastrophic reactions by individuals and groups harbouring anti-Islam feelings.

The ugliest manifestation of Islamophobia was witnessed in Christchurch in New Zealand last year when 50 Muslim worshipers were killed in an attack on three mosques. It has been reported that some members of a far-right group have been arrested in Germany a few days ago who were planning a similar attack on mosques in Germany. Attacks on members of Muslim community, harassment of Muslim women and incidents of desecration of the Holy Quran have occurred with increased frequency.

No wonder that it has sent a wave of alarm among the global community and strong voices are being heard for promoting inter-faith harmony. Nations and different communities within them are realising the grave threat that this phenomenon poses to peace and tranquility within their societies

as well as at the global level, and have taken initiatives to discourage this hate syndrome and promote religious harmony.

The biggest proponent of inter-faith harmony is Pope Francis who is on record to have repeatedly said, “It is not right to identify Islam with violence as all religions have a small fundamentalist group as such faith is not the only cause of terrorism. Social injustice and idolatry of money are the prime causes of terrorism. If I speak of Islamic violence, I have to speak of Catholic violence. Not all Muslims are violent.” The Pope is right on the money in his analysis of the causes of terrorism and in dispelling the impression of all Muslims being violent. He has also tried to reach out to Muslims by visiting several countries in Asia and Africa, showing solidarity with Muslim communities affected by violence against them.

But regrettably, Islamophobia continues to raise its ugly head sporadically. Last week, some anti-Islam elements indulged in the desecration of the Holy Quran in Norway and Sweden which invoked a strong reaction by the Muslim community. Pakistan rightly condemned the incidents saying “The rise of such Islamophobic occurrences goes against the spirit of any religion. Freedom of speech cannot justify religious hatred. Ensuring respect for religious beliefs of others is a collective responsibility and is absolutely critical for global peace and prosperity”.

While hate against Muslims in the West remains confined to individuals and far-right groups the redeeming factor is that it is not practiced as a state policy by any country. The only country which regrettably is engaged in anti-Muslim acts



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as a state policy is India under BJP regime headed by Narendra Modi. The BJP government inebriated by the RSS ideology of 'Hindutva' which aims to reshape India as a Hindu state has been pursuing communal policies, mostly targeting the Muslim minority.

The BJP government first deprived 1.9 million Muslims in Assam of Indian citizenship and then followed it up with the Citizenship Amendment Act which seeks to grant citizenship to six persecuted minority communities from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan—except Muslims. These two anti-Muslim legislations provoked countrywide protests, particularly against the Citizenship Amendment Act. To quell this movement, BJP activists were let loose on the demonstrators and the law enforcing agencies remained a silent spectator while Muslims were being butchered. More than 50 Muslims were killed during the protest movement. It was manifestly state-terrorism against its own citizens.

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in an article published in *The Hindu* on March 6, referring to the situation in Delhi said, "Delhi has become subjected to extreme violence over the past few weeks. We have lost nearly 50 of our fellow Indians for no reason. Several hundred people have suffered injuries. Communal tensions have been stoked and flames of religious intolerance fanned by unruly sections of our society, including the political class. University campuses, public places and private homes are bearing the brunt of communal outbursts of violence, reminiscent of the dark periods in India's history. Institutions of law and order have

abandoned their dharma to protect citizens. Institutions of justice and the fourth pillar of democracy, the media, have also failed us. Just in a matter of a few years, India has slid rapidly from being a global showcase of a model of economic development through liberal democratic methods to a strife ridden majoritarian state".

A renowned Indian writer, political and human rights activist Dr Arundhati Roy joined the protests against anti-Muslims laws and remarked "you cannot get more raw and open fascist than this. These laws are breaking the back of the Indian constitution. The Citizenship Amendment Bill and the National Register of Citizens combined together are making petitioners out of the entire population. The Act is anti-Muslim even it was meant only for undocumented immigrants. To discriminate against Muslims, to leave out Sri Lankan refugees and to not talk about persecuted Muslim minorities in other countries is unconstitutional. When you say that citizenship will be based on the government scrutiny of a certain set of documents, this is what happened in 1935 Germany, these were what were known as the Nuremberg laws."

Unfortunately, the Indian government has not stopped at only these anti-Muslim legislative measures within India but has also taken this hate syndrome to Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir. The BJP government first scrapped Article 370 of the Indian constitution, ending special status of the state followed by annexation of the state through the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act and finally bringing in a new domicile law meant to change demographic realities, in blatant violation



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of the UN resolutions, bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan and the 4th Geneva Convention.

IIOK is under siege and complete lockdown since August 5, and the Indian security forces have killed more than 200 Kashmiris in extra-judicial killings while the world maintains criminally indifferent to their plight. Indian security forces even attacked a Muharram procession and reportedly killed ten people and injured many.

India's belligerent disposition towards Pakistan, its Muslim neighbour, also poses a grave threat to peace and security in the region. One really wonders when the world would realise that Muslim lives in India and IIOK also matter and the Indian Islamophobia needs to be stopped in its tracks before it is too late.

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7. Daesh's Growing Influence in the Region

Senator Rehman Malik

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I have been watching the fast growth of Daesh in the region and I was the first one who pointed out the presence of ISIS, but successive governments have been refusing to accept its presence just as a policy. In fact, I have always been advocating that Daesh is very much in Pakistan. The Daesh handlers recruited over 80 thousand Pakistanis mostly from south Punjab. The recent ouster of Pakistani Daesh operators from Syria finally landed in Turkey where they were checked and interviewed by our agencies in Istanbul, which was coordinated by the Council General Pakistan embassy. The last I heard, there were around 8000 operators who had reported for help to return to Pakistan. In fact, we have already got thousands of trained boys from Daesh. It is an alarming situation for the government as these trained ones are the asset of ISIS present in Pakistan and after returning from Syria/Turkey they have gone to their home districts. We have another potential threat of ISIS and Pakistani Taliban relations.

Now, the estranged Pakistani Taliban leaders have also shunned their differences in light of Daesh's growing foothold and joint anti-terror operations by the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. On August 17, the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) and the Hizb-ul-Ahrar(HuA)—the two militant groups that splintered from the TTP—announced they would merge back into one fearsome terror outfit, pledging their allegiance to its chief Mufti Noor Wali. Daesh's Khorasan chapter, also known as ISIS-K, also poses a

new challenge to the TTP. It has caused further splintering in the group because Daesh's extremely radical ideology and substantial financial resources have attracted a number of disgruntled leaders from the TTP, including senior commanders like Hafiz Saeed Khan and Haji Daud, the former chief of the Taliban in Karachi. Khan, who operated in a tribal district Orakzai, joined Daesh in October 2014 and he was killed in 2016 in a US drone attack. The JuA had also briefly joined Daesh for a few months in late 2014.

In July, the UN Security Council also put Wali on the Daesh and Al Qaeda sanctions list, designating him as a global terrorist for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, or perpetrating of acts or activities.” The recent UN report was a trigger factor behind this unification alongside long-term future development under Wali. It is estimated that more than 10,000 Daesh terrorists remain active in Iraq and Syria two years after the extremist group's defeat, and their attacks have significantly increased this year. The Daesh/ISIS terror group has increased its attacks in Iraq, especially in rural areas, amid political instability and security weakness in the country as well as the US-led coalition forces' withdrawal due to the coronavirus outbreak.

Daesh has been trying to strengthen its operational capability in rural areas since mass protests against the Iraqi government erupted in October in the capital Baghdad and southern provinces. The pandemic's impact on Daesh recruitment and fundraising activities remains unclear, and there is no clear indication of a change in the terrorist group's strategic direction



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under its leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi.

The attacks on mosques in Pakistan, election rallies, and security forces have killed dozens of people, affecting Pakistan's economic ambitions, and making it very clear that the Daesh is a bigger threat to Pakistan than to India. I am sorry to say it will grow to become more lethal.

The group's ability to strike alliances with militant organisations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan splinter group is continuously expanding its longevity and resilience, and becoming a threat not only to Afghanistan and Pakistan but also other regional countries, Central Asian republics, Russia, and China. Amid its blame games, India is facing the same threat. The President of Tajikistan and its interior minister told me how Daesh is expanding in his country and most of them have trained in Afghanistan. There are nearly six Daesh training centres where ETMI and some Iranians are getting training to be launched in their respective home countries. Turkey recognised Daesh as a terrorist organisation in 2013 but I blame Turkey as they were part of the collation countries to help in raising Daesh against Syria and I advised President Gul and his foreign minister in the presence of President Asif Ali Zardari to not to support this terrorist group as they will come against Turkey as the Taliban came at our throat. The world witnessed the suffering of Turkey in the hands of ISIS. Since then, the country has been attacked by Daesh terrorists numerous times, including 10 suicide bombings, seven bombings, and four armed attacks that killed 315 people

and injured hundreds. In response, Turkey has launched military and police operations inside the country and abroad. Turkey also captured top Daesh terrorists in counterterror operations at home and Syria.

On March 6, 2020, ISIL gunmen killed 32 people and injured over 80 people at a ceremony in Kabul, on 25 March 2020, ISIL killed 25 people in a Gurdwara in Kabul, and on 12 May 2020, gunmen executed a mass shooting at a hospital's maternity ward. 80 patients were evacuated, 24 victims, including newborn babies, mothers, and nurses, killed by the gunmen, and all three attackers killed by the army; An hour after the Kabul attack, a suicide bombing took place in Kuz Kunar, Nangarhar Province at the funeral of a police commander, killing 32 mourners and injuring 133 others. ISIL was thought to be responsible for the Kabul shooting although the Afghan government blamed the Taliban for it; ISIL claimed responsibility for the Kuz Kunar bombing. On August 3, 2020, ISIL launched an attack on an Afghan prison that left at least 29 dead.

Whereas now the United States is providing support to the Taliban in its fight against ISIS but according to reports, ISIS is also being used against the Taliban and selectively against governments. Taliban units actively engaged in fighting with ISIS-K," the ISIS branch in Afghanistan. The U.S. also carried out strikes on known ISIS-K locations but emphasised that those strikes were not coordinated with the Taliban and there was hardly any damage but an eyewash planned operation to show that the USA is not on the side. Although the US is emphasising that the Taliban would defeat ISIS, should the US leave the territory but some analysts caution that the



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US clearly knows about ISIS real motives as the leaders of IS-Khorasan, like their counterparts in Iraq and Syria, seem to be less focused on holding territory, instead of looking to lay the groundwork for a larger resurgence after US forces leave Afghanistan and the USA will inverse the funding for ISIS and ISIS will be used against Pakistan and China and partly against Russia. US intelligence indicates that despite having lost territory in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, IS-Khorasan still has strongholds in Herat province and parts of Kabul, while maintaining smaller cells in Helmand, Kapisa, and Baghlan provinces.

There are also indications that IS-Khorasan is focusing on more global ambitions. There have been many attacks on President Ashraf Ghani and reports are that these are usually combined operations of ISIS and Taliban and those who want to eliminate him. I foresee more attempts on Ashraf Ghani in the near future and we will yet see a new group of followers of late Dr Najeeb Ullah emerging with some others duly sponsored by certain countries including RAW which has already established a deep relationship and RAW demonstrated its action with ISIS in Sri Lanka to ensure Sri Lanka to follow Indian policy.

I warn the government and the agencies to please prepare an anti-Daesh Counter National Action Plan as it is likely to be used against us. It is shocking to note that ISIS has been carrying out attacks worldwide except for the US lately and ISIS will never attack against the USA & more over USA will further destabilise South Asia and the Middle East through proxy wars.

ISIS claimed to have done the deadliest attacks on Niger's military, which left 71

soldiers dead and 12 wounded. The attack happened when several hundred heavily armed militants ambushed soldiers at an outpost in the west of the country near the Mali border, according to the defence minister, Daesh picks those countries as its targets where there is grouping because of the political instability. Niger which is named after the long river called Niger. This entire region remained under the influence of Libya but after the fall of Col. Al-Gaddafi it is now gone under the influence of France and Nigeria and also under USA influence but both the countries are the targets of ISIS whereas the Ivory coast, DRC Congo, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan continue to under intense internal fights and ISIS will be used in these countries as ISIS has turned out to be the best tool for proxy war especially in the Muslim States.

On February 2, 2020 two people were stabbed in Streatham, London, and one more had minor injuries and the perpetrator, Sudesh Amman, who was a fighter of Islamic State and had previously praised it, was shot dead by police. It looks as if the USA itself does not want immediate peace in Afghanistan and is playing a game to keep Pakistan and President Ashraf Ghani under pressure.

Author's note: Opinions expressed are solely my own and not necessarily to reflect the views or opinions of my party.

The writer is a former Minister of Interior Pakistan.



8. While FATF Sleeps

Dr. Usman W. Chohan

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The world was yet again left aghast by the scale of global money laundering when the recent FinCEN leaks were brought to public attention. The litany of files, assiduously studied and revealed by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), covers an 18-year period worth of suspicious transactions worth a colossal \$2 trillion. Even then, files that comprise the FinCEN leaks are thought to amount to a mere 0.02 percent of total reports filed by banks with FinCEN during that period.

For its part, FinCEN is a branch of the US Treasury which receives “suspicious activity reports” (SARs) filed by banks as part of their oversight of transactions. Filing an SAR is not the only measure banks are meant to take; it is in fact just the very first step in maintaining a strong anti-money laundering oversight regime. What comes out from the ICIJ’s study of the FinCEN files gives us an indication of just how international capital has been laundered into a parallel economy that benefits only very limited but powerful global interests.

Who are the culprits involved in all this dirty money? If one were to believe the politicised gimmicks of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan would be #1 on the list and sure to be blacklisted for monstrous financial crimes. Yet the biggest money-launderers identified by far include JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of New York Mellon. North American and European banks are in fact the worst perpetrators of money laundering in the world, and FinCEN helps to cement that

realisation of the West’s culpability in global money laundering.

Where does Pakistan fit into the FinCEN files? According to the preliminary analysis, there is a mere \$2.5 million of supposed money laundering in FinCEN’s leaked SARs. In other words, Pakistani SARs amount to a tiny drop in the ocean (\$2.5 million out of more than \$2 trillion), a paltry sum if there ever was one. This begs the question of why Pakistan is constantly singled out for the FATF’s grey list and possible blacklisting.

This is particularly true when one examines the presence of Indian banking institutions among the FinCEN files, which flag \$890 million potentially suspicious transactions that involve almost all major Indian lenders (\$400m outbound and \$490m inbound). In other words, the value of Indian suspicious transactions might be 400 times larger than that in Pakistan. But does the international financial sanctions regime take note of this?

It is baffling to see why the FATF constantly singles out Pakistan, given that the scope of global money laundering is in fact countless orders of magnitude greater in the West, not to mention India. Yet the Western capitals point their fingers incessantly at Pakistan’s financial oversight. It goes without saying that, if one were to take global money laundering seriously, one would in fact sanction New York, London, and Frankfurt to the hilt.

But of course, that is not the real purpose of the FATF in global financial regulation, and the fact that the FinCEN files shed new light on suspicious international financial activity is an indictment of the FATF’s misguided zeal. Where was the FATF in



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uncovering the transactions shown by the FinCEN? and why has civil society (the ICIJ) had to take the initiative in revealing global money laundering?

Sadly, the same question could have been posed of the FATF with each major leak that has occurred in the past decade, including: the Panama Papers (2016), the Paradise Papers (2017), the Lux Leaks (2014), and the Swiss Leaks (2015). The scope of money laundering, fraud, organised crime, and terrorist financing continues to grow, all under the FATF's nose. Its discriminatory and selective approach towards a country such as Pakistan belies how poorly the FATF has fared in controlling what it was meant to control around the world since its founding in 1989.

This is not to say that the FATF's recommendations should not be followed in Pakistan. Far from it, Pakistan requires an accountable, dynamic, transparent, and well-regulated financial architecture driven by the rule of law and financial professionalism. But the FATF's attempts to brutally cage the world's fifth largest population is a wretched attempt at that goal.

We should also note that, in treating money laundering and suspicious financial activity as a global problem, the solution will not be found in shackling the doors of rural seminaries in the Third World. Rather, it will be found in bringing to account those in pinstripe suits behind swanky glass offices in major world capitals. If not, money laundering will continue to swell and worsen, all while the FATF sleeps.

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9. Cancerous Ethno-Sectarianism in Pakistan

Imran Malik

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Pakistan should draw the right lessons from the epoch-making geopolitical developments underway in the Greater Middle East Region (GMER). Unbridled ambitions to dominate the region and rampant ethno-sectarianism have caused unbridgeable divisions amongst the Muslim states of the GMER. The US-Israel Combine has pitilessly exploited these weaknesses to split and literally subjugate them. The Persian Gulf resultantly divides the GMER on ethno-sectarian lines, between Arab and non-Arab, between Sunni and Shia!

Pakistan is faced with a similar predicament. One of its most critical internal fault-lines is the scourge of ethno-sectarianism which stubbornly refuses to die. This vulnerability has been exploited by the Indians through a ruthless 5GW and hybrid war against it. India's multidimensional assault on Pakistan has included fanning ethno-sectarian issues too. It unabashedly sponsors separatist ethno-terrorist outfits like the BLA, BRA, BLF, PTM, Sindhudesh Liberation Army etc. Sectarian/sub-sect disharmony too has been the bane of Pakistani society. The presence of proactive militant wings of sectarian groups/sub-groups like the Lashkar e Jhangvi, Sipah e Sahaba, Sipah e Muhammad etc provide ample hunting grounds for the Indians to exploit. Ironically, these militant wings are fighting others' wars on Pakistani turf against fellow Pakistanis! This environment is further vitiated by Indian sponsored and abetted terrorism. The RAW-NDS cabal operates from Afghanistan (and RAW from Iran too) and sponsors, funds, trains, equips, directs and launches terrorist groups like ISIS-K, TTP, JuA, IMU, etc into Pakistan for sabotage, subversion and terrorist activities.

This conundrum thus portends a vicious three-dimensional threat to Pakistan's solidarity, integrity and economic well-being (BRI-CPEC). Each threatens to harm Pakistan through its own singular fanaticism. Their menace will assume perilous dimensions were they to crossover (Indian machinations) and start operating in each other's domains—for or against one another, with or without concurrence or consent! Either way, they make for an explosive concoction which could create grave existentialist threats for Pakistan!

For the moment, the ethnic, sectarian and terrorist groups are largely operating independent of one another. Pakistan must ensure that it stays that way. Such crossover activities have taken place in the erstwhile FATA during the mid-to-late 80s. Terrorists acting on behalf of the erstwhile KGB-RAW-KHAD Combine would move at night to fire mortars, rockets and heavy machine guns into a village of one of the sects and then move and repeat the process in a village of the other sect. This would create a perception where both sects would feel that the other had attacked them and would lead to unmitigated inter-sect violence. Similar exploitation is possible even today. The Indians could still play one sect against the other, covertly or even overtly through their sleeper cells or through the ethnic and/or terrorist outfits operating from Afghanistan and Iran. In any case, these terrorist organisations have their own religious/sectarian idiosyncrasies and would not be too averse to oblige.

Pakistan must guard itself against this triple jeopardy, the ethno-sectarian-terrorist threat. It must not allow any one of them to reinforce the efforts of the other one or both. They must be isolated and neutralised, piecemeal. In particular, it must not allow the ethno-sectarian elements to be exploited by the Afghanistan or Iran-based terrorist elements. It must ensure that the sleeper cells do not foment further trouble by



arousing ethno-sectarian emotions. The success of Operation Rad ul Fasaad thus becomes imperative, inevitable. Pakistan must establish and assert its writ and control over all ethnic and sectarian activities in the country. It must continue to carry out effective counterterrorism operations inside the country. The fencing on the borders with Iran and Afghanistan must be completed, post haste.

Of the three, the sectarian threat is the most crucial to overcome.

A well-structured, duly authorised joint body must be formed under the Ministries of Interior and Religious Affairs, with a clearly enunciated articulation of command. It must comprise relevant government officials at the federal and provincial levels, representative members of all sects/subjects and experts from all LEAs and intelligence outfits. It must have sub-bodies at the division, district and lower levels for better oversight, control and management. It must be made responsible for fostering peace and harmony between the sects. It must also be the first forum where all complaints or disputes of a sectarian nature could be heard and resolved. It must have oversight and primary authority to adjudicate over such sectarian issues. It must pre-empt sectarian disharmony through a well-considered plan of action. It must ensure that no sect feels undone by the (mis)deeds of the others. Dispute resolution must be provided promptly and on the scene of occurrence. Matters may only go to the formal legal/judicial processes after having failed at this level.

Leaders of all religious/sectarian parties must be made aware of the latent dangers inherent in such sectarian strife in the current strategic environment. Jointly, they must promote and ensure inter-sect harmony. They must be held personally responsible for the (mis)conduct of their followers. Pakistan must legislate control

and strict governmental oversight on all types of Madaris in the country. The Single National Curriculum is a step in the right direction and must include inter-sect harmony as an important part of the syllabi. All foreign funding to the Madaris and sectarian outfits must be outlawed. Any clandestine foreign or domestic funding that promotes or instigates sectarian disharmony must attract the provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terror Financing laws; and where required, a proper diplomatic response. The Government of Pakistan may take it upon itself to fund these Madaris equitably, if possible. Media must be denied the leeway to fan or arouse sectarian differences, rather it be (t)asked to deliberately promote sectarian harmony. Distribution of all forms of hate or derogatory material and instigation of inter-sect violence must attract the harshest provisions of the relevant anti-terrorism laws.

United, Pakistan is invincible. Sectarian harmony reinforces all its strengths. The enemy must not be allowed to create and/or exploit any cracks in our unity. Pakistan needs a whole of the nation approach to forestall these threats with rabid sectarianism being the prime one!

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10. Policing Principles

Tariq Khosa

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THE nine principles Sir Robert Peel laid down in 1829 when he established the London Metropolitan Police remain relevant today:

“1) The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. 2) The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon the public approval of police actions. 3) Police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public. 4) The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionally to the necessity of the use of physical force.

“5) Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion, but by ... demonstrating ... impartial service to the law. 6) Police can use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient. 7) Police ... should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police.... 8) Police should ... direct their action strictly towards their functions, and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary. 9) The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.”

The police have failed to gain the people’s trust.

Unfortunately, police in Pakistan have failed to gain citizens’ trust. We often find a nexus between compliant police commanders and political leaders who disregard the rule of law. The rulers’ hold over police through transfers, postings, promotions and other administrative and operational matters has destroyed discipline and morale in the ranks. The real sufferers are the people for whom the traits of good governance, merit, fairness, impartiality, integrity, efficiency and courage of conviction in police services are missing.

These features require a greater understanding of the principles of superintendence and autonomy, external and internal accountability, and professionalism and service delivery. Some of the following points I have made earlier but they are important to reiterate.

Superintendence: i) The responsibility of this may vest in the government but does not mean the latter should use police to settle political scores. The government’s role is to set policy direction, not select officers at whim and meddle in the force’s administrative and operational affairs. ii) While parliament, the courts, media and civil society are external accountability mechanisms, non-political institutions are required to provide the police and public with safeguards against extraneous influences. iii) An effective criminal justice system is impossible without the help of an impartial, independent police. For this, ensuring the security of tenure for two to three years for police commanders and allowing them a free hand in internal administrative and financial matters is a must.



POLICING PRINCIPLES

Accountability: i) Concerns about police corruption, misuse of authority, illegal detentions, torture, faulty investigations, etc must be addressed. The centre and provinces must prioritise setting up independent police complaints authorities, headed by reputed retired judges or police officers. ii) Internal accountability branches and district-level public complaints mechanism installed across Pakistan on Supreme Court orders in 2019 should be strengthened. iii) Governments should never condone staged police encounters. Every encounter causing death must be independently probed. iv) Corrupt police officials should be weeded out through new legislation or by amending present laws.

Professionalism: i) The metropolitan model of policing should be established in large cities where small-scale police stations may be replaced with divisions headed by SPs. This would not downgrade the SPs but upgrade a basic police unit giving it preventive, detective, law and order, traffic and record management systems under one roof managed by a senior officer. ii) The

IGs should create a merit-based pool of SHOs and SDPOs.

iii) A pool of investigators is an urgent need as a specialised sub-cadre requiring high levels of competence and integrity.

iv) Crime scene units must be established in each district and sub-division and a manual for first responders and investigators prepared; v) As recommended by the Police Reform Committee, district-level committees should be formed to analyse bails granted and acquittals recorded to identify loopholes in investigation, prosecution and trial. vi) Massive retraining and attitudinal changes are needed. Empathy for disadvantaged sections must be emphasised in police ranks.

The message is clear for our politicians: they must choose between strong institutions with an effective role in administration of justice or continue with a fractured system where a weakened police keeps capitulating to the power wielders.

The writer is former IG Police and author of *The Faltering State and Inconvenient Truths*



11. Perils of Sectarianism

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in the DAWN, October 04th, 2020

SECTARIANISM is so deep-rooted in our society that even the state deems it ‘normal’ and does not react unless extremist manifestations of the phenomenon start turning ugly. The state’s typical response entails the ‘concealment and appeasement’ approach, which was evident from its dealing with the recent upsurge in sectarian tensions in the country.

Since August this year, Shia-Sunni tensions have been on the rise. Reportedly, it all started after a Shia orator was alleged to have uttered some derogatory remarks in a small gathering in Islamabad. When outrage on social media grew, moderate religious scholars from the two sects tried to cool the situation down. However, banned sectarian outfits and radical Sunni organisations did not want to squander the ‘opportunity’ to flex their muscles and showcase their strength. The state allowed them to hold countrywide protests, but also ensured that there was a complete blackout of mainstream media coverage in order to contain the impact and give the impression of normalcy.

Meanwhile, state institutions engaged religious leaders to develop a legal draft to protect the honour of the family members and companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The draft of the bill, which was shared with religious scholars, would be called the Paigham-i-Pakistan bill. Paigham-i-Pakistan was a declaration against terrorism and extremism signed by hundreds of religious scholars of all sects in 2018 under the supervision of state

institutions. For the first-time in Pakistan, a consensus religious decree categorically defined ‘jihad’ as being the purview of the state and disallowed the use of force to compel obedience to Islamic laws.

Recent countrywide protests have exposed the flawed strategy of the state.

It was ironic that banned groups were made custodians of Paigham-i-Pakistan and encouraged to launch a countrywide campaign in support of the state-led initiative. This also projected the leaders of violent groups as if they had abandoned their hateful ideologies and narratives. These groups were indeed using Paigham-i-Pakistan as a tool for their survival, with a view to keeping their networks intact. The recent sectarian campaign has exposed both the flawed strategy of the state and the dual face of the extremist groups’ leadership. The same religious leaders who had been preaching sectarian tolerance until last year suddenly took to the streets with slogans of hatred.

It is not possible for an organisation that is at its core sectarian and violent to change its ideology overnight. These radical groups had gone into hibernation under the cover of Paigham-i-Pakistan. One can imagine the consequences of the re-emergence of banned sectarian groups. It has taken the country decades to reduce levels of sectarian violence, but this time the situation can get even worse because Bareilvi organisations have also come into competition in hatred against Shias.

It is not that state institutions were naïve in not knowing the impact of the country’s increasing sectarian divide, but that their approaches to counter it have certain flaws.



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They might have considered the political utility of religious groups, but on one level the state is also scared of ‘mullah power’.

As has been discussed several times in these pages, religion is at the core of nationalism in Pakistan and the establishment is too barren to visualise anything else. Religious scholars and clergy know this weakness of the state. Religious sloganeering remains at the heart of Pakistani politics, irrespective of military or civilian regimes. The clergy can also challenge the religious credentials of the national leadership, putting them in an awkward position and eroding their moral authority. This is a dangerous built-in tendency among religious groups, and state institutions try to manage them through multiple appeasement strategies, offering lucrative positions in government, and bargaining on their demands.

Call it a matter of expediency or a rational, cogent affair, but the relationship the state and religious circles have developed over the decades is pushing society deeper into extremism. Though there is an impression that Pakistan’s power elites are largely secular in their social lives, is it possible for the sectarian divide to widen and for them to remain immune to it?

Many political analysts fear that the state’s alliance with the clergy will eventually lead the country to an exclusive political structure, with an exclusive religious and sectarian identity. The same process is happening in neighbouring India, where the BJP government is excluding religious minorities from its neo-nationalist plan.

The contents of the prospective Paigham-i-Pakistan bill have not yet been revealed, but, strangely, the whole process is

superseding parliament. The Constitution already protects religious identity and the rights of the majority. The new bill can disturb the social contract, which provides minimum safeguards for the country’s inclusivity.

The Punjab Assembly passed the Punjab Tahaffuz Bunyad-i-Islam (protecting the foundation of Islam) Bill this year. Though there is no comparison between both bills, they reflect the governments’ approach towards religion. If the PTI government thinks that more religious legislation will convert Pakistan into the state of Madina, it is naïvety on its part, as it will only empower the religious clergy who are under the influence of extremists.

Religious extremism weakens national and social cohesion and also divides loyalties. The leaderships of many banned sectarian groups are more loyal to their respective capitals of ideological resonance, from where they also extract financial resources. Even when there were foreign travel restrictions on the leaders of banned organisations, they regularly visited Gulf states for pilgrimages and long stays. Many of them still enjoy the full security protocols provided by these states.

The sectarian divide is dangerous and cannot be bridged through policies of appeasement. It requires a dialogue within the communities and stakeholders at every level, but there can be no alternative to parliament-led engagement.

The writer is a security analyst.



12. Resurging Terrorism

Current incidents of terrorism are either propelled by ethno-nationalism or by religious militancy

Syed Akhtar Ali Shah

Published in the Express Tribune October 07th, 2020

Three militants killed in an encounter in Malakand division; Balochistan CM condemns attacks on FC; two terrorists killed in Naurang; soldier martyred, three injured in blast in North Waziristan; four terrorists killed in encounter near Bahawalpur; two traffic policemen among five injured in Peshawar blast; two soldiers martyred in North Waziristan; retired SSG commando killed in encounter; soldier martyred in North Waziristan attack; seven terror suspects killed in two operations in K-P; officer martyred, 2 terrorists killed during security operation in DI Khan: ISPR; two terrorists killed in gun battle were TTP members: Langove; FIR of Quetta mosque bombing registered.

The above are few of the recent headlines from the newspapers amplifying the gravity of the landscape of terrorism.

Although independent sources such as AP also reported that terror attacks in Pakistan dropped by more than 85% as compared to figures 10 years ago, the problem is far from over. The figures indicated by the reports found that terror attacks dropped from nearly 2,000 in 2009 to fewer than 250 in 2019. Similarly, the United States Institute of Peace also expressed more or less the same views stating therein that the country continued to be grappling with multiple sources of internal and external conflict. While incidences of domestic terrorism have reduced, in part due to measures taken by the Pakistani state,

extremism and intolerance of diversity has grown.

The South Asian Portal indicates that 136 incidents — featuring the killing of 142 civilians, 137 security forces personnel as well as eight terrorists — took place in the year 2019. As compared to 2019, with figures till October 1, 2020, where the incidents of killing accounted for 140, which included the killing of 112 civilians, 140 security forces personnel and 124 terrorists.

Even though the aforementioned figures and events have occurred in different parts of the country at different times, they are not to be taken in isolation. These are not the acts of isolated individuals or of a specific gang but are orchestrated by well-organised networks possessing enormous resources. As such, thorough analysis is needed to diagnose and solve the issue.

The current incidents of terrorism are the offshoots of militancy of two different dimensions; one propelled by ethno-nationalism and the other by religious militancy. The focus of this discourse is more on the religiously motivated militancy. This breed of militancy is of transnational character, drawing inspiration not only from local leaders but also across borders. Therefore, the developments within our region and the Middle East cannot be delinked. The stronger the Taliban get in Afghanistan, the greater will be the impact on militant organisations within Pakistan, as such organisations have been drawing their inspirational support from Mullah Umar and Tehreek-i-Taliban Afghanistan.



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Reports from various sources suggest that Al Qaeda has not been completely eliminated and is still operative. Analysts of international repute have not been able to certify whether the Taliban have cut their ties with Al Qaeda or provided demonstrable proof of doing so. The UN reports of 2019 and May 2020 also suggest that the Taliban met frequently and remained in contact with Al Qaeda to coordinate “operational planning, training and the provision by the Taliban of safe havens for Al Qaeda members inside Afghanistan”. This aspect is also quite worrying from the Pakistani perspective.

Afghanistan has observed an escalation in the level of violence since the inking of the Doha agreement between the US and the Taliban. During the talks, the Taliban had been adamant that they would not stop violence and go ahead with their jihad till an eventual takeover of Kabul and the government based on the strict interpretation of Sharia. The past experiences have shown that negotiations have been used as tools to capture power. The Taliban in Pakistan and other militant organisations also harp on the same theory.

The strategic goal of the militant organisation is to establish the Islamic Emirate with no scope for pluralism. The word of the caliph or ameer in such a polity assumes finality. Such groups avoid facing the organised might of the state, and making tactical retreats whenever military operations are launched. They remain at bay, gain time and space, regroup and then strike with regular intervals in order to preserve their human resource, while still remaining effective.

In this backdrop, the recent organisational restructuring of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan under the leadership of Noor Wali

Mehsud — who has political exposure and is considered a religious scholar, ideologue and author of a book — is quite alarming. Reportedly, rather than being carried away by short-lived tactical dividends, he adopted a long-term plan, using all his energies on a strategic reorientation of the group.

The major focus of Wali has remained on re-articulating TTP’s ideological orientation. He has simultaneously issued a code of conduct to infuse organisational discipline within the terror group. Ever since, the organisation is regularly circulating a propaganda magazine, Mujallah Taliban, to highlight the group’s position on different issues. The TTP also got published two issues of Sunnat-e-Khula, a magazine focusing on female recruitment and radicalisation in Pakistan.

In this context, a current UN report has suggested that there were 6,000 to 6,500 TTP militants in Afghanistan. This number, along with the aforementioned mergers as well as dormant supporters within Pakistan poses a serious threat to our security. This also means that militant organisations are still capable of recruitment, training and execution, and an imminent counter-terrorism challenge to Pakistan. It also raises question marks on our efforts to exhibit zero tolerance against extremism leading to violence. It is high time for us to implement all the 20 points of the National Action Plan, lest it is late and we have to pay a higher price.

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13. Narrative Warfare

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

Published in DAWN, October 08th, 2020

The battle of narratives is the least understood aspect of countering extremism and terrorism. Engaging primarily in hard approaches means states maintain a monopoly over countering extremism, with little input from civil society, which gives extremist groups an advantage. But killing terrorists alone won't kill their ideology; thus it is necessary to adopt a more diagnostic and holistic approach.

Extremists use emotional appeals couched in generalities about victimhood, brotherhood, jihad, liberation, conquest, caliphate, etc to attract young disaffected followers. Democracy is deemed an illusion, and violence the only means for change. In Egypt, the ouster and death of Morsi further strengthened this belief, helped reconstruct the jihadist narrative, and intensified the debate on conceptual vs operational caliphate.

In announcing the establishment of an operational caliphate in 2014, the militant Islamic State group found an opportunity to undermine Al Qaeda, which struggled for decades but failed to establish one through its conceptual approach. IS took full advantage of technology and online spaces to expand its influence, and argued that a caliphate could only be established through territorial gains. They claimed Al Qaeda was a mere organisation, whereas they were a 'state'.

In developing their narratives, the authors of extremist ideologies sought to establish historical linkages as well as adapt to their target audiences. The narrative of Al Qaeda

included violent jihad, implementation of Sharia, freedom from external influence, territorial integrity of the ummah, protection of resources and an ideal Islamic empire. In 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri sought to simplify Al Qaeda's concept of caliphate. With IS's emergence, Al Qaeda projected itself as a less sectarian organisation, the sole 'pragmatic' option. In his earlier writings, Zawahiri supported attacks on non-combatants and glorified suicide bombing. He subsequently revised his stance, directing followers to not target public and residential areas. Al Zawahiri also criticised the Muslim Brotherhood for adopting the 'Western democratic model', described by him as a 'modern-day disease'. He believed that global consumerism had weakened Arab nationalism, as secular rulers bribed the clergy to appease them.

Extremists know how to appeal to their target audience.

In 1997, the Afghan Taliban established a self-styled 'emirate', but over time its religious hues gave way to a more nationalist narrative. Thus, the Taliban shuttled between religiosity and Afghan nationalist passions.

After declaring its allegiance to IS in 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (renamed Wilayat Sinai) argued that 'freedom' could not be achieved through parliamentary politics and that spilling blood was the only option. In Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba opted for secularism and modernisation whereas Salah Ben Youssef struggled to establish an Islamic order. The secular narrative resulted in the emergence of the Islamic Tendency Movement. The Jasmine Revolution bid to democratise Tunisia in 2011 only led to more chaos and economic



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uncertainty. Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia vetoed the idea of democracy. Meanwhile, militant groups took advantage of Tunisians' high literacy and bilingual proficiency to employ them on multiple fronts.

While Al Qaeda and IS had different models to bring about their desired social transformation, both sought to utilise the tribal fabric of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen to their advantage. It was easy, for instance, for terrorist groups to multiply their influence in the Kanuri tribe, scattered across Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. Both also tried to understand their target audience in their selected area of influence. They took advantage of difficult terrains and abject poverty. They focused on the illiterate and isolated, preferably located in weakly or ungoverned areas, who were easily manipulated through cultural and religious appeals. They created narratives specifically to reunite former militants. They celebrated their dead instead of mourning them. In constructing the 'enemy', they referred to them as animals. In drafting counter-narratives, states are supposed to follow the guidelines in Security Council Resolution No. 2354, which expresses concern over terrorist groups misrepresenting religion to justify violence, recruit fighters and garner support.

Besides successful military operations, Pakistan drafted the National Action Plan (2014), Counter Extremism Policy guidelines (2018), National Internal Security Policies (2014-2018 and 2018-2023) and Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2020. It is high time that Pakistan reassesses all such endeavours and readjusts the institutional and legal frameworks of counterterrorism to address ground realities. Pakistan has successfully defeated the savages, but the smouldering embers of ideological warfare have yet to be extinguished.

*The writer is the author of **Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace**. Tweet [@alibakhel](#)*



14. India to Stop Sponsoring Daesh

Senator Rehman Malik

Published in the Nation October 12th, 2020

I have been consistently advocating, authoring, and warning the world about the expansion of Daesh and its misuse in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other South Asian Countries.

In 2014, Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval had visited Iraq and met with Daesh head to create working relationships with Daesh and also met with the other leadership of this extremist group. I had mentioned Indian designs in Chapter-5 “The Role of The Indian State in Establishing & Expanding Daeshism in South Asia” of my book “ISIS- Daesh – A Rising Monster Worldwide” as under:

“It is feared that the mischievous and anti-Pakistan Syndrome of Modi will be energised further by Doval and RSS influence on Doval coupled with Daeshism is likely to engineer more brutalities for innocent Kashmiris and more terrorism in Pakistan especially support to some Indian-fed terrorists there. India will make Balochistan, KP and Hazara the prime targets of terrorism as per the anti-Pakistan policy conceived by PM Modi and his NSA”.

“Investigation on all recent terrible incidents of terrorism link to Indian interests and can be traced back to Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval as the key figure in promoting Daesh activities in South Asia”

In my book “Modi’s War Doctrine”, I had revealed as under:-

“RSS and Daesh nexus in collaboration with RAW is emerging and it is on record and exposed by an Ambassador from Middle East posted in Indian capital Delhi. He confirmed training of numerous Indians by ISIS in Kurdistan. According to reports, on behest of RAW, the RSS and Daesh to implement the larger Indian plan “cleansing Kashmiri Muslims” are operating to eliminate Muslims from Indian Occupied Kashmir”

In my book “Bleeding Kashmir” I have stated as under:

“Modi came under terrible pressure from International community and internal political parties after self-created Pulwama drama for his election and Sri Lankan attacks by Daesh/RSS operators from India. USA has always drawn benefit from Pakistan by increasing the pressure from India on LOC whereas western boarder is already under USA command.”

India has strength its terrorism network of RSS by blending the militancy and skills of Daesh which are visibly observed in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOK) and Sri Lanka. India was able to force Sri Lanka to come to its policies through massive attacks by ISIS in the Capital of Sri Lanka.

I know some of my critics did not agree with me at that point that India has become a proper hub of Daesh to be used against Pakistan, China, and other countries. Now my assessments and information about the expansion of Daesh in South Asia has been validated by USA media as referred below. The American magazine namely Foreign Policy in its article “Indians and Central Asians Are the New Face of the Islamic State” dated October 8, 2020, has confirmed my earlier findings. The



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American journal states “While at first glance this seems unsurprising, the presence of Central Asians and Indians in transnational attacks is a relatively new phenomenon that reflects a shifting pattern in jihadism linked to the Islamic State.”

Pakistan had been trying its best to bring peace in Afghanistan and Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa with all his sincerity and abilities have been able to get all the parties together on one forum which has also been appreciated on record by Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation. Pakistan believes that safe Afghanistan means safe Pakistan whereas peace in Afghanistan does not suit India and this is the reason India has all along been sabotaging the peace process by using Daesh and some factions of Afghan Taliban operating in Afghanistan by killing innocent Afghans. I narrated this assessment based on certain information from Afghanistan that India will launch very offensive and aggressive terroristic moves in Afghanistan to sabotage the peace process and the world is witnessing the same.

I hope US President Donald Trump and his team realise the covert and in-built anti-Afghan operations of India through Daesh and its some paid Afghan agents. The USA has to ensure the withdrawal of Modi’s criminals and its agents duly sponsored by RAW from Afghanistan and the Indian anti-Afghan peace process terrorist activities must come to end immediately otherwise after the withdrawal of the American forces in December 2020, India will create havoc to generate civil war in Afghanistan through RAW & Daesh.

It is therefore proposed that America and UNO must ensure to have a contingent of peace-making force from UNO to be deployed in Afghanistan to counter Daesh. ISIS had been active against Pakistan from

Afghanistan and the terrorist activities duly sponsored by India through its agents in Afghanistan in Pakistan. India has a covert plan to continue proxy war through Daesh in Pakistan. India is already using Daesh & RAW in Balochistan, KPK, and other parts of Pakistan to achieve the following four main objectives in Pakistan:

To destabilize Pakistan through proxy wars and Daesh activities by infiltrating its agents in Pakistan to commit terrorism against specific targets; To attempt to undermine the Pakistan Army by propagating in Indian media and other like-minded media houses hired for this purpose; To sabotage the peace in Pakistan by acts of terrorism against the political elite of Pakistan in the coming months; and to create massive anti-Pakistan propaganda and lobbying against Pakistan with the purpose to keep Pakistan under pressure by FATF and other International forum.

I am surprised that India has not yet come under the radar of FATF despite declared terrorist activities by India and money laundering through various banks. None but The Indian Express-in its report titled “44 Indian banks, transactions of \$1 billion, flagged to US regulator” on September 24, 2020 has revealed that at least 44 Indian banks have been identified in connection with transactions by Indian entities and individuals in a set of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by US banks with the watchdog, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Records investigated show that Indian banks mentioned in the SARs include: state-owned Punjab National Bank (290 transactions); State Bank of India (102); Bank of Baroda (93); Union Bank of India (99) and Canara Bank (190), among others. Among private banks that figure in the SARs are HDFC Bank (253 transactions); ICICI Bank (57); Kotak Mahindra Bank (268); Axis Bank (41) and IndusInd Bank



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(117) among others. Why FATF has not yet placed India in black list where as a well-documented complaint by is with the president FATF.

I hope America will now move a complaint against India as it had moved against Pakistan without any genuine reasons with FATF. Let us see how many laws of anti-terrorism, anti-money laundering, amendments in Indian penal code, and changes in the constitution of India are demanded by FATF as demanded from Pakistan. FATF owes an explanation to the world failing to place India in the grey list in the light of the recent revelation by American media being sponsor of Daesh and state level money laundering.

I would like to advise and warn the law enforcement within Pakistan and the intelligence agencies to enhance their vigilance on the various Indian initiatives of launching proxy wars in Pakistan. Let's not forget that India is preparing for war against Pakistan and we should expect anything from mentally unstable Indian Prime Minister Modi who has been getting elected and surviving on the support of homegrown terrorism of RSS and Daesh.

The act of terrorism of Samjhauta express confessed by Lt Col Prasad Shrikant Purohit and the terrorist activities confessed by Kulbhushan Yadav in Pakistan in the recent past are a reminder for us to observe and take effective steps to ensure the safety general public, sensitive installations, and some leading politicians of the country. I have made these assessments exclusively the same way which I have been warning since 2015 and now the world has validated all my assessments and I feel that the inertia of terrorism created by PM Modi is ultimately meant to destabilise Pakistan. I

am confident of the abilities of our agencies and law enforcers that we will not only counter Indian ill-designs against Pakistan but successfully weed out Daesh from the country. India will also have its befitting response to ensure a good lesson to India.

In the meantime, let's put our House in order by ending the continued growing polarisation within our politics. We must learn to create complete national unity and harmony to defeat the incoming danger from the enemy. The political hierarchy has to ensure that India does not take the advantage of the row between the present government and opposition.

Let me also warn China that India has all the ill designs to use Daesh in China. I hope China will take all the necessary measures to counter Daesh. Daesh has trained members of the ETMI in 5 locations in Afghanistan.

May God guide us in the right direction enabling us to serve our beloved land to the best of our abilities remaining above our political interests, Aameen.

The writer is a former Minister of Interior Pakistan.



15. Indian Banks and Financing Terrorism

Sajjad Shoukat

Published in the Nation October 18th, 2020

For years, India has been lobbying the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog, to blacklist Pakistan, accusing Islamabad of using the banking system to sponsor terrorism.

Pakistan has been on the grey list of the FATF since June 2018. In this regard, some Western countries and particularly India have been calling on Islamabad to take action against the terror groups to avoid a further downgrade by the FATF. They have long failed to do so. The Indian media looks to spread disinformation that Pakistan may be put on the Blacklist.

Islamabad is confident to avoid any new action by FATF, as it has support from China, Malaysia and Turkey. Even countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Saudi Arabia have also favoured Pakistan. Pakistan should be excluded from the grey list and put into the green or white list, as in the recent past, Islamabad has made impressive progress on at least 20 out of 27 of FATF action plan points.

In this regard, the current government led by the ruling party PTI has fully grasped the significance of putting in place a strong anti-money laundering regime. Recently passed FATF-related bills in parliament might be cited as an instance. Pakistan strictly implemented the guidelines given by FATF, as laws related to the banking sector were amended and assets of banned organisations were frozen.

However, reports suggest that FATF might maintain Pakistan's greylist status for an extended period of 6 to 12 months, but in such a scenario, there will be no new action plan.

In this respect, Indian attempts and lobbying to blacklist Pakistan failed after no country supported India's narrative.

On the other side, the involvement of Indian banks in money laundering and financing terrorism has been exposed. In this context, a recent report names 44 Indian banks highlighted by a US agency (on September 27) which works to combat money laundering, terrorism financing and financial fraud.

The report of the top-secret files of the US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has exposed the involvement of Indian banks, including state-owned banks, in money laundering through transactions used in facilitating and financing acts of terrorism, particularly in the region.

While, indicating India as the hub of dirty money, the report revealed: "At least 44 Indian banks, including the state-owned banks have been tagged as the financial institutions of the country linked to transactions by the Indian entities and individuals in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by the watchdog agency FinCEN. The entities and individuals were involved in money laundering of \$1.53 billion through 3,201 illegal and suspicious transactions between 2011 and 2017".

Data gathered by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) from the SARs filed by US banks proves that the flagged transactions carried by the Indian banks could be related to activities such as money laundering, terrorism and drugs.

An India-based publication like others has also reported that between 2010 and 2017, several transactions went through the Indian banks which were flagged as top-secret SARs by the FinCEN for money laundering, terror financial and financial fraud.



Earlier, a report released by the United Nations also disclosed the presence of a significant number of terrorist groups in Kerala, Karnataka and Assam.

There are also reports that gold and diamond were also used for money laundering, while the Indian Premier League (cricket tournament) has also been pointed out for money laundering practices by the Indian judiciary.

It is notable that India has used terror financing to conduct terrorism in Pakistan. In this connection, speaking at a talk show on television in the second week of May last, a retired Indian military officer, Major Gaurav Arya confessed to his involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan's province of Balochistan. He also claimed that he had been in touch with Baloch separatist groups.

Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav, a serving Indian Navy officer associated with Indian RAW, who was arrested during a counter-intelligence operation in Balochistan on March 3, 2016 and later sentenced to death by the Field General Court Martial, also confessed to the involvement of his state in carrying out terrorism in Pakistan. The International Court of Justice had also rejected an appeal by the Indian government to release Jadhav.

It is of particular attention that in an interview with Indian media outlet The Wire, on October 13, besides indicating India's other anti-Pakistan moves, Pakistan Prime Minister's Adviser on National Security Moeed Yusuf spoke about RAW's role in the terror attacks which took place in Pakistan over the last few years, including the attack at a five-star Hotel in Gwadar, the Chinese Consulate in Karachi—the Pakistan Stock Exchange and the 2014 attack on the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar.

He further said that Indian Embassy funds have been used to sponsor terrorist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and that hard evidence had been collected. Yusuf added that RAW had used \$1 million to facilitate TTP and that Pakistan knew the names and ranks of officers in touch with terror leadership and would soon reveal Indian activities to the world through a detailed dossier based on lengthy investigations.

Nevertheless, Indian claims regarding Islamabad's involvement in terror financing have been neutralised, while Pakistan's grievances on similar charges against New Delhi have been justified.

Interestingly, Indian authorities eager to see Pakistan on the FATF blacklist themselves must now be in hot water in view of the appearance of this latest FinCEN report. Hence, instead of targeting Pakistan as a double standard, the West-led FATF must review India's role in money laundering and financing of other terrorism-related issues.

Undoubtedly, we can conclude that after failed attempts to push Pakistan to the FATF blacklist over accusations of money laundering and terror financing, India has been caught red-handed.

The writer focuses on international affairs and is the author of the book, "US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations". He can be reached at sajjad_logic@yahoo.com



16. India Sponsors Terrorism in Pakistan

Masud Ahmed Khan

Published in the Nation October 18th, 2020

India is yet to reconcile and accept the existence of Pakistan and is always busy in plotting conspiracies to destabilise Pakistan. During the 1971 war, India armed, trained and funded Mukhti Bahni and attacked East Pakistan from multiple directions. Because of its location 1000 miles away, it was difficult to support from West Pakistan and therefore resulted in the dismembering of Pakistan. During his visit to Bangladesh, Prime Minister Modi recalled with pride his participation in the campaign to support Mukhti Bahni in East Pakistan.

In his book *Inside RAW, The Story of India's Secret Services*, the writer Ashoka Raina writes "Indian sources including journalists have put on record how much RAW had established the network of a separatist movement through cells within East Pakistan and military training camps in India adjoining East Pakistan". India is now trying hard to damage Pakistan not only from east but also from the west (Afghanistan) in the light of so-called Doval doctrine. According to this doctrine, "India needs to go into the offensive-defensive mode when dealing with Pakistan" and warned Pakistan by saying "you may do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan".

He further said a terror organisation could be bought with money and weapons. In Afghanistan, Indian influence expended after the fall of the Taliban and India started using this soil for terrorist activities inside Pakistan. India is fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan, which is actively supported by Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. With the start of CPEC, India stepped up its terrorist activities through its proxies like BLA, BRA, TTP and JuH. In

the past, former Pakistani Prime Minister Gillani personally handed over a detailed dossier of Indian terrorism in Balochistan to former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav from Balochistan proves Indian involvement in terrorist activities in Balochistan and Karachi. Former US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel is on record of having said, while addressing the Cameron University in Oklahoma in 2011 that, "India has over the years been financing terrorism in Pakistan from across the border". He further added that "India is using Afghanistan as a second front against Pakistan". RAW was involved in the kidnapping and killing of Chinese engineers in 2006 and 2016 in Balochistan. The Gwadar Pearl Continental hotel attack claimed by BLA was sponsored by RAW in a bid to sabotage CPEC. The attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi was planned in the neighbouring country and executed with the assistance of RAW and India was also behind the attack on Karachi stock exchange building. In an interview to Indian Journalist Karan Thapar, the Prime Minister's Advisor on National Security Moeed Yousaf said that "Pakistan had proof of Army Public School Peshawar massacre's mastermind was in contact with an Indian consulate during the attack. He further said India recently spent one million dollars to merge the TTP and four other terrorist organisations under the supervision of RAW officials.

The American magazine "Foreign Policy" has recently exposed the link between India and terrorists in its article "Indians and Central Asians are the new faces of the Islamic State". Links of Indians in attacks in Afghanistan and Syria have also been unearthed. 44 Indian banks also figured in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by the US bank with a watchdog agency. There are over 2000 transactions valued at over one billion dollars between 2011 to



INDIA SPONSORS TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

2017. RAW is also instrumental in exploiting sectarian and sub-nationalist issues in Gilgit-Baltistan. Some dissident individuals who have no standing at all are running a campaign to instigate locals against CPEC and Pakistan. In the past, some persons were arrested in Gilgit who confirmed that they have received funds from RAW to sabotage CPEC and create unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan. Recently a nationalist leader and head of banned organisation Abdul Hameed Khan returned to Pakistan unconditionally and offered an apology to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan for his anti-state activities. He told a journalist that “during exile, 25000 Euros was paid to me monthly by RAW to create unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan”. He confessed that “he played in the hands of the enemy (India). The recent killing of Maulana Adil Khan was again reportedly executed by RAW sponsored terrorists as Prime minister Imran Khan had already warned of sectarian attacks planned by RAW in Pakistan. In a tweet, the Prime Minister said “we have prevented a number of such attempts pre-emptively in the last few months”. The objective of these attacks is to promote sectarian tension and unrest in Pakistan.

India is also not happy with the peace process in Afghanistan as in a stable Afghanistan she won't be able to use its soil against Pakistan. India views new development in Afghanistan as a threat to her interest in Afghanistan. India wants Afghanistan to remain unstable, weak to use its soil against Pakistan and CPEC. Indian was also behind the Kabul gurdwara and Jalalabad prison attack, claimed by Daesh. Pakistan is sincerely committed with the Afghanistan peace process however India is adamant in spoiling its efforts. The Taliban has also accused India for playing a negative role in Afghanistan. In a recent book of Yatish Yadav, RAW, a History of India's Covert Operations, it has been revealed that RAW recruited three

Afghan warlords including Ahmed Shah Massoud during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to a report published in The News, the book did not mention the names of other two warlords as they still occupy positions in Afghanistan politics. Pakistan provided evidence to the UN of four Indian nationals namely Venumadhav Dongara, Ajoy Mistry, Gobinda Patnaik and Angora Appaji for planning and executing terrorist activities from the neighbouring country inside Pakistan. Pakistan proposed the designation of these four India nationals under the UN 1267 sanction as terrorist. They used their work as cover to provide financial and material support to terrorist groups. Angora was in contact with the mastermind of the APS Peshawar attack and Patnaik was the mastermind of the Mastung carnage.

Interestingly, the Mumbai attacks in 2008 were false-flag operations by RAW to malign Pakistan. Elias Davidson in his over 800-page book raised hundreds of questions and no Indian has ever responded to the questions raised by him. The COAS while addressing the passing out parade of PMA cadets said “that Pakistan was subjected to wars, terrorism and economic strangulation, but Alhamdulillah we have survived. The enemies who brought us down to doom and destruction are now watching us in disdain”. The whole nation is standing shoulder to shoulder with Pakistan's armed forces in combating terrorism.

The writer is a retired brigadier of Pakistan Army and freelance columnist.



17. Sectarianism & Civil Society

Muhammad Amir Rana

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NOTHING is more challenging for a state than maintaining social harmony during times of religious discord and hatred. The challenge becomes more uncertain when civil society and other stakeholders become indifferent or are left out, and the matter is left to state institutions alone. This is exactly what is happening in Pakistan.

During the recent upsurge in sectarian protests and hatred in the country, civil society largely failed to respond proactively; it could not go beyond issuing mere condemnations. While state authorities have taken a few initiatives, these also did not get the attention of opinion-makers in the media.

The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) recently developed a Code of Conduct (CoC) for ending sectarian violence and communal hatred in the country. Endorsed by religious scholars of all schools of thought, the 20-point CoC is being termed as a major development in addressing sectarianism. It is also one of the major achievements of the CII under the chairmanship of Dr Qibla Ayaz, who will soon complete his first tenure without having created any controversy.

The CoC is not the first initiative taken by the state or religious scholars to reduce sectarian tensions. Apart from several other state-sponsored religious decrees and declarations, a somewhat similar document was also developed by the Milli Yakjehti Council, an alliance of religious parties formed to address sectarianism in the mid-1990s. The CII's CoC echoes similar

clauses espoused in the MYC draft, but can be termed different in terms of authority and source. This is based on the Paigham-i-Pakistan, a comprehensive state-sponsored declaration against extremism endorsed by hundreds of religious scholars of all schools of thought.

Coercive uniformity cannot be an alternative to diversity.

The CoC can be divided into three parts. The first in particular refers to protecting the rights of women and non-Muslim citizens. The second discusses legal issues, including related to blasphemy, and declares that only courts of law are authorised to decide on such cases. The third and integral part of the CoC concerns sectarian harmony. It declares all kinds of violence in the name of religion as revolt against the state and denounces the deliverance of hate speech and excommunication of other sects, including at mosques, imambargahs and mass gatherings.

One must appreciate the CII's CoC. But will it be enough to address the violent manifestation of the existing sectarian divide? What miracle can this CoC achieve that previous similar declarations failed to?

Traditionally, such fatwas and declarations have wielded little to no influence on most radical elements and extremist groups in Pakistan. Even in the presence of such drafts and decrees, extremist elements and groups would continue to spread hatred as per their convictions or other internal and external compulsions. For state institutions, however, creating and adopting such resolutions is an official obligation and means that the 'job is done'. But the issue is deep-rooted and linked to our society's



religious, identity-related and sociopolitical ethos.

Civil society — especially segments that operate on a non-religious basis, ie media, professional bodies, and even political parties — does not intervene in such issues proactively due to a few obvious reasons. For one, a sense of religious sensitivity and sanctity, in which the clergy does not allow anyone else the authority to take up religious matters, keeps diverse societal segments out and renders the entire discourse their exclusive domain.

Second, state institutions also discourage the involvement of civil society. They have made it an exclusive turf for themselves (in which they engage with the clergy alone) and try to conceal prevalent sectarian fault lines from popping up and tarnishing the country's image abroad. The media blackout of recent incidents related to sectarian hatred is an example of that attitude. Perhaps they believe that such blackouts can prevent the fire from spreading. But the overall environment that it creates discourages not only civil society but also media and even parliamentarians from speaking on the issue.

National cohesion cannot be created without developing sectarian harmony, and both require managing and celebrating diversity. Fear of diversity is rooted in mistrust of the social contract, in which coercive uniformity is seen as the only option. But uniformity cannot be an alternative to diversity. Usually, state and societies have multiple social contracts to conduct day-to-day business with each other, but two are considered especially important. One between the state and society, ie the Constitution, and the second among diverse segments of society to manage their religious, racial, ethnic and

cultural differences, which is part of our collective memories. In Pakistan, the constitutional crisis has deep roots and reflects state institutions' weaknesses in honouring and abiding by constitutional principles, whereas the sectarian divide has badly affected the social contract within society.

On one side, state institutions are not providing the way for civil society to participate in restructuring the social contract. On the other, the clergy has developed a stake in the economy that thrives on hate and conflict. The institution of the madressah has further deepened the intellectual and social stakes in sectarianism on which radical groups thrive. Civil society has itself failed to build pressure on the state and clergy to course correct. For civil society, rights issues are more important than a cohesive and inclusive social contract that accommodates all religious, sectarian, ethnic, racial and cultural differences and provides better mutual understanding. A functional social contract can help to develop a better citizenry and ensure social cohesion.

It is also important that all state institutions and pillars act within the constitutional framework and contribute to strengthening constitutional values. Both the state and civil society have to collaborate to break the intellectual and economic stakes linked with sectarian hatred. It would be a great service to the nation if the CII took up the task and provided some useful recommendations in this regard.

The writer is a security analyst.



18. Politicising Terrorism

Muhammad Amir Rana

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COUNTERING the threat of terrorism requires accurate assessment, political resolve, a long-term strategy, and, resilient and in-sync security and law-enforcement structures. Terrorist movements strike back when given a moment to breathe. A decline in terrorist violence has several reasons, but it is too early to declare victory unless terrorist networks are completely dismantled.

The terrorists apply both operational and political strategies to unnerve security apparatuses. For instance, Baloch insurgent groups perpetrate small-scale terrorist attacks and sabotage activities frequently and conduct major, high-impact attacks sporadically. They may even ‘disappear’ for some time and then carry out surprise attacks. In September, Baloch groups did not perpetrate a single attack in the province, which created an impression of stabilisation, but in October they struck back with lethal attacks.

Usually, religiously inspired terrorist groups in Pakistan have enough human resources, and intervals in their attacks could have other causes. However, when there are breaks in terrorist violence, the government, political parties, and security institutions seem relaxed or are confused about the threat. This gives the terrorists some breathing space to plan and carry out more attacks. They know when to manoeuvre political situations and add to the crisis.

A significant upsurge during the last couple of weeks saw several incidents of terrorism being reported from different parts of the country. The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan,

Baloch insurgents, and violent sectarian groups were reportedly involved in these attacks. The TTP targeted a military convoy with a remote-controlled blast in the Razmak area of North Waziristan in which six army soldiers including a captain were martyred. In Balochistan, BRAS, an alliance of Baloch insurgent groups, targeted a convoy of security forces escorting OGDCL employees from Gwadar to Karachi. Seven FC soldiers and as many private security guards were martyred.

Terrorist groups thrive in times of political crises.

In another incident, terrorists opened fire on a patrolling party of security forces southeast of Turbat. However, two other attacks created the impression that terrorism had returned. While one of these attacks took place in a Peshawar madrasah, causing several casualties and fear, the other targeted civilians in Hazarganji, Quetta, at a time when an opposition rally was underway a few kilometres away.

Unfortunately, the treasury and opposition exploit such attacks for political purposes. Some believe the government uses ‘security alerts’ as a tool to create fear among the political workers of the opposition parties. Many in the Pakistan Democratic Movement built conspiracy theories around these attacks. At the same time, once again, the externalisation factor, or involvement of a foreign hand, in these attacks was exploited out of proportion.

The militant landscape of the country is complex. For one, the TTP’s operational strength has increased manifold after its former splinter groups and several other small militant groups and commanders recently merged with it. It is evident that the militants have been increasing their



POLITICISING TERRORISM

presence and activities in the tribal districts for several months now. While our counterterrorism focus was waning, militants wasted no time in exploiting this mistake. In recent times, TTP militants taking shelter in Afghanistan have regularly carried out attacks in the Waziristan districts, either by crossing the border or through their operatives present in parts of the tribal districts.

Similarly, the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda and the militant Islamic State (IS) group still looms large in the region. Communal and sectarian violence is on the rise and of late, sectarian tensions have also flared. The recent incidents of sectarian violence, however, have more than a local context. The country has been in the throes of sectarian tension since the month of Muharram when Shia and Sunni clerics indulged in sectarian-related hate speech.

In this backdrop, underrating the terrorism threat is nothing short of daydreaming. An examination of the blast in Peshawar's Zubairiya madressah is enough to understand the gravity and complexity of the terrorist threat. The principal Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani is an Afghan national. A graduate of the leading Deobandi, Hanafi madressah Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak, he has a history of sectarian confrontation with those subscribing to the Salafi sect. This has led him to oppose IS. Some unconfirmed reports indicate his close association with the Afghan Taliban, which, if true, make his animosity with IS understandable.

IS is suspected to be behind the attack, though it has not accepted responsibility; the group has also not found to have been involved in any terrorist activity for the last four years in the city. If IS were involved in the attack, it would mean that a new threat

has emerged in KP's capital city. The TTP has condemned the attack for obvious reasons of sectarian affinity with the madressah, but in recent months it has been using IEDs effectively in its terrorist operations. It is not an exclusive tactic or weapon of choice for the TTP, and there are many other criminal and sectarian groups, and hostile foreign agencies that use it; such devices are even used in tribal and family feuds.

If IS or TTP were not involved in the attack, it would have been an isolated one. But the increasing operational capabilities of the TTP cannot be ignored. Interestingly, the TTP has refuted the security alerts issued by the National Counter Terrorism Authority about the possible targeting of the opposition parties' leadership and their rallies. This could be seen as a political gimmick played by the TTP to exacerbate the ongoing political crisis in the country. Terrorist groups thrive in times of political crises, when their narrative becomes more attractive to frustrated and marginalised segments of society. A unified TTP would not only concentrate on the revival of its operational capabilities but also try and regain the political legitimacy of its narrative.

The political overlay with regard to security-related issues both by the government and opposition will only benefit the terrorists. Politicising threats will affect the morale and capacity of police and the counterterrorism departments, and lead them to avoid investigation of terrorism incidents blaming the external forces for them.



19. The Need for a Cohesive National Action Plan

M Ashfaque Arain

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While warfare is as old as human history and its basic objectives remain unchanged, its methods, means and techniques have continuously transformed with the evolution of technology. In modern times, the unacceptably high cost of men, material and resources has made hybrid warfare the desired means of attaining national objectives with the concurrent application of kinetic and non-kinetic means. Though this is not a new concept, technological advancements have made this type of warfare more effective and practicable.

Hybrid warfare requires synchronized use of numerous power centres, led by intelligence agencies to target an adversary's crucial vulnerabilities in political, socioeconomic, and diplomatic spheres at different levels of intensity over time. Combination, blending or a mix of different modes of warfare, such as the use of irregular forces, unconventional methods and multipronged approach to achieve synergistic effects to destabilise, demoralise and disintegrate the adversary, sets hybrid warfare apart from other forms of armed conflict. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts and managing the level and intensity, the aggressor also avoids attribution and even retribution.

The key elements of hybrid warfare include proxy, information, economic and cyber warfare, as well as propaganda, terrorist activities, and political and diplomatic coercion. The perpetrators of hybrid war apply these elements singly or in different

combinations and manipulate the intensity of each component according to the need of the situation. While applying pressure across the entire spectrum of conflict, the hybrid adversaries however, endeavour to keep the constituents separate to avoid detection by the adversary, thus avoiding attribution and legal implications. In doing so, they take advantage of shortcomings in the national and international laws; which have failed to adapt to the rapid technological advancements and growth of social media tools, which hybrid threat actors use as a means. The hybrid adversaries therefore, aim to create ambiguity to disguise ground reality to obscure the differentiation between peace and war. Responding to such threats militarily thus becomes difficult due to legal and jurisdictional concerns questioning the legitimacy of the response.

Pakistan has been a victim of hybrid war being waged by India for a long time and the problem continues to compound. Our arch-enemy has been exploiting our vulnerabilities—identity conflict, ethnic and sectarian divide, poor economy, poor governance, political instability, weak or non-functional institutions and the like. Some important examples of Indian hybrid warfare against Pakistan in the past include training, facilitation, funding and support for Mukti Bahini for creation of Bangladesh, Agartala conspiracy to destabilise Pakistan and Ganga airliner hijacking incident to stop overflights in the run-up to the 1971 war.

Recent examples include training, support and funding for Baloch separatist groups and MQM, terrorism in Balochistan and Karachi, hydro warfare by violating the



THE NEED FOR A COHESIVE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

Indus Waters Treaty, repeated political coercion by deploying military forces and corrupting international bodies such as FATF to pressurise and isolate Pakistan economically. India has also been very effectively using social media to spread fake news and propaganda to create political, religious and ethnic disharmony, the results of which we evidence every day, in every facet of life in the country. According to an EU-based NGO, EU DisinfoLab, in the last few years, almost 265 websites related to an Indian company named Srivastava, named after defunct newspapers and media outlets being operated out of 65 countries continue to deliberately project Pakistan negatively to discredit it at international forums on one plea or the other. Indian actions have, therefore, not only created problems inside Pakistan, but have also maligned the country internationally.

There is, thus, an urgent need to understand the dynamics and implications of hybrid warfare since it profoundly affects the national security of Pakistan with serious threats to internal cohesion, socio-economic well-being, culture, and political stability.

The areas which require immediate attention include sustained development for a strong economy, realigning our foreign policy to changing geostrategic realities and creating religious, ethnic and interprovincial harmony.

It is, therefore, extremely important for the political leadership in coordination with all state institutions to prudently assess the dynamics and formulate short term as well as long term strategies to effectively counter both external forces as well as their collaborators who use these tools to create disorder and instability from within. In the entire endeavour, taking the nation onboard remains the most important aspect in convincing the potential aggressors of the futility of any forms of pressure.

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20. Police Complaints

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

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VIOLATIONS of procedure and code of conduct, corruption and excessive use of force are common complaints against the police. Mishandling public complaints not only multiplies crime but also compromises the peace and image of the state.

Countries that inherited colonial policing systems are often confronted with a trust deficit. In the absence of autonomous complaint authorities, entrusting the disposal of complaints to the same department compromises fairness, which further erodes police-community relations. The majority of complainants are either unaware of the procedures, or are met with bureaucratic delays. This, as well as other issues such as compromising confidentiality, provides the accused ample opportunity to manoeuvre the inquiry to their advantage.

In Pakistan, the police's public relations wings are plagued by capacity and resource constraints. They generally follow one-way communication, and focus on individuals' image building at the expense of the institutional image. Instead, they should focus on publicising complaints procedures. Transparency increases public confidence. Easy registration and early disposal of complaints, as well as the ability to appeal decisions, enhances the police's credibility. It symbolises the police's efforts to uphold professional integrity.

In India, retired IG Kiran Bedi introduced the 'beat box' system in Delhi, which significantly improved police-community relations. In Pakistan, IG Nasir Durrani

introduced the Police Access Service (PAS), which integrated all operational ranks of police and complainants, and analyses complaints statistics to monitor police performance.

Transparency increases public confidence.

Chapter X of the Police Order, 2002, mandated external oversight, but this was thwarted by the status quo. Article 36 of PO 2002 states that the DPO and head of the federal law enforcement agency shall inform the police complaints authority of any incident or complaint of bodily harm to any person in police custody. Article 155 specifies punishments for certain types of police misconduct. Without functional and autonomous police complaint authorities, however, this will remain a lofty ideal.

Sections 6 (2) and 17(7) of the KP Police Act, 2017, empower the IGP to establish a public complaints section and complaints management system at regional and district levels. Section 46 linked local government tiers with district police. Local government heads are empowered to refer public complaints to the DPO and receive a report within 15 days. Owing to dysfunctional local bodies and litigation concerning composition of the scrutiny committee, regional police complaint authorities (Section 66) are yet to be constituted.

Societies transitioning from colonial to democratic policing should enact laws, digitise processes and build capacity. But this is not possible without legal, procedural, institutional interventions and political ownership. Instead of manipulating and withholding statistics, the police should adopt an open and diagnostic approach. Creating free and easy



POLICE COMPLAINTS

complaints registration and adopting a liberal policy of sharing public records will not only build trust with the public, it will also help the police to understand the causes of complaints, which should become a part of the training curriculum. This data can also inform policies to improve police-community relations, as well as point to flaws in legislation or procedures that need amending.

Police oversight and complaints bodies can be classified as fully independent or hybrid bodies. England and Wales have an independent police complaints commission; similarly, Malaysia, the Maldives, New Zealand, and the Philippines have independent functional bodies. In New York, an independent mayoral agency was established to review police complaints, with the power to subpoena and recommend action against NY police officers. Hybrid complaint bodies (such as in Canada, Liberia and the Netherlands), meanwhile, are either controlled by the police or the executive. In Pakistan, to deal with complaints, KP introduced PAS, Balochistan e-complaints, while Sindh and Punjab introduced complaint management systems. Punjab Police reformed its complaints management apparatus; other provinces should adapt this to their needs.

In Pakistan, establishing oversight commissions by legislation can ensure autonomy. Bodies created by executive order remain under the executive's shadow. Moreover, complaints mechanisms need to be effectively linked with training and human resource branches. To ensure credibility, these mechanisms must be audited jointly by police, sociologists, rights activists and parliamentarians. We can assess the effectiveness of such systems through indicators such as improved public service delivery, reduction in police misconduct and timely resolution. But without political commitment, the public's expectations will remain unfulfilled.

The writer is the author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace. Tweet @alibabakhel



21. Benchmarks of Tolerance

Tolerance cannot be imparted to citizens through statements but should be demonstrated through practical examples

Faisal Ali Raja

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Tolerance can be defined in individual or collective terms which impact each other and leave positive or negative impressions in society. It can neither be theoretically taught nor be inculcated among humans without presenting a practical mode for action. Tolerance experiences many challenges in a diverse social set-up, including accepting diversity and taking it as an opportunity to reshape lives and human behaviour in society. Unfortunately, we talk a lot about tolerance but are unable to translate it in our daily lives. Let us look at some benchmarks of tolerance from our existing social set-ups. First, we do not go for a diverse occupation choice as we enter into practical lives. Our choice is a function of a monopolistic social instinct which keeps shaping our key decision-making. Hardly few of us follow an untrodden path or go for something different from our ancestral line of profession.

Second, we do not encourage diverse opinions in classrooms let alone appreciate a diverse class culture where students from different geographical locations, dialects, sects, lineage or backgrounds are present. Unless one appreciates diversity, one is unable to explain its practical manifestation. Moreover, the classroom walls in our educational facilities depict a monolithic cultural landscape negating diversity and multi-culturalism. The names of roads or avenues are also based on historical Islamic heroes without alluding to

any non-Muslim entity who helped or assisted Muslims during dire circumstances of their historical struggles. Hence, we cannot teach tolerance and diversity through hollow statements without presenting a diverse practical ambience.

Third, the curriculum or subjects taught at primary, secondary or higher secondary level having a diverse base are not so varied when it comes to their implementation. These subjects should present a picture which promotes, appreciates and utilises cultural pluralism for its advantages. Recognising it we have now started diversifying the curriculum and incorporating a variety of viewpoints and areas of study.

Fourth, a multiple dialogue culture should be promoted not only in educational institutions but on electronic media too. We have rarely seen active debates among madrasa and elite school students. As a result, both exist in their separate artificial social set-ups and do not cross each other's paths except in rare cases. Whereas, understanding each other's perspective through discussion and debate is a healthy sign as it helps bridge the intellectual gap and promotes tolerance and respect for each other.

Fifth, appreciating minorities and prompting their roles in national cohesion and unity is also an important aspect of inculcating tolerance in our society. We normally do not greet them in their way of welcoming or good-bye. We also channelise their utility at a menial pedestal without strategically recognising their importance and significance. We have even denied them their due share in jobs and related opportunities at provincial and



BENCHMARKS OF TOLERANCE

federal levels. Our key decision forums are usually constituted without their presence in it. This is not only annoying but also damages national solidarity and unity discourse as well.

Lastly, we have been unable to promote intra-religious harmony through tolerance and patience among different sects. As a result, it has emerged as a major fault-line in our national security strategy. The external actors or hostile intelligence agencies have been exposing and attacking it with relative ease both in physical and non-physical spaces. Already we have seen that social media-based text messages, audio or video clips targeting different sects has increased manifolds during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the room for operation against cyber assaults is minimal in the current set up as social media companies wield complete monopoly of control over addition or deletion of any content on their platforms.

Therefore, tolerance cannot be imparted to citizens through messages and statements but should be demonstrated through practical examples from the lowest level to the highest office in the country. Diversity is good but it needs to be demonstrated through tolerance and patience.

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INDIA'S TERRORIST PLOT AGAINST PAKISTAN

22. India's Terrorist Plot Against Pakistan

Dr. Jumma Khan Marri

Published in the Nation November 27th, 2020

Under the façade of democracy India has long been engaged in pushing its hegemonic designs by fomenting trouble in neighbouring countries, including Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Nepal. Now Pakistan has come out with solid, irrefutable evidence of India covertly sponsoring terrorism in Balochistan and its other provinces. Holding a joint media conference recently, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and DG ISPR Major General Babar Iftikhar explained in detail how India was sabotaging the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and supporting terrorism in Pakistan.

Briefing the media, the country's top diplomat and the military spokesperson presented a dossier detailing India's involvement in terror attacks in Pakistan. Numerous video clips and audio clips, along with documents, were presented during the media conference as proof of Indian handlers and terrorists communicating with each other and Indian intelligence operatives giving instructions to their agents in Pakistan. The dossier contains elaborate details proving India's involvement in numberless acts of sabotage, bombings and killings across Pakistan.

International opinion has acknowledged that over a few years, Islamabad has scored remarkable success in fighting terrorism and smashing militants' networks targeting the people of Pakistan. But, in a nefarious attempt to undo the achievements of Islamabad, India has been weaving a dark

web of terrorist rings aimed at sullyng the image of Pakistan which has emerged as the frontline state in the war on terror.

There is incontrovertible proof of Indian intelligence agencies supporting terrorist groups who have been exposed and outlawed by Pakistan. A study of the trail of events over the last three years shows that India has enlisted various terrorist organisations which were driven out of Pakistan by its security forces. The recent upsurge in violence in Pakistan is a direct consequence of New Delhi's intensified engagements with various groups of terrorists, sub-nationalists and dissident's operating against Pakistan.

Evidence has surfaced to show that India has hatched a multi-layered plot to destabilise Pakistan. According to intelligence reports, New Delhi has now planned an upsurge in terrorist activities in Pakistan, especially in its urban centres, in coming days with a view to rattle Pakistan. The recent terrorist attack on the Karachi stock exchange building and an endless series of suicide bombings and target killings in Balochistan and KPK are standing proofs of India's diabolical designs against Pakistan.

An officer of RAW named Anurag Singh gave \$0.5 million dollars to terrorists who attacked Pearl Continental Hotel Gwadar sometime back.

Indian embassies and consulates operating along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan have become a hub of terror sponsorship against Pakistan, with Indian ambassadors in Afghanistan supervising and directing the terrorist operations. In one such recent instance, Indian ambassador in Afghanistan



INDIA'S TERRORIST PLOT AGAINST PAKISTAN

and Indian consular in Jalalabad held detailed discussions with co-conspirators to provide financial support to TTP and dissident Baloch elements. The Indian mission in Afghanistan has also paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to sub-nationalist groups under the garb of humanitarian assistance. Details of the transactions for such activities are in possession of the authorities in Pakistan.

India is also trying to defame Pakistan by creating 'Daesh-e-Pakistan'. As per available evidence, recently 30 Indian Daesh militants were relocated from India to various camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border by two Indian intelligence agencies operatives. These militants were handed over to Daesh Commander Shiekh Abdul Rahim alias Abdul Rehman Muslim Dost.

A prime target of India's terrorist plan is CPEC which is universally acknowledged as an economic game changer for Pakistan. To this end New Delhi has established a special cell within its intelligence agency tasked with sabotaging CPEC projects. The cell with a hefty sum of Rs 80 billion at its disposal works directly under the supervision of the Indian prime minister and its mandate is to ensure the failure of CPEC at any cost. Simultaneously, India has established a 700-strong militia to mount terrorist attacks on CPEC projects through militants specially trained for this purpose.

Another target of the Indian subversive activities is Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) where it is trying to fuel sectarian strife and foment trouble against the federal government through sectarian and sub-nationalist groups. In this connection, a meeting was

held by India's Ministry of Home Affairs to "deliberate upon the methodology to trigger negative reactions" with regard to the provisional provincial status of the region. To this end, various subversive operations in Kashmir and GB have been planned in the coming months.

According to security experts, the Indian terrorist plot has three main objectives. The first is to create turmoil in Pakistan and thus impede its pace of peaceful progress. The second objective is to unsettle Pakistan's economy and scuttle its development plans. The third objective is to create political instability in Pakistan through its paid agents. To fulfil its designs, New Delhi is reported to have distributed Rs22 billion so far among sub-nationalist groups, sectarian outfits and terrorist cells to create divisions and disaffection among people.

All the evidences cited above are enough to get India declared a rogue state because it is providing financial and material support to various terrorist organisations, including UN designated terrorist outfits—Jammatal-Ahrar (JUA), Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The international community must take strong notice of India's flagrant violation of international laws and conventions and the threat it poses to peace in the region. Pakistan has presented the dossier on India's state terrorism to UN, OIC and P5 Countries, and it is now for the world to act before it is too late.

The writer is a senior political activist from Balochistan.



23. The Rise of TLP

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in the DAWN, November 29th, 2020

SPECULATIONS persist regarding the future of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan after the demise of its chief Khadim Husain Rizvi. For many, this is the beginning of the end for the TLP as it has lost not only its leader but also the charisma he possessed. However, it would be unwise to underestimate the power of the TLP narrative.

The TLP under Rizvi has been an amalgamation of charisma and religious narrative; the organisation has eagerly wanted power either through entry into the corridors of authority or recognition of the influence of its religious zeal and street power on politico-ideological and policy matters. However, it is not the first organisation with hard-line, religiously inspired motives and ambitions to have emerged. There are at least 247 religious groups and parties operating in the country that have more or less similar motives and agendas. The inception phases of many of these groups have also been similar; they largely grew from either the Khatm-i-Nabuwat movements of the 1960s and 1970s or sectarian groups' campaigns of the early 1980s, which deepened the sectarian divide in society. These groups also had firebrand leaders who nurtured religious narratives, and the TLP has banked upon the same ideological arguments.

Since the establishment of Pakistan, each decade has seen different religious groups that have hedged or amplified religious-ideological sensitivities around various issues. But the finality and honour of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) have

remained the most important themes for sensitising the people. The TLP, however, organised aggressive street protests and choked federal and provincial capitals. In recent history, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) led violent protests in 1989 over the issue of Salman Rushdie's blasphemous novel. From 2005 to 2012, it was the banned Jamaatud Dawa which mobilised and brought together religious organisations under the banner of the Tehreek-i-Tahaffuz-i-Hurmat-i-Rasool over the issue of the blasphemous images of the Prophet published in different European countries. The Barelvi parties remained very instrumental in all these campaigns mainly in Karachi and Lahore. In Karachi, it was the Sunni Tehreek that led such protests and in Lahore several small Barelvi parties remained part of the JuD-led alliance.

The JI has lost its relevance in the discourse because of its other political priorities and JuD's top leadership is facing trials on terror-financing charges. When Mumtaz Qadri was hanged over the 2011 killing of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, there was a vacuum which many Barelvi parties tried to fill including the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah. Khadim Husain Rizvi suddenly caught the attention of many because of his highly charged sermons. His overly simplified political and religious narratives played a key role in making him and his party popular.

The organisation has been testing the nerves of state institutions for a long while now.

A report has been doing rounds in the media that the TLP is facing an internal leadership crisis and the nomination of its new head Saad Rizvi, the son of Khadim Rizvi, has



THE RISE OF TLP

been challenged by some senior members of the party and by others who have left the organisation. Such divisions among religious groups are not a new phenomenon. Many groups split over the issue of leadership and control over financial resources. The TLP will need someone to follow in Rizvi's footsteps for exploiting the religious narrative and attracting crowds, which may also keep the party's rank and file united.

But whether or not the TLP succeeds in maintaining its unity, it will be a huge challenge for the new leaders to keep the firebrand legacy of Khadim Rizvi going. At another level, while there are several contenders within the Barelvi school of thought, other sects are also waiting to replace the TLP. The followers of the other sects, including those he had issued statements and fatwas against, also attended the funeral of Rizvi. The reason was the narrative, which Rizvi made attractive through his fiery sermons.

Apart from the debate about the future of the TLP, another issue remains crucial and this is about the state's inability to deal with such groups. State institutions have sympathy for all sorts of religious groups, except when they start challenging their turf. The TLP had been testing the nerves of state institutions for a long time and the state adopted its conventional approach of appeasement and pressure whenever TLP supporters came out onto the streets. The disadvantage of the approach is that religious groups seek legitimacy and political power whenever the state makes an agreement with them. Khadim Rizvi had made a deal with the government just a week before his death, which was a big gain

for his party, though the government had denied that it is bound to follow the agreement. Such commitment gives the impression that the state institutions are not capable of chalking out a long-term strategy to deal with such groups for whom they may have some other political utility.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is looking to use its soft image as a diplomatic instrument for regional economic and political advantage, but the presence of radical groups on its soil makes this task complicated. The TLP launched its latest protest at a time when Pakistan had initiated an international diplomatic campaign against Indian state-sponsored terrorism. It should be noted that when Pakistan wanted the support of the world, especially the influential Western countries, a religious group was signing a deal with the government for curtailing ties with a key member of the European Union.

There are other civilised ways of protest and Prime Minister Imran Khan had condemned the statement by the French president. But allowing an ambitious religious group to halt normalcy in the federal capital has hurt the national image most.

Extremism is the biggest enemy of the nation, which is not only weakening the already deteriorating governance system in the country but also undermining national dignity and Pakistan's global image.

The writer is a security analyst.



24. India Sponsoring Terrorism inside Pakistan

Muhammad Zahid Rifat

Published in the Nation November 30th, 2020

Pakistan has launched a fully offensive attack on India through providing irrefutable evidence to the international community and world forums about it persistently supporting and sponsoring terrorism to destabilise Pakistan and sabotaging CPEC as a whole. All major powers, whether they acknowledge it or not, know that India is threatening peace and stability not only of Pakistan but the entire region.

The dossier presented to the international community, UN and other world forums, contained irrefutable evidence of Indian sponsored terrorism in Pakistan though the provision of financial assistance to terrorists and anti-Pakistan bodies like Jammatul Ahrar (JUA) and TTP. Now, the sincere and genuine expectation from our government is that the international community will act to prevent India from continuing its agenda against Pakistan. All that needs to be done is to compel India to halt its state sponsorship of terrorism inside Pakistan and bring to justice all those responsible for supporting and financing terrorism inside Pakistan according to relevant domestic and international laws. Furthermore, they should reiterate that Pakistan reserves the right to defend itself in every possible way.

This was for the first time that Pakistan came out comprehensively and forcefully to tell the world at large as to what India was doing to destabilise it, threaten its security and block all means of prosperity and progress through CPEC. For years, Pakistan

had been telling the world about Indian brutalities and atrocities within Pakistan as well as in Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJK). With such proof out in the world, Pakistan made it clear that if the international community does not act to prevent India from continuing its state-sponsored terrorism then Pakistan would be free to presume that ensuring peace and stability in a nuclear South Asia is not their priority.

Undoubtedly, India's actions inside Pakistan have resulted in the deaths of a large number of Pakistanis and no longer can a blind eye be turned to this behavior of a state which refuses to adhere to international laws and conventions. Briefly, India has provided Rs22 billion over the years for reorganising and uniting the shattered terrorists for promoting terrorism in Pakistan. Indian embassies and consulates in many countries are the hub of terror sponsorship and the Indian intelligence agency, RAW, according to the dossier is paying Rs10 million for each suicide terrorist attack in Pakistan.

It is worth mentioning here that this time, the world at large was growing increasingly responsive to Pakistan's stance on India's state terrorism and the matter was also being highlighted by the foreign press. Outside of sponsoring and supporting state terrorism by all possible means in Pakistan, India also continues to resort to unprovoked violations of the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan's armed forces, while exercising maximum restraint, are also prepared and ready for any misadventure by India. Such violations like killing innocent civilians, including women and children, have expedited ever since fascist Prime Minister



INDIA SPONSORING TERRORISM INSIDE PAKISTAN

Narendra Modi, obsessed with RSS philosophy and promoting Hindutva, has come into power.

According to information given to the media by DG ISPR at the second joint press conference with the Foreign Minister, India is presently operating as many as 66 training camps for sponsoring and harbouring terrorists on its soil and also in Afghanistan.

By addressing two news conferences within a matter of few days from each other, the Foreign Minister and the DG ISPR have fully exposed India for its state sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan and efforts to sabotage CPEC. By opening the eyes of the international community through the dossier. And presenting it at various forums, at the appropriate levels, we have left it up to them to act now before it is too late.

Many details have been avoided for want of space here and may be dilated upon some other time for keeping the readers updated with regard to Pakistan's just and full of facts stance and urging the world at large to play its much desired role to prevent India as a whole.

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25. Changing Strategies

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

Published in DAWN, December 05th, 2020

CAN we attribute the apparent decline in terrorism in 2020 to the erosion of extremist ideologies or to the militants' physical and territorial losses? Successful intelligence-based operations have either eliminated hardened terrorists or pushed them across the border. The Afghan peace talks, Covid-19 and influx of militants from other conflict zones to Afghanistan have all influenced the current landscape. Besides looking at incidence rates, we need a fair evaluation of the capability, capacity and ideological appeal of terrorist groups.

Once organisationally intact, over time the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan split into factions. Mullah Fazlullah's death has once again shifted the TTP's command from the Swati to Mehsud group. Mufti Noor Wali's ascendancy as emir redefined the TTP's priorities. Besides resolving inherent factionalism, these now include reconsolidation and searching for new partners.

In August, two breakaway factions, Jamaatul Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar, rejoined the TTP. This development speaks of Noor Wali's 'reconciliation' efforts. The TTP's new priorities have also led to reported collaborations with ethnic sub-nationalist groups in Sindh and Balochistan, which not only undermine the TTP's ideological posture but also speak of its desperation.

Though the major kinetic battle seems almost over, ground realities suggest that the global war against terrorism has entered

another prolonged phase of violent extremism. Military operations, target hardening and border fencing have established the writ of the state in weakly governed areas, leading to a significant reduction in the frequency and lethality of attacks. But to regain lost space and influence, these groups may form alliances or merge with each other.

How has terrorism evolved in 2020?

The future relationship of the TTP and Afghan Taliban will likely remain limited to ideological linkages or operational collaboration. Though the TTP and Daesh (IS) are poles apart, collaboration may not only give the TTP a boost but also provide it access to technology and weapons, while Daesh may benefit from the TTP's dormant networks and geographical knowledge.

Sectarian and regional influences remain active in pockets of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi, though there's been a shift from suicide to IED attacks. This raises several questions. Have they exhausted their reserves of would-be suicide bombers or are they trying to maintain their armoury? Are they facing problems in recruiting or financing? Is it because the masterminds were killed or the motivational speakers neutralised?

Terrorists have also transitioned from a blow-and-kill to a fight-and-die strategy. By targeting the Pakistan Stock Exchange in June, militants tried to undermine public as well as foreign investor confidence. The Peshawar madressah bombing and attacks in Kabul indicate that education institutions are now high-priority targets. Besides attacking the youth, they seek to exploit sectarian fault lines. 'Impact generating'



CHANGING STRATEGIES

activities are the new priority. To retain the sympathies of common folk, they continue to mainly target LEAs and security personnel.

There have been other changes. With people spending more time online in 2020, extremists are trying to gain influence in cyberspace. And while, historically, weather has determined the fighting season in Afghanistan, in recent times militants have tried to maintain pace throughout the year.

Since 9/11, 78 groups have been notified as proscribed organisations. In 2020, five groups (three ethnic separatist and two sectarian) were proscribed. Monitoring such groups is a concurrent jurisdiction where multiple departments collaborate. Pakistan has tried to maintain transparency and synchronise its efforts with international practices. It also made improvements to the surveillance and revision of persons placed under the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Presently 3,234 persons are on the list while previously there were 6,660. This reduction speaks of the transparency and improved working of CTDs.

In erstwhile Fata, besides intensified hard options, soft interventions coupled with local administrative reforms and community engagement will earn positive dividends. In Balochistan, establishing cadet colleges and youth skills development plans will help counter extremism. Biometric verification of SIMs has also proved effective. This should be revised to limit ownership to two SIMs per person. To counter foreign narratives, FM radio stations must be made functional in the tribal districts.

The six-year-old National Action Plan needs to be revised to facilitate stakeholders and readjust operational priorities. In the ongoing battle, adaptability and innovation will enable states to defeat terrorism. But success will not be possible without public empowerment and engagement in countering violent extremism.

The writer is author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace. Tweet @alibabakhel.



26. India's Ugly Face of Terrorism Unmasked

Sajjad Shaukat

Published in the Nation December 07th, 2020

In his book, *The Prince*, Machiavelli suggests that the rulers should use terror to obtain their goals and foreign ventures to divert the attention of the public from all internal crises. Since Narendra Modi became the Indian Prime Minister, he has been following the discarded tactics of Machiavelli through the Indian intelligence agency, RAW.

Recently, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United Nations, Munir Akram, handed over to the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, a dossier on India's campaign to promote terrorism and subversion in Pakistan. He urged Guterres to force New Delhi to cease illegal and aggressive activities by pointing out that India was violating international law, the UN Charter and the Security Council resolutions.

Earlier, at a briefing along with the Director General (DG) of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Major-General Babar Iftikhar, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi unveiled a dossier containing 'irrefutable evidence' of India's sponsorship of terrorism in Pakistan. He said, "India is sponsoring terrorism from its soil and beyond Pakistan. We have taken another step forward with regard to exposing Indian acts of sabotage like terror financing and supplying of weapons and equipment to various militant outfits operating on Pakistan's soil. India is using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy."

DG ISPR further revealed that India is running 87 terrorist camps; 66 in Afghanistan and 21 in India. Furthermore, India united Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with other banned dissident organizations along with enhanced efforts to reestablish Daesh-e-Pakistan. Foreign Minister Qureshi expressed similar thoughts as well.

However, in the recent past, some terror attacks were carried out in Karachi, Ghotki and Larkana in Sindh, as well as Balochistan, Waziristan and Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—leaving several people, including some security personnel dead and a dozen injured.

RAW is in collusion with the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad, and has established its network for assisting terror-activities in various regions of Pakistan through terrorist groups like Jundullah and TTP as well as their affiliated outfits. RAW is also using terrorists of the ISIS, which claimed responsibility for a number of terrorism-related assaults, in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Being cognizant of these factors, during his recent visit to Kabul, PM Imran Khan focused on deepening bilateral ties and encouraging the intra-Afghan peace process. He assured the Afghan government of Pakistan's unflinching cooperation to end violence in the country by adding that peace and connectivity was the best way to ensure the prosperity of both the countries, even the entire region as well. Both PM Khan and President Ashraf Ghani agreed to accelerate their joint efforts to reduce the recent spate of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan through close coordination.



INDIA'S UGLY FACE OF TERRORISM UNMASKED

Notably, it was due to the key role of Islamabad that the US and Taliban signed the agreement in Doha –the capital of Qatar on February 29, this year. The agreement states that, working with other NATO allies to proportionally reduce the number of coalition forces, America would withdraw all forces from Afghanistan in 14 months. However, through a tweet, the US President Donald Trump surprisingly announced, on October 7, that all US troops in Afghanistan could be home by Christmas.

American analysts and NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, warned that Trump's plan would weaken Kabul's position in the intra-Afghan talks and would further strengthen the Taliban. The outgoing President Trump was in favour of a complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, but now the Pentagon has announced to retain some troops in that country after all. This backchanneling on the issue of total withdrawal, as per the commitments made at Doha, could lead to a widening trust deficit.

Islamabad cannot afford instability in Afghanistan, while Indian support to terrorist outfits continues to destabilize these two countries; particularly Pakistan which has unmasked Indian ugly face of terrorism. Addressing the 2020 Afghanistan Conference in Geneva, Foreign Minister Qureshi termed Pakistan as a major stakeholder and the largest beneficiary of peace in Afghanistan and apprised the international community about Pakistan's constructive contribution to the ongoing Afghan peace process.

The writer focuses on international affairs and is the author of the book, "US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations". He can be reached at sajjad_logic@yahoo.com.



27. Countering Extremism

Tariq Khosa

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The Government’s decision to establish a commission “for implementation of national narrative and development of structures against violent extremism and radicalization” is a significant move towards countering violent extremism (CVE) and terrorism (CT) in the long term. In a meeting last month, the cabinet approved the proposal submitted by the interior ministry and the draft legal framework is currently under consideration by its sub-committee on legislation headed by the law minister. This initiative requires debate and ownership by state and society.

The primary objectives of the proposed commission include: (i) providing a legal mechanism to curb violent extremism; (ii) enforcing national narratives and policies in line with the National Action Plan (NAP); (iii) establishing a policy review board under the commission to coordinate with ministries, government departments and academia; (iv) establishing a Centre of excellence to conduct degree and diploma courses in CVE and CT; (v) establishing a national facility to design and implement strategies in deradicalisation, rehabilitation, and psychological and religious counseling of prisoners and detainees involved in terrorism; (vi) prohibiting offences related to VE and sectarianism; (vii) preparing deradicalisation modules, strategies and vocational training programmes for suspected terrorists and extremists; and (viii) promoting awareness through print and electronic media, publications, seminars, conferences, etc.

Extremism must be addressed through policies that include strategies and action plans, clarity on CVE laws, and national consensus on narratives. The first-ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP

2014-18) suggested “constructing a robust national narrative on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism, and militancy as the cornerstone of an ideological response to non-traditional threats”. Mere words, no action. An under-resourced Nacta could not achieve this.

Also so far on paper alone, the NISP 2018-23 was nonetheless an improved version adopted after extensive consultation with all political parties, and contained an effective institutional mechanism designed in consultation with all provinces. What is the use of making policies if they are not to be implemented? Intriguingly, we still do not have a comprehensive national security policy despite having established a national security division a few years ago. A military doctrine has limited scope. An all-encompassing security policy must prioritise socioeconomic and human development, supported by all elements of national power.

What is the use of making policies if they are not to be implemented?

NACTA drafted detailed CVE policy guidelines in January 2018 after extensive stakeholder deliberations. These identified the drivers of extremism and covered areas such as the rule of law, service delivery, media engagement, education policy, promotion of culture and the four ‘R’s: reformation, rehabilitation, reintegration and renunciation strategies. Extremism was broadly defined as “having absolute belief in one’s truth with an ingrained sense of self-righteousness”. Such a mindset was then “likely to be accompanied with violence” to impose one’s belief system. The CVE guidelines should have been adopted to reduce intolerance and violence in our society. Similarly, Nacta’s policy review of NAP in 2019 found that actions were required in nine out of 20 points. The government should pay attention to the guidelines and policy review.



COUNTERING EXTREMISM

The 22-point, 120-page Paigham-i-Pakistan, was launched in January 2018 through the joint efforts of the Council of Islamic Ideology and Higher Education Commission. Currently, it has more than 5,000 signatories. It can be the basis of a national narrative against religious extremism. Reportedly, the CII is toying with the idea of converting it into law, thus criminalizing any violations of the decree. This would be a dangerous path to tread, as witnessed recently with the Tahaffuz Bunyad-i-Islam bill in Punjab. The role of the state is that of an enabler and facilitator, not an enforcer, in matters of faith and belief of individual citizens.

Another recent development deserves attention. Extremism has been defined in the Citizens' Protection Rules (Against Online Harm), 2020, as "the violent, vocal or active opposition to fundamental values of the State of Pakistan including the security, integrity or defense of Pakistan, public order, decency or morality, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs". This definition is problematic, ambiguous and likely to promote internal discord. It calls for serious review. It took more than two decades to restrict and rationalize the definitional aspect of terrorism in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, when in 2019 a Supreme Court bench restricted its scope by delinking acts of terror from personal enmity or private vendetta. Similarly, defining extremism requires thorough deliberation.

In its report in 2013, the UK's Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalization and Extremism quotes from the 2011 Prevent strategy in which extremism is defined as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs". The similarities between the UK's and

Pakistan's definitions may be a coincidence, but it is worth noting that the British government has abandoned plans to define extremism in law after being told it would criminalize legitimate political and religious activities.

Lord Anderson, former independent reviewer of UK's terrorism legislation, recently said, "The notion [of extremism] is far too broad to be suitable for legislation. Coercive state powers should not be applied to 'extremism', but only to specific types of violent, abusive and anti-social conduct that there is a sufficiently strong reason to prohibit." According to Sara Khan, appointed to head the UK Counter-Extremism Commission in 2017, "Government cannot tackle extremism alone. Extremism is complex and new laws may not result in a reduction. Civil society and communities are vital partners," and "Extremism is a threat to our rich diversity and fundamental freedoms, and it requires a whole society response."

Setting up a CVE commission is a good idea. However, I urge policymakers to pay heed to the words of Edith Wharton: "True originality consists not in a new manner but in a new vision."

*The writer is director of the National Initiative against Organized Crime and author of **The Faltering State and Inconvenient Truths.***



28. Policing the Police

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

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POLICE accountability is much discussed but less implemented. It constitutes holding the police responsible for what they do, organisationally or individually, and monitoring their policies and practices, addressing issues such as failing to register cases, poor investigations, custodial torture, corruption and abuse of power. The police have powers to arrest, detain and use force, and therefore must be held accountable for violations of this authority. In developing societies, however, a ‘blue wall of silence’ within police ranks facilitates the concealment of misconduct and abuse.

Globally, the police are accountable to the bureaucracy, parliament, judiciary, civil society and human rights and independent oversight bodies. Historically, however, accountability and interference have often been used interchangeably. Police services in societies like ours confront colonial structures but democratic expectations. Political interference is often justified as being in the public’s interest while in reality representing elite interests.

The Police Act, 1861, did not provide for autonomous external oversight, leaving the police accountable to internal chains of command or to the executive. Article 8(e) of the Police Order, 2002, incorporated accountability. Section 6(2) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa PA 2017 opted for more clarity. Article 8(2) of the Sindh Repeal of PA 1861 and Revival of PO 2002 (Amendment) Act divided the police department into 17 branches but did not include an exclusive accountability branch

as envisaged in PO 2002. Balochistan opted for PA 1861, maintaining silence on the question of an exclusive internal accountability unit.

Article 155 of PO 2002 explains the penalty for certain types of misconduct. Though it was intended to improve public safety standards, it has often been used against junior officers, thus undermining its purpose. In some cases, officers were wrongly implicated to ease public and media pressure. Some faced both criminal and departmental proceedings. While officers have the right to appeal, prolonged processes demoralise the innocent. An independent body is needed to review disciplinary decisions. Article 171 of PO 2002 and Section 126 of KPPA 2017 offer immunity to officers who acted in good faith while performing their duty. But innocent officers often fail to get such protection. Besides ensuring fairness, weightage must also be given to fact-finding inquiries.

To follow due process during a search, seizure and/or arrest, police must follow a code of conduct. Under Article 114 of PO 2002, the IGP must issue such a code, which should be audited to assess its effectiveness. In UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169, the CoC for law enforcement officials refers to accountability. Articles 7 and 8 require police to combat corruption. The Paris Principles define minimum standards for national human rights institutions.

A ‘blue wall of silence’ facilitates misconduct.



POLICING THE POLICE

Police recruitment criteria must also be changed. Scrutiny regarding involvement in discriminatory behaviour, criminal acts and human rights violations, as well as suitability for public service, needs to be made integral to recruitment processes.

In response to the huge volume of complaints against the police in the 2006 Prakash Singh case, India's supreme court passed seven directives including establishing police complaints authorities at state and district levels. In Pakistan, though police accountability is a concurrent jurisdiction, owing to dysfunctional public safety commissions and complaint authorities at all levels, the process lacks institutional fairness.

Internal and external accountability mechanisms have strengths and weaknesses. The public considers the latter more credible. The former relies heavily on the commitment of senior police management. Trans-parency also needs the engagement of other actors and institutions, such as human rights commissions. The efficiency of an internal apparatus can supplement an external one, thereby expediting the accountability process.

Complaint authorities and public safety commissions must have a pluralistic composition (i.e include women and minorities) of members selected transparently to ensure credibility, and be linked with parliament to enhance autonomy.

Effective parliamentary oversight of the security sector requires proactive standing committees. These are not possible without instant access to information, sufficient resources and enhanced legal and operational understanding of the criminal justice system. The existence of transparent procedures will protect operational autonomy of the police as well as public safety.

Policing the police is not possible without functional federal and provincial police complaints authorities, public safety commissions as envisioned in PO 2002 and regional police complaint authorities mentioned in KPPA 2017. Public safety will remain elusive without accountability, professionalism and autonomy.

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29. The Key to Peace and Prosperity in Balochistan

Major Adil Raja (R)

Published in the Nation January 04th, 2021

I could tell straight away that he, an officer, wanted to talk. He came in to see me as part of a four-member scholars syndicate working on their thesis, which is a part of their M. Phil in media studies. As a Major in the Pakistani Army, he belongs to the Marri tribe of Balochistan. Before he joined the Pakistan army, his father took up arms against the state. By the time he was commissioned, his father had been arrested and put in jail.

As our young Major, in his late twenties now, kept diligently serving in the Army, his father was released by the State. This gesture impacted his father and the entire tribe in such a way that their whole attitude towards the State took an absolute turnaround. Now, they all proudly identify themselves as Pakistani first and then Baloch.

What I learnt through this heart-to-heart conversation with the officer is that all it took for this change of heart were a few rounds of sincere negotiations, brokered by his well-wishers in his unit, to get his father released from the prison. This gesture had a positive ripple effect. Upon his release, his father talked to fellow tribesmen, enabling them to think and reason.

As the Major was opening up to me, he wanted to underscore the message that negotiations must be a viable option under all circumstances. As the former US President, John F. Kennedy, famously said, “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”

Poverty, development and education are the key concerns of Balochistan, where people are being exploited by our enemies which are desperate to block the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC). Unlike a regular job, it doesn't require any education or physical standards to work for an Indian sponsored insurgency in Balochistan that pays well enough to provide bread and butter to the families. Working for the Pakistani state, or CPEC related projects, is the first choice of Baloch people. However, due to a lack of educational facilities in the vast and erstwhile province engulfed with poverty, it is practically impossible for the Balochi population to get mainstream jobs in Pakistan. The sole exception are the youths who are getting education in institutions run by the Pakistan Army. The Army also educates the locals on the opposition and disinformation campaign so that development in areas otherwise considered as inaccessible or unfriendly to business projects happens.

Pakistani military has given the world a textbook on counterinsurgency, but the nature of operations, vis-a-vis Balochistan, is different from that in the North-West frontiers. Vast terrain, sparse population and an inaccessible geography makes it a different ball game altogether. Negotiations before operations was the technique adopted in the North-West Pakistan's exemplary counterinsurgency operations by the Pakistani State. However, negotiations alongside operations should go on for the counter-insurgency protocols in South-West Pakistan as well.

Peace in Afghanistan is also an important aspect to control insurgency. It is a known fact that Indian intelligence agencies based



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in Afghanistan are training, arming and funding Balochi youth that are tasked to carry out terrorism inside Balochistan and also in different cities and suburbs of Pakistan. The exposed Indian network in Iran, headed by Indian Navy's officer, Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav—deputed in RAW—was an eye opener for the world. Jadhav's arrest and the subsequent interrogation by the Pakistani authorities revealed how vast and sinister India's terror network is in the region and why peace is so elusive.

Alongside counterinsurgency and counter-intel operations, Chinese investment should help to neutralise the Indian network in Iran. India's frustration after Sino-Iran Chabahar deal amply indicates how much of a setback India saw it to its regional foreign policy in which terrorism is being employed as an integral tool by itself.

Another integral element to bringing the indoctrinated Baloch elements on the table is to bring about an understanding between the warring Baloch tribes. Vested interest and power games inside Balochistan—tribes baying for each other's blood and constantly fuelling the centuries old feuds—need to be addressed by the State. Negotiations, as our young serving Major exhorts, are the key to opening this door. This ultimately leads to the path of a prosperous Balochistan, the largest and the most resourceful land mass in Pakistan.

An institutional process for talks based on the above mentioned points should be evolved at district levels, comprising all stakeholders. The agenda of the dialogue should be initiated and formed at tehsil levels by incorporating all stakeholders through negotiations. Recommended solutions decided by the District Negotiations Body (DNB) must be adopted at provincial and national levels as well. Feedback of the dialogue and subsequent issues or actions must be discussed regularly in the DNB as well as communicated down to the tehsil levels through media outlets.

Our holy prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) believed in negotiations as the means to end any conflict. His whole life teaches us the importance of negotiations to settle conflicts which were won not only by sword, but through wisdom and peaceful negotiations as well. The victory of Mecca was the sum total of all the efforts, in the end achieved through negotiations in which our holy Prophet pardoned even his personal enemies, for the sake of peace and stability, which became the basis of a global Islamic.

The writer is a freelance columnist.



30. Fighting Terrorism

Malik Muhammad Ashraf

Published in the Nation January 15th, 2021

While there are no two opinions about the fact that our valiant security forces and law enforcing agencies have broken the back of the terrorists and cleared Pakistani territory of their outfits, they still retain their ability to stage attacks on symbols of state power and civilians. Of late, Balochistan seems to be their preferred target. The province has been in the grip of sectarian and separatist terrorism for a long time. The cold-blooded murder of 11 miners belonging to the Hazara community carried out by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in collaboration with Daesh was preceded by the attack on an FC post in Harnai on the night of December 26, 2020, in which 7 FC soldiers were martyred and an assault on a convoy of security forces in Omara in October in which several soldiers and security guards were martyred; this suggests that the fight against terrorists is not yet over.

These incidents, however, in no way reflect on the dedication and commitment of the nation and its security forces to eliminate this scourge. DG ISPR, in a presser revealed that during the last twenty years, 1200 operations were conducted to root out terror outfits killing 18000 of them besides eliminating and capturing 1100 Al Qaeda operatives. Pakistan also shared intelligence with 70 countries. The effort, according to him, cost the country 83000 lives including civilians and security personnel and financial loss to the tune of \$126 billion. He also asserted that over 3,71,000 intelligence-based operations were conducted under operation Radd-ul-Fasad and resultantly, terrorists' support

bases, their facilitators, abettors and financiers have been eliminated and no organised terrorist infrastructure exists in Pakistan. He claimed that terrorist incidents had declined by 45 percent and over 50 percent terrorist threats were averted during the last year. Similarly, Karachi has witnessed a decline of 95 percent in incidents of terrorism, 98 percent in target killing, 99 percent in extortion and 98 percent in kidnapping for ransom.

The dilemma is that terrorism in Pakistan has both internal and external dimensions. As for as Balochistan is concerned, it is India which is supporting the insurgency and acts of terrorism in the province. Indian involvement was corroborated by Kulbushan Sudhir Jhadav, a serving commander in the Indian Navy who was arrested on March 3, 2016 in Balochistan while crossing over from Iran in a counter-intelligence operation. He was found in possession of a valid Indian passport with a fake name of Hussain Mubarak. During the investigation, Jhadav confessed to the Indian intelligence agency RAW being involved in destabilising Pakistan and he was a serving officer of the Indian Navy working in Pakistan at its behest. He also acknowledged that he launched covert operations against Pakistan from the Iranian port of Chabahar for which he used to get instructions from Joint Secretary of RAW Anil Gupta. According to him, RAW had been funding the Baloch separatists for carrying out their insurgency operations. Kulbushan also admitted that he had been directing various activities in Sindh and Balochistan on directions from RAW since 2013 and had a role in the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi.



FIGHTING TERRORISM

He was awarded the death sentence by a military court after due process of law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at Hague announced its verdict on the Kulbushan Jhadav case; while rejecting Indian plea for annulment of the military court decision of awarding death sentence to him and ordering his release and repatriation to India, it observed, "Though Pakistan had been found in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Access it is not the conviction and sentence of Mr Jhadav which are to be regarded as violation of Article 36 of Vienna Convention." The verdict was a confirmation of the Indian involvement in supporting and sponsoring of terrorism in Pakistan.

RAW, in collaboration with the Afghan intelligence agency, NDS, has also been helping and supporting the TTP in carrying out acts of terrorism in Pakistan. Irrefutable corroborative evidence exists about the use of Afghan soil concerning APS and Badaber Airbase attacks.

The situation left no choice for Pakistan but to take a unilateral decision to fence the entire border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and set up watch posts to check cross-border movement of the terrorists. Reportedly, 83 percent of the fencing of the 2611 km border with Afghanistan has been completed so far and the rest is likely to be completed mid-year. Similarly, 37 percent of fencing along the Pak-Iran border has also been established.

The foregoing revelations amply prove that our security forces and intelligence apparatus is dealing with the scourge of terrorism in an effective manner and the government is trying to eliminate the scourge by all means with unflinching resolve. But it is regrettable to note that whenever a terrorist attack or incident occurs, certain elements start blaming it on an intelligence failure and the government also comes under unwarranted flak. Those indulging in such criticism do not understand that we are fighting against an invisible enemy. If we look at the history of countries which had to face the scourge of terrorism and how long it took them to eliminate and subdue the menace, it can be safely inferred from their experience that there is no quick fix solution to it. For them, fighting terrorism has invariably been a long drawn-out war with debilitating social, economic and political consequences. Italy and Sri Lanka are examples in recent history. Pakistan may also have to brace for a long-term fight against terrorism due to the complexities involved. But given the commitment and unswerving resolve of our security forces and the government as well as unstinted support of the masses, we would by the grace of God emerge triumphant in this battle.

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31. Digitisation of Pakistan's Economy—Security Aspects

Major Adil Raja (R)

Published in the Nation January 16th, 2021

He sounded so convincing, on the phone, with his posh English accent. I received his call from a local line, local to the scenic town, on the outskirts of London that I lived in, one of the home counties of England, where my wife was born and raised. Thankfully she was with me while I listened to the gentleman on the phone's speaker. He craftily told me that my credit card had been used to pay a suspicious online transaction. In order for him to cancel the transaction, he required me to confirm my card details. Being a fighting army officer with a straightforward and no-nonsense kind of an upbringing, I most probably would have been taken in by the cheerful sounding man on the other end of the line, but the lawyer in my wife realised what was happening and to my surprise she told the man to "get lost". After all, God did make wives to keep men on the straight and narrow.

Living in a digital economy can be quite challenging until you get used to it and even then, there is always an element of opportunity for the cons and crooks. Awareness about digital fraud coupled with law enforcement, equipped with dealing in digital crimes down to the police station level is very important.

Prime Minister Imran Khan, in his efforts to make "Naya Pakistan," brought in the idea of a digital revolution, capitalising on the human resources in Pakistan. His government embarked upon the ambitious journey of digitising the economy. The

move has only now started to pay off, and is just the beginning of a long journey of digitisation. Pakistan has the potential to turn the wheels of the economy through this digital revolution; in the financial sector in particular. The whole credit goes to Prime Minister Imran Khan's team for starting this revolution.

The Pakistani remittance record through the Roshan Digital Account is one of the major success stories of this commendable effort. Prime Minister Imran Khan is making use of the international monetary system through the State Bank of Pakistan and is a good model to show the world about Pakistan's investment potential, but it requires people to get used to the digital economy. For this initiative to succeed, the people of Pakistan have to voluntarily contribute. The success of digital banking initiatives and participation by citizens is an interdependent arrangement which will eventually run alongside the overall development of the country.

It however, must keep in view the security aspect of protecting the sanctity of a digital economy, making it safe from online financial frauds. It requires a comprehensive mechanism, having the muscle to enforce laws relating to the digital economy. Having a district level policing mechanism; with proper training, equipment and dedicated manpower will be a step ahead in future. It would be an investment which will create consumer confidence required for such a colossal change in mindset fixed on the cash economy. Even developed countries find it hard to cope with the number of financial crimes faced by them, due to shortage of manpower. If we can overcome this



problem using the abundantly available workforce at an affordable price in Pakistan, then this would in turn revolutionise the people's mindset due to the security offered by a digital economy. Voluntary enforcement is the key to a society's success.

This is where Prime Minister Modi went wrong in India by forcing digitisation of the economy. He failed in his pitch to sell the idea which is now evident from the sorry state of the Indian economy, despite having seven times more potential than that of Pakistan, in terms of population-based growth of a digital economy. People simply don't trust online transactions, due to everyday frauds originating in India. The Indian government faces the same problem as the developed world, that of having an underpowered policing system, unable to secure the digital economy and provide swift justice for petty financial frauds occurring regularly through con artists.

If we have to make a difference and take advantage of the digital system; roping in an attractive consumer market for investors, we must make an impregnable security system ensuring safety of a digital economy, free from financial crimes. The ultimate success of Pakistan's digital economy depends on the security given to it.

“To have something you've never had, you have to do something you've never done.”

The writer is a freelance columnist.



32. Religious Harmony in Pakistan

Hafiz Muhammad Tahir Mahmood Ashrafi

Published in the Nation January 17th, 2021

Our dear homeland Pakistan is the most important country in the Islamic world and the first nuclear power in the Muslim world.

For the last four decades, Pakistan has been facing multiple challenges and its adversaries have been trying to portray it as a weak state that relies on others for its survival. Indeed for a long time, Pakistan has been the victim of terrorism and sectarian violence, but that is now history. Whatever conspiracy is peddled against Pakistan, the reality is that it has successfully defeated terrorism.

Though Pakistan is now 90 percent out of the terrorism mess, international terrorist groups in Afghanistan are still conspiring to target Pakistan. These terrorist organisations have been conspiring against Pakistan with Indian support. There are currently being reorganised by India but Pakistan's security agencies are constantly thwarting their conspiracies.

The present government has a clear policy from day one to eradicate the menace of extremism and terrorism from Pakistan and make it a peaceful, stable and tolerant country.

It would not be wrong to say that the official status of Madaris education has been formally recognised after seventy years. In the past, the degrees of Madaris Educational Boards were recognised only as honorary degrees and were considered equivalent to MA Islamic Studies or MA in Arabic, that too by a few government departments. Many simply did not

recognise them. However, as a result of continuous negotiations with state officials, not only has the registration issue of seminaries been sorted out, it was also decided that along with the religious education Madaris will also impart conventional education up to Intermediate. It was also decided that the government would not interfere in the affairs of the seminaries and their curriculum unnecessarily.

The Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Imran Khan, has appointed me as the Special Representative for Religious Harmony and the Middle East. I have been assigned a special duty to promote and strengthen religious harmony and begin an interfaith dialogue with key stakeholders, to dispel misconceptions related to Pakistan and Islam. Alhamdulillah, Pakistan is today one of the safest countries for minorities. Look at India where minorities are in perpetual danger. More than 2,000 churches, hundreds of gurdwaras and mosques have been targeted. Massacres of minorities and forced conversions have become a routine matter in India. Also what is happening to Muslims in Europe, the United States, and the United Kingdom under the guise of Islamophobia is no secret.

With the praise of Allah, protection of the rights of minorities in all walks of life according to the Constitution of Pakistan is being ensured in every possible way. During the last three months, issues of forced conversion, forced marriage and blasphemy have been closely watched, and in case of any complaint, the matter was resolved immediately. In this regard, I can responsibly say that Pakistan has no major issue related to the rights of minorities.



RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN PAKISTAN

Most of what we hear is propaganda. Nevertheless, we still are vigilant and ready to solve the problem. How the Ulema-e-Islam and the 'Khatam-e-Nabowat Lawyers Forum' reacted to the false accusation of blasphemy against six Christian workers in Lahore was a step in the right direction. The religious scholars and the lawyers have also agreed that in the event of misuse of the blasphemy law, not only will the attempt be stopped but action will also be taken against the perpetrator.

Despite the outbreak of the corona pandemic, Christians were provided full security during their festivity days, especially on Christmas. A function was also held in the Presidency to send a clear message that the protection of the rights of all Pakistanis, as enshrined in the Constitution, is the responsibility of the state. Those who attacked the Hindu temple in Karak had been arrested. Not a single voice from across the country was raised in their support while the religious scholars have demanded full action against the perpetrators. Prime Minister Imran Khan had taken a personal interest in the arrest of the accused involved in the Karak incident. Similarly, the Chief Justice of Pakistan also ordered the Temple without delay. All these actions show that the state is seriously protecting the rights of minorities. As the Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, my office is working round the clock to address the grievances of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Progress is being made to establish interreligious and interfaith harmony councils at the union level to resolve issues at the local level. We are also working to bring an end to the culture of hate speech and writings. Although the Muttahida Ulema Board Punjab has been working on it for a long

time, with the coordinated effort of concerned departments, the trend shall now be spread across the country.

This article will not be complete without mentioning the continuous persecution of Hazara community members in Machh, Balochistan. They have been the victims of terrorism for a long time and the role of anti-Pakistan forces is clear in these instances. India is supporting ISIS and Pakistan's banned organisations in Afghanistan. ISIS has claimed responsibility for terrorism in Machh, Balochistan. Although some internal and external elements tried to spread hatred and politicise the tragedy, the Hazara community leaders, scholars and elders, and the government of Pakistan not only thwarted it but for the first time, the government solved the problems of the Hazara community by signing a written agreement on the instructions of Prime Minister Imran Khan. We strive to welcome positive criticism and respond effectively to unwarranted propaganda, be it on issues of minorities or the problems of Pakistanis in the Middle East. It is our utmost priority and first responsibility to resolve all these issues. Insha Allah, I will soon write on the government's goals and our efforts in the Middle East.

The author is a globally recognized Muslim Cleric and the Chief of the All Pakistan Ulema Council in Pakistan. Serving as special representative to the prime minister on religious harmony.



LESSON LEARNED

33. Lesson Learned

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

Published in DAWN, January 19th, 2021

HAD perfection been the reality in intelligence and law enforcement, attacks like 9/11 would have been averted and the world may have not experienced the damaging, costly war on terrorism.

Initially, militants exploited flaws in our apparatus and incubated in weakly governed areas. Dedication, volunteerism and unpredictability worked to their advantage. Technology, innovation and mobility further intensified violent extremism. Only states opting for a diagnostic indigenous approach and tailored strategies on learning from past failures were successful. What lessons did we learn?

In the initial onslaught of militancy, our legal framework, capacity, CT apparatus and intelligence sharing were weak, and police responded to threats on a case-by-case basis. Improving legal, institutional and coordination responses took another decade. Four accords struck with militants (2004-08) proved to be appeasement, in which peace was the casualty. This policy's failure reduced the scope of soft approaches and led to successful military operations. The consequences of such operations were not worked out well in advance.

Militants persistently changed tactics and targets. Groups re-emerged with different names, and to put restrictions on such entities Pakistan proscribed 78 organisations. Militants transited from suicide attacks to VBIED attacks, from target killings to IED attacks, and from a

blow-and-kill to a fight-and-die strategy. Targets changed from hard to soft, and from tribal to rural and finally urban areas.

To invest in policing is to invest in peace.

During a surge in sectarian extremism, Punjab's response was commendable; a dedicated CT department was established in 2010. To collate data and intelligence, and coordinate among stakeholders, Nacta was established. The APS attack and increasing attacks on civilians resulted in the National Action Plan and National Internal Security Policies 2014-18 and 2018-23. The establishment of provincial apex committees also speaks of improved civil-military coordination and responses.

After 9/11, the criminal justice system remained dependent on military assistance. Flushing militants out of Karachi, Fata and parts of KP and Balochistan would not have been possible without the collaboration of the army, FC and Rangers. For speedy disposal of terrorism cases and improved conviction rates, military courts were established. Of the 10 constitutional amendments enacted since 9/11, four related to Fata reforms and military courts. In the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, 87 changes were made (48 in 2013-14), which shows our reactive approach. Australia, which did not experience any significant terrorist attack, enacted 82 anti-terrorism laws.

Before 9/11, the ruling elite considered policing a non-developmental affair and was reluctant to invest in it. A surge in attacks on politicians increased the threat level and their understanding of its gravity. Governments generously enhanced financial allocations. To share the extra



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burden, one per cent of the divisible pool of the NFC award was earmarked for KP. Balochistan and Punjab enacted laws for relief and rehabilitation of civilian victims, which warrants more transparency and a centralised databank of human and financial losses.

Terrorism cannot be eradicated through sole application of soft or hard approaches. For one, the state is obligated to provide free, compulsory education under Article 25-A, but to bring over 22 million out-of-school children back requires a practical plan.

Communities must also be empowered. Persistent attacks on police infrastructure led to KP Police improving and standardising the design and security of its stations. But a militarised outlook negatively impacted community relations. An effort was made to improve this by incorporating public liaison councils, regional police complaint authorities, and public safety commissions in the KP Police Act, 2017, yet besides PLCs these bodies remain non-functional.

At the height of militancy, Lady Reading Hospital treated about 80pc of those injured in terrorist and drone attacks in KP and Fata. The KP Emergency Rescue Service Act, 2012, was passed. KP's Rescue 1122 has since responded to 689 terrorism-related calls. The improved response strengthened police-public relations.

Though Pakistan has developed the institutional infrastructure for counterterrorism, gaps within the legal and institutional framework of counter violent extremism need to be addressed. Ambiguity on the part of the state works to the advantage of non-state actors, while reactive law enforcement erodes public confidence. Internal security is our first line of defence, so to invest in policing is to invest in peace. As a front-line state in the fight against terrorism, we should share our successes with friendly states in the form of training.

Though many of us are not fond of learning from history, repeating it is not a viable option. Creating history is better.

The writer is author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.



34. Roots of Extremism

Anjum Altaf

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DOES the left hand know what the right one is doing? I was forced to ask this question on being updated on recent measures to counter terrorism in the country.

I learnt that the government has set up a commission “for implementation of national narrative and development of structures against violent extremism and radicalisation” one of whose objectives is “establishing a centre of excellence to conduct degree and diploma courses in CVE [countering violent extremism] and CT [countering terrorism]”. Another objective is “promoting awareness [of extremism and terrorism] through print and electronic media, publications, seminars, conferences, etc”.

This reminded me of the bizarre state of modern medicine. If you go to a doctor with a general malaise he/she would, if you are lucky, have your blood pressure measured and, if it turns out high, would prescribe you a pill to take every day to keep it under control. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred, the physician would not bother to discover why your blood pressure is raised and so you will be on a lifelong medication whose dosage would be progressively increased as you grow older. Ditto for cholesterol, uric acid or anything else that might be above the prescribed range. You will never be cured and meanwhile the drugs would wreak all sorts of unknown damage on your body.

Now we will be establishing centres of excellence to conduct degree and diploma

courses in CVE and CT which will be progressively upgraded to HEC-approved universities with their own vice chancellors, provosts, registrars, etc all of whom would have official residences, vehicles, POL and telephone allowances. Meanwhile, friends and relatives would be wined and dined at international conferences and study tours would be arranged to countries that have successfully done what we have now so admirably set out to do.

Rigid thinking inclines societies towards zealotry.

Also, there will not be a single word in the print and electronic media, publications, seminars, conferences, etc about how we got saddled with the extremism and terrorism that we have now set out to eradicate. Did they just drop out of the sky? Or were they always with us ever since Aug 14, 1947? Or are they a test that some divine power has devised for its followers who have to pass it by fire to prove their worthiness?

As long as there is no honest discussion of how we got this sickness, there will be little hope for a cure. We won't even know if we are serious in undoing the causes of extremism and terrorism or if we are just going through the motions to tick off a box on some checklist that has been handed down to us to regain good standing in the international financial system of banking transactions.

I also learnt that NACTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority) had drafted detailed CVE policy guidelines in 2018 in which extremism was broadly defined as “having absolute belief in one's truth with an



ROOTS OF EXTREMISM

ingrained sense of self-righteousness” which mindset was “likely to be accompanied with violence” to impose one’s belief system.

Given this definition of extremism, how do we square the setting up of a centre of excellence to conduct degree and diploma courses in CVE and CT with the curriculum that is intended at the school level to inject an absolute belief in one’s truth with an ingrained sense of self-righteousness which, to repeat the Nacta prognosis, is likely to be accompanied with violence to impose one’s belief system?

To go back to when and how extremism and then violence entered our society, can we not discern a connection to the parallel attempt to impose a uniformity in our thinking from early childhood with a heavy dose of an absolute belief in one’s truth with an ingrained sense of self-righteousness — in other words to the cradle-to-grave imposition of Pakistan Studies and some other subjects in our educational institutions? And can we not put two and two together to see that this was done to create the national narrative that would endorse and support the conscious nurturing of extremism for equally admirable geopolitical objectives?

The objective conditions in Pakistan today are giving rise to broad trends of conformity, rigid thinking, and loss of imagination that incline societies towards extremism and violence. Everyone being made to learn and think the same truth on pain of being declared anti-national can only yield an unreflecting mass and a submissive society which is what authoritarian rulers drool over in their dreams.

Thus we see the paradox of a centre of excellence at the tertiary level to undo the damage inflicted at the elementary level. The only question of interest is whether the left hand knows what the right one is doing or whether both are clapping to the same tune?

The writer is a former dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Lums.



35. Security Projections for 2021

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in the DAWN, January 24th, 2021

PROJECTING trends of insecurity and violence is not an easy task especially for countries like Pakistan where security challenges are complex and state responses cursory and sporadic. Against all prognostic fears over the past year, the security situation in the country remained relatively stable for which law-enforcement agencies can take the credit. However, keeping in mind the fast-changing militant landscape, 2021 will be another challenging year, and countering terrorism will remain the top priority of the security forces.

The year 2020 sustained the declining trend in the incidence of terrorist violence in Pakistan that has been ongoing since 2014; the year witnessed a 36 per cent decrease in the number of terrorist attacks as compared to 2019. Contrary to different assessments, even in the time of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic the security landscape of Pakistan did not witness any major shift. However, the frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks slightly increased from May to July, particularly in the North Waziristan district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Again in October, the terrorists stepped up their attacks and that trend continued until the end of the year. Despite the huge dent in the militant infrastructure, the operational capabilities of terrorist groups are still intact and new formations also emerged over the last year, which according to some conventional assessments could negatively affect the security situation in the country.

Tackling religious extremism will remain a low priority for the state.

As in the past several years, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan remained the major actor of instability in 2020 when it was found to be involved in 46 terrorist attacks. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) was the second major lethal group, which perpetrated 19 attacks in the course of the year. The trend shows that the TTP's operational base is shrinking fast as out of the 46 attacks it perpetrated in 2020, as many as 40 were concentrated in KP alone. The TTP is regrouping in the Waziristan and Bajaur districts to create physical space for itself. But so far, even after the merger of several small groups and splinters, there has not been any major shift in the group's operational priorities.

The militant Islamic State group carried out two terrorist attacks last year. However, the group's claiming the killing of 11 Shia Hazara coal miners in Mach early this month was an indication that its Pakistan chapter or an organisation influenced by its ideology is still active in Balochistan and may continue to pose a threat in the future.

Last year, six Baloch insurgent groups remained active in Balochistan, but the BLA and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) were the two major groups that carried out most of the reported attacks from the province. The BLA even carried out two attacks outside Balochistan including the coordinated one on the Pakistan Stock Exchange in Karachi. It is an indication that Baloch insurgent groups are trying to expand their area of operation while focusing more on south and south-western Balochistan besides continuing to show their presence in Quetta. Throughout the



year in 2020, violent Sindhi nationalist groups launched several attacks on the security forces and Chinese nationals in Sindh. This worrying trend indicates there may have been a possible rapprochement between the BLA and BLF, and these groups' alliance with the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army has complicated the security challenges.

It is likely that in 2021, terrorism-related challenges and responses will revolve around CPEC and the security and safety of Chinese nationals in the country. The Baloch insurgents are already known for their terrorist activities against Chinese nationals and CPEC, and last year, violent Sindhi nationalist groups had also joined their league while attempting to target Chinese nationals in Karachi. Religiously inspired terrorist groups are also desperately looking for soft targets, which could have an immense impact on CPEC security. In this context, the safety and security of the CPEC projects would be a top priority for law-enforcement agencies.

Fulfilling the conditions of the FATF will remain a challenge, which will ultimately put pressure on militant groups and leaders of banned militant groups. An anti-terrorism court in Lahore recently sentenced Lashkar-e-Taiba supreme commander Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi to five years in prison, which is another indication that state institutions have decided to fix the top leadership of banned militant groups involved in terror-financing cases. The top leadership of the Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) including its head Hafiz Saeed have already been booked in several terror-financing cases. There are indications that action would be taken against the leadership of other militant groups, especially the banned

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), over similar charges.

It is interesting that the JuD has not reacted to the arrest and trial of its leadership, which is an indication that the group is still cohesive and has decided to contest its cases in the courts. But JeM could be a different case, as it has a history of fragmentation and its splinters have in the past taken up arms against the state. Law enforcement will remain vigilant about the possible backlash from JeM if their leadership is booked in terrorism-financing cases.

However, tackling religious extremism will remain a low priority for the state, despite the fact that incidents of communal violence and religious and sectarian hatred have become a regular feature of Pakistan's security and political landscape. In one of these incidents, the shrine of a Hindu saint was vandalised and torched in Karak. Similarly, while on the whole sectarian violence has come down in Pakistan in recent years, sectarian discord and the groups promoting it continue to persist.

The state's tolerance towards extremist groups is the latter's major strength. State institutions still believe that the threat posed by the extremist groups can be dealt with through political tactics. The government has not devised any strategy to reduce the appeal of their narratives and it is quite possible that the extremists will continue exploiting the government's weakness.

The writer is a security analyst.



36. The Soul of Pakistan

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in the DAWN, February 21st, 2021

RELIGIOSITY has begun to define the Pakistani citizenry. Those who wield power see it as a positive trend that can achieve national cohesion. Unfortunately, instead of helping to inculcate better ethics and integrity, this phenomenon is encouraging a tunnel vision.

The recent hounding of Nobel Laureate Malala Yousafzai on social media over her response to a tweet by the fugitive militant Ehsanullah Ehsan reflects the mindset of a large segment of Pakistan's social media consumers who are not willing to stand by a girl under threat from terrorists. The trolls are spewing what they have absorbed over the years — religious, politico-ideological and patriarchal sensitivities and biases. They are also casting doubt on Malala's patriotism because, after the attack on her, she was medically treated and educated in the UK.

Such trolling in Pakistan is not new as many campaigns of the sort have been unleashed over the years. The ideological and political credentials of many of these trolls are very well known. It does not matter why a specific segment of social media consumers launches smear campaigns against sane voices in Pakistan; indeed, one can see it as a form of collective response by that class. What is of greater concern is that countering responses to such campaigns are either missing or very weak. The social media campaign against Malala was mean; most of the trolls appeared willing to allow concessions to a notorious militant, who had claimed responsibility for the killing of hundreds of innocent Pakistanis. Does this

relate to support for Ehsanullah's 'religious credentials' and the state's provision of impunity to him, or was it a manifestation of inherent biases against Malala and others of her ilk?

The trolls are spewing what they have absorbed over the years.

The government's response was vague. Initially, the prime minister's focal person on digital media stated that the tweets threatening Malala were posted from a fake account. However, it was proved later that the account was not fake as Ehsanullah confirmed this statement which was a veiled death threat to Malala. The government was not taking the issue seriously and wanted to brush it under the carpet as it usually does with issues relating to religion or religious groups.

Interestingly, the government itself uses religion to express its vision about Pakistan's future as a welfare state. The prime minister often refers to the 'state of Madina' in his speeches but hardly contests the radical views of extremist religious groups on statecraft and governance. If the government really believed in the state system established by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) in Madina, it would be projecting Misaq-i-Madina as the document of its vision. Misaq-i-Madina was the social contract formed to defuse tensions among different communities, including those between the Muslims and the Jews of Madina.

Sticking to a religious ethos could be an attempt by the government to exploit the religious sentiments of the people as well as to confront political challenges thrown at it by religious political parties. The JUI-F is



one of the ruling PTI's major political rivals, and uses religion as a tool against Prime Minister Imran Khan by casting doubt on his loyalty to Islam and Pakistan. On the other hand, the religion-oriented vote is increasing in Punjab and Sindh, which worries the security establishment. The Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan is still relevant to the political landscape of the country; it had more than two million votes in the 2018 general election. The religious parties would gain more power if the PTI government failed.

Ironically, the establishment has been promoting the idea of a transparent political order led by a clean man for the last three decades, which has damaged the political landscape by depoliticising all political nurseries — from educational institutes to local bodies.

The 'third party' mantra had somehow worked in the last election, but so far the affairs of the state haven't seen any radical change and the government has failed to cope with the challenges or introduce any radical reforms in governance and the economy. Failure of the PTI government to deliver will add to the prevailing disillusionment of the middle class and marginalised segments who will be exploited mainly by the religious political parties.

For the common man, the state of Madina is an ideal welfare state based on a just society. Who can exploit this concept more than the religious parties? And the establishment will see no harm in sharing power with the religious parties if matters reach a level where no other choice is left. After all, all religious groups have remained

partners of the establishment at various levels and for different purposes.

For the establishment, only religion can glue the nation together though it does not share its ideas on statecraft with the religious parties. It has its own reasons which various scholars have tried to justify in different ways.

Faisal Devji, professor of Indian history at the University of Oxford and author of *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*, has attempted to see the phenomenon through the lens of the caste system as well. One of his recent articles shows how the caste system still shapes the power structure in India and Pakistan and has an important role on the power chessboard. The bania (business community) holds on to an austere kind of religiosity, which the Brahmin (clergy) claims. Their alliance either with the Kshatriya (civil and military bureaucracy), Brahmin or Shudra (labour class) in power brings more focus on bhakti (accommodative religious tradition).

He argues that in Pakistan, the equivalent of the Kshatriya-Shudra grouping became an absolute majority with the separation of the eastern wing. As for the clergy, their declining status has allowed them to emerge as ideological brokers for groups making claims to power in the name of religion. Perhaps they will soon be successful in evolving their alliance with the civil-military bureaucracy. One can imagine what the country would look like. May Malala's dream for a prosperous and progressive Pakistan come true.

The writer is a security analyst.



HOW TO TELECAST VIOLENCE AND TERROR?

37. How to Telecast Violence and Terror?

We live in an integrated digital environment where privacy has slowly shifted from the private to the public domain

Faisal Ali Raja

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Our collective perception is a function of electronic and social media. Our viewpoints are formed on the basis of coverage of violent incidents, their projection and presentation on a daily basis. The influence of such telecasts on the viewers vary over a wide spectrum depending on their education level, nature of understanding, duration of violence transmission and its frequency of repetition. Strengthening the rule of law and establishing the writ of the state cannot be accomplished if the media keeps televising violence regularly with negative connotations. It also promotes extremist tendencies and goads innocent minds towards violence and terror. Since the most important thing in establishing security within a region relies on developing a sense of safety among the people, therefore violence or terror should be televised in a manner that explores the positive aspect of the incident too.

The recent attack on the Islamabad High Court (IHC) by members of the lawyer community was telecasted in a way which sent a negative message to ordinary people. It indicates that assaulting the office of the IHC Chief Justice is a possibility for anyone. The ransacked offices point towards three important aspects of the rule of law and its social perception in the country. First, it shows that one can go to any extent including raiding the office of

the head of a constitutional entity. This ossifies the idea that such action is within the bounds of an individual, a group, pro-state actors or a mob in the country. Second, it indicates the fragility of the local security apparatus to tackle the situation in a timely and effective manner. The police's response seems to be tampered by circumspection and tactfulness as they foresee an awkward situation for themselves in case they participate with alacrity without institutional support. Third, it establishes a strong statement that an illegal act cannot be undone by a legal procedure as the accused start raising their voices against the action with wrong allusions and references.

Interestingly, this is not the first incident of its kind as the electronic and social media have been relaying videos which dampen spirits and pollute people's minds. This does not mean that we should restrict media coverage of an incident, however a positive angle of violence may be kept in mind during transmission. For example, the assault on the IHC CJ office should have been covered with handcuffed assailants in police custody, which would uphold the perception of the rule of law. Similarly, instead of capturing blown up pieces of cars or human remains in a terrorist incident, the media should depict effectiveness of local security in curtailing and reducing the intensity and impact of terrorism. Moreover, officials of LEAs who come on media in describing the incident should do so with a positive depiction of the local security apparatus. In many terror incidents, the media's display of LEAs is marked by uncertainty and ambiguity, thus strengthening a sense of fear and insecurity among people.



HOW TO TELECAST VIOLENCE AND TERROR?

We live in an integrated digital environment where the concept of privacy has slowly shifted from the private to the public domain. Though every violent incident cannot be censored, these events can be televised in a constructive manner. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) has issued comprehensive guidelines which encompass all aspects of televising a terror or violent incident. It also emphasises on the training of anchors and media staff for sensitisation.

Every citizen has a right to know what is happening in the country but social and electronic media have the monopoly of control over people's perception in a way which may produce positivity or negativity in the hearts and minds of people. Therefore, the strength of positive perception is the basis of security, cohesion and unity of a country.

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38. Proxy War Against Pakistan

Malik Muhammad Ashraf

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It is an irrefutable reality that Indian leaders, both past and present, have never accepted Pakistan as a reality and it has been their innate desire to reunite India or in case of failure to achieve that objective, to harm and weaken Pakistan irreparably.

Three wars over Kashmir and the role played by India in the dismemberment of Pakistan are rousing testimonies of the inherent malice that it harbours against Pakistan. The animosity unfortunately, did not end at that. India has been relentlessly engaged in maligning and denigrating Pakistan at the global level through sustained and false propaganda and the contrived narrative of Pakistan being a hub of terrorism. The revelations made by the European Disinfo Lab in regards to the web of deception woven by India to mislead and misguide world leaders and opinion makers about Pakistan is indeed mind-boggling, and clearly indicates Indian malevolence and depth of the thought process to achieve their nefarious designs. It has spurned all overtures by Pakistan to make a new beginning in the relations between the two countries through peaceful resolution of disputes between them, including Kashmir.

Since the advent of Narendra Modi—a hardcore disciple of RSS ideology of Hindutva—the animosity has been taken to a much higher level. Scrapping Article 370 of the Indian constitution, ending special status of the state, its subsequent bifurcation into two territories and annexation to the Indian Union followed by the law to change demographic realities and the suppression

of the freedom movement through ruthless use of force, has created a very alarming situation which poses a grave threat to peace and security in the region.

India has also been waging a proxy war against Pakistan, which has been intensified by Narendra Modi's government. The indication of this escalation came when Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) attacked the stock exchange in Karachi on June 29, 2020 and in a statement issued after the attack, it warned to intensify its struggle against China's interests, if Beijing continued to remain "involved in Baloch exploitation". The attack carried the hallmark of the 2018 BLA attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi. Not only was It designed to scare investors but also to send a warning signal to China since its companies took over the management control of the stock market in 2016 after acquiring 40 percent of the shares. These shares are held by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange and China Financial Futures Exchange. The group has also been targeting Chinese nationals working on the corridor projects in Balochistan. It killed several workers in a bus attack in Dalbandin district about three years ago.

According to media reports, a special desk has been created in RAW to undermine and thwart the implementation of the CPEC and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan have gathered authentic information to this effect. The RAW Chief who reports directly to the Indian Prime Minister is personally supervising the venture.

Besides supporting BLA, India has also been financing activities of Daesh, TTP and other terrorist outfits. Indian involvement in



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the sectarian and separatist terrorism in Balochistan is a proven reality as confessed by the Indian spy Kalbhushan Jhadav.

Recently, the province has seen resurgence in acts of terrorism. In the first week of January 2021, eleven miners belonging to the Hazara community were massacred, preceded by an attack on FC post in Harnai on the night of December 26, 2020 in which seven FC soldiers were martyred. In another attack on a convoy of security guards in Ormara in October 2020, several soldiers and security guards were martyred. The BLA was also responsible for an attack on PC Gwadar and killing several workers employed on CPEC projects. India's RAW, has also provided sanctuaries to the Baloch separatists on Afghan soil besides setting up training camps for them.

The foregoing facts leave no doubt about the fact that India, through a sustained proxy war, was not only trying to sabotage the implementation of CPEC in Pakistan but also using all overt and covert means to destabilise and weaken Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan has shared a dossier with the UN, US and other countries containing irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement in sponsoring terrorist acts within Pakistan and extending support to Baloch insurgents and other entities on the terrorist list of the UN. But it is a regrettable reality that nobody seems bothered about state terrorism by India and the brazen attempts to foment instability in a neighbouring country.

That criminal apathy to the situation created by India portrays a hypocritical dimension of global politics which is subservient to the strategic and commercial interests rather than concern for humanitarian causes,

international law and UN conventions. It explains why issues like Kashmir and Palestine have remained unresolved and the respective perpetrators of oppression and persecution continue to pursue their nefarious objectives with unruffled focus. It is indeed an affront to the UN, a body responsible for maintaining and promoting peace and making sure that all member states act in conformity with the principles enshrined in the UN charter.

India, through her proxy war against Pakistan has created a very dangerous situation. Pakistan and India are both nuclear powers. Any military confrontation between them can have disastrous consequences for the region and beyond. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the UN and those who never tire of professing their humanitarian credentials, adherence to the principles of the UN charter and love for peace, to prove them through concrete actions. Expressing concerns and then looking the other way would lead to further aggravation of the situation, to the detriment of the interests of all the regional and global stakeholders in peace and security.

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39. The Cyber Reality

The cyber space has been a favourite medium for opinion transmission of extremists for their needs

Faisal Ali Raja

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Undoubtedly, cyber space will dominate the future. It is an expanding domain which is experiencing modification on a daily basis. New things are being introduced with modern interventions giving the space more adaptability and accessibility. As the world embraces the cyber reality, the threat template is also shifting from physical to non-physical space. There are three broader areas in which the cyber domain is going to impact developing countries in years to come. First, an upsurge in cyber-criminal activities may force countries to focus on counter cyber-criminal activities creating a void in cyber security. Interestingly, cybercrime and cyber security are distinct fields but are closely linked. Lack of cyber security enhances chances of high cybercrime.

Second, conventional intelligence collection mechanisms may not work as the cyber space provides an all-encompassing avenue of authentic, speedy and reliable information collection. Third, young minds are required to keep pace with the dynamic state of cyber world and many developed countries have outsourced their cyber security structures to youth with special skills of cyber entrepreneurship. These individuals coin new ideas and come up with new techniques to break codes, hack systems and venture into sensitive cyber networks to introduce viruses, cyber jamming software and remote computer communication retarding techniques.

The cyber space has been a favourite medium for opinion transmission of extremists for their needs, networks and narratives. They need to influence young minds to cultivate them for focused goals. This is a dynamic state of action which finally culminates in radicalising the youth. The networks are live relationship wires which can be activated anywhere depending on the group's requirement. Moreover, national fault lines are exposed and criticised with full force in the cyber space. For example, the number of sectarian attacks in cyber space has increased manifolds since last year.

These include audio and video messages against different sects often resulting into exposing inter- or intra-sectarian susceptibilities. The cyber medium is the most important carrier of extremist narratives of different groups or organisations. The terror actions are also being shifted to the non-physical domain with each passing day. For example, recently former TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan allegedly threatened Malala Yousufzai. Though it was rebutted by the government and was labeled as a fake tweet, such attempts show the extent of cyber space and its far-reaching effects. Even if the account was fake it was employed to spread disinformation and intimidate a person living hundreds of miles away. The Nobel laureate, subsequently, tweeted critical remarks against the government and an investigation is under process too.

The alleged tweet by Ehsan highlights three important factors. First, it enhances the importance of cyber space which can be conveniently used to hurl threats against a



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personality with an ensuing criticism against a government for a lackadaisical attitude. This not only creates international media ripples but raises questions on the CT action spectrum of a country. Second, militants are no longer required to use the physical medium for action impact. They can now create impressive activity in the non-physical sphere through a simple tweet or message on a social media platform.

Third, a faster and speedier cyber network will present a more complex challenge to a government or a cyber-monitoring department in a developing country as the response time may reduce further for blocking unwanted online content. Here, the electronic evidence collection, its preservation and presentation are areas of concern.

An effective model may be evolved through developing a collaborative approach between the FIA and provincial counter terrorism departments (CTDs) for investigation and apprehension of extremist elements involved in criminal cyber activities.

The cyber reality is here to stay and it will keep on presenting a dynamic challenge to any country. We need to wake up to this reality as soon as possible.

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WHAT IS TERRORISM?

40. What is Terrorism?

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in DAWN, March 7th, 2021

THE Financial Action Task Force has announced that Pakistan would remain on its grey list for further monitoring for another four months. In this period, the country will have to improve its financial transaction mechanisms so that these are not misused by terrorists and criminals. Apart from other measures related to effective investigation and prosecution, and the implementation of eventual sanctions, Pakistan would also have to make more laws in order to comply with the mutually agreed action plan.

Pakistan amended or made almost three dozen laws during the past year to meet the FATF requirements. All these changes and new laws were essential to bring Pakistan out of the FATF's grey list in order to dispel the negative impression about the country's 'soft stance' towards certain militant groups. More than a year ago, the Supreme Court had also recommended that parliament develop a new and comprehensive legal definition of terrorism. Apparently, as the Supreme Court judgment did not detail any punitive consequences, the government did not take it seriously despite the fact that a clear definition of terrorism would have not only brought clarity to counterterrorism functions but would also have improved the government's performance in implementing FATF-related measures.

The term 'terrorism' is still defined in a vague and contradictory manner.

The legal community and law-enforcement agencies have been demanding an amendment to the definition provided in Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997, but the state has been reluctant to touch it. Ironically, the persisting, decades-long challenges of religiously motivated

terrorism and violent extremism have failed to 'influence' the policymakers for that.

In its judgement, the Supreme Court had observed that the definition provided in Section 6 of ATA 1997 had failed to capture the essence of terrorism and had often been misused for multiple reasons. The court was in particular concerned about the legality of the definition. In Pakistan's legal or policy lexicon, the term 'terrorism' is still defined in a vague and contradictory manner, to the extent that it is not fully clear what 'terrorism' is and what distinguishes it from other forms of political violence.

Since its inception in 1947, the country has encountered several waves of political agitation and violent movements, which have been ethnic, linguistic, sub-national, communal and religious in nature. Violent religious, political and ethnonational movements continued posing security threats throughout the country's history. Violent protests against religious communities, especially the campaign against the Ahmadi community in Punjab in 1953, insurgencies in Balochistan, ethnic and linguistic-based violence in Karachi, low-scale ethnonational violent agitations in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and sectarian conflict in Gilgit-Baltistan shaped the security approach of the state.

Organised religious movements for the enforcement of the Sharia, and sectarian disagreements, both of which turned violent time and again, posed a more complex security challenge for the state. Despite facing all these challenges, it took Pakistan 50 years to define terrorism in 1997, and even so, the ambiguities still surrounding the definition forced the Supreme Court to weigh in. All through the various legal measures that Pakistan has taken to deal with terrorism-related security challenges, the legal definition of terrorism has remained vague. It is far from being comprehensive and criminalises expressions of sectarian hatred and certain



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violent political acts, which are already listed as punishable offences under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC).

Pakistan does not have any official definition of extremism either and usually, extreme actions of religious hatred come under the PPC or ATA domain. Violence is an integral part of terrorism, militancy or insurgency, whereas extremism may employ persuasion manoeuvres to draw advantage. For example, the banned sectarian outfit Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan has consistently claimed to be a non-violent movement, but its leaders have often indulged in inciting violence against another sect and yet got legal relief by not being found directly engaged in perpetuating violent acts.

Nationalist insurgents and religious militants use terrorism as a tactic to create chaos, disorder, fear and to undermine the state's authority. They also employ other tactics to attract people and expand their support base, including via provision of social services for locals, offering alternative delivery systems, such as maintaining law and order and setting up informal courts as the Taliban did in Afghanistan and the UNSC-designated terrorist group Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) did in Pakistani tribal areas.

They also run their propaganda campaigns, and their activities other than violent actions have similar objectives, but can these too be described as terrorism? Section 6 (5) of the ATA does say that any act undertaken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation amounts to terrorism. When former TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan surrendered to the security forces in 2017, he claimed amnesty on the ground that he had never been part of the TTP's terrorist operations, rather his task was confined to running its media affairs. Hence the question: who is a terrorist? Are terrorists only combatant units or non-combatants as well? And does every action

of a terrorist, even if non-violent, automatically and always amount to terrorism?

The confusion deepens when one tries to distinguish between terrorism and terrorists. Before his eventual indictment in a terrorism-financing case, the legal advisers of Jamaatud Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed had pleaded in court that he had never been found involved in any terrorist activity in Pakistan and he did get relief from the courts every time. There have been many other examples of this sort.

In a nutshell, parliament has to develop a clear definition of terrorism. Causing fear, violence, the deliberate nature of the act, targeting of civilians, disturbing the domestic, regional and global order, issuing threats (all this by non-state actors) are some common vital elements in every definition of terrorism. However, all these expressions need to be defined as well. The task is not beyond the capacity of parliament and it can restrict the meaning of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the crime and political/ideological motives, and avoid broad interpretations and political misuse.

The writer is a security analyst.



41. Changing Security Paradigm?

Muhammad Amir Rana

Published in the DAWN, April 04th, 2021

A SERIES of recent events has led many to speculate that winds of change pertaining to the national security paradigm may be blowing in Islamabad's policy corridors. From the Pakistan army chief's calling on India and Pakistan to bury the past and move on, and the exchange of letters between the two countries' prime ministers, to the renewed discourse on bilateral trade — despite the subsequent backtracking — it reflects Pakistan's apparently changing and intertwined national security and economic diplomacy outlooks. And this is happening at a time when an initial draft of the long-awaited national security policy is expected to be soon submitted to the prime minister.

Successive governments in Pakistan, since 2008 to be precise, have struggled to craft a brand new, comprehensive national security policy. They assigned the task to diplomats, bureaucrats, and retired generals, who submitted the drafts to their respective governments. While the governments, for reasons unknown, preferred not to announce or make public those policy drafts, portions of these made their way into the media. They indicated a shift from geostrategic to geo-economic considerations, and the insertion of non-traditional and human security dimensions into the orbit of national security. The last policy document had gone a step further by adding a component of regional connectivity to supplement the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative while conceiving Pakistan as a transit state. Although previous versions have already covered most essential elements of national security, both internal and external, the incumbent government claims that the

policy draft it intends to put forth would be the outcome of a more inclusive process.

However, it is difficult to understand these 'mysterious' inclusive processes in Pakistan, in particular on national security, which evade parliament and are usually considered the exclusive domain of powerful institutions. Lack of parliamentary debate on the issue was also a major flaw in the previous drafts of the national security policy. On the whole, in Pakistan, democracy or democratic processes are hardly considered a factor in nurturing national cohesion, building trust among communities and bringing economic prosperity to the country. There is no harm in getting input from academic institutions and think tanks, despite their sorry state of affairs in the country. At least the standing and special committees of the lower and upper houses can be taken on board. In the end, these committees can ensure implementation and transparency in policy discourse. But the establishment is not a big fan of these committees and often ridicules the 'quality' of the people's representatives.

The fate of the policy framework, which has yet to materialise, cannot be predicted. The bureaucracy has also developed some security frameworks, including the National Internal Security Policy, Counter Violent Extremism Policy, and National Dialogue Policy. However, these policies have never been taken seriously enough to be implemented. The existing power structure is not capable of conceiving new ideas nor can it implement even what it devises on its own. The National Action Plan is another example of this failure, with a little exception in that parliament was taken on board, at least for its endorsement. This is the reason NAP is still alive in memory and we recall it whenever any critical extremism challenge arises.



CHANGING SECURITY PARADIGM?

A shift in our security approach needs open discussion on public forums, media, and in parliament.

Developing a discourse on critical security challenges does not require rocket science. The collective memory of a nation guides its provisions, which are largely related to our lives, society and nation. Drafting may require skill and for this purpose, the bureaucracy is brought in. If shorn of clichés and jargon, the national security discourse can be described in a simple way.

To handle its internal and external challenges, Pakistan needs a strong economy and good relations with the world, especially with its neighbours. Among the neighbours, India is the most critical challenge, mainly because of the Kashmir issue. To deal with India, there are several courses of action possible, including direct talks, mediation or complete disengagement. To defuse tensions, there are few better examples in both countries than the efforts made by Vajpayee, Musharraf, and Mian Nawaz Sharif. If required, these can be used as a template or they can be reinvented, but the most important consideration is leadership.

The relationship between India and Pakistan has passed through many ups and downs. During the good patches it has triggered enormous optimism on both sides, but its fundamentally conventional framework has remained intact. It is interesting that whenever a change in national security is conceived in Islamabad, it starts from the eastern border. This is natural as our political universe revolves around the threat from the eastern side, and this is deeply rooted in our psyche.

In that context, does there need to be a shift in Pakistan's security approach? Does the conventional security paradigm not serve the purpose? If so, why, and what kind of shift does the power elite have in mind?

These questions need an open discussion on public forums, media, and most importantly, in parliament.

Pakistan's political and strategic position has been subject to an international coercive process, where its relationship with traditional allies including the US and the Middle East has gone through a transformative phase, and India has exploited it very well. Since its inception, Pakistan's economy has remained dependent on its political and strategic relationship with the world, mainly the West, China, and the Middle East. Whenever global and regional political dynamics change, Pakistan's economy suffers. The power elites have been successful in so far as realignment and adjusting according to their strategic needs are concerned, but they have never seriously addressed the economic issue.

Pakistan has to focus more on transforming its economy, which may require good relations with India, Afghanistan and Iran. Conceiving everything in the security perspective and putting everything in the basket of human security will further empower the elites, which are least interested in reforming the economy, state, and society, and more concerned about maximising the advantages to themselves. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has become a victim of this mindset. CPEC has great potential to transform the economy and challenge the existing means of production, but the idea has been confined to a narrow strategic and political context.

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42. Targeting State Institutions

Masud Ahmad Khan

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The Pakistan army started functioning with the creation of Pakistan. Since 1947, Pakistan has fought four wars with India and there were continued border clashes along the Line of Control (LOC) and Working Boundary (WB). Recently, on February 25, 2021 Pakistan and India agreed to observe a ceasefire along the LOC and other sectors. In the past, India put to test different doctrines against Pakistan such as Sunderji and Cold Start doctrines etc. However, Pakistan came out with a potential professional response to these so-called doctrines. After failing to impress Pakistan with these doctrines, India has now subjected Pakistan to hybrid and fifth generation warfare. Recently, European Disinfo Lab has once again exposed a disinformation group run by RAW since 2005.

The Indians used fake groups to produce fake reports to feed mainstream media to malign and undermine Pakistan globally. Another objective was to give an impression to the world that Pakistan sponsors terrorism, there is no freedom of expression and Pakistan is a violator of human rights. Domestically, this responsibility has been given to pseudo-intellectuals and paid bloggers to propagate against Pakistan and the Army. Also using some pressure groups in the country to undermine peace and stability in erstwhile FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. They are continuously maligning and targeting Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In 2014, a former DG ISI was accused for plotting an assassination attempt of a journalist. This led to an

organised campaign against the agency by sections of the media.

The Indian electronic and print media took full advantage of the situation. This has not stopped, as some segments of society are pursuing a dangerous line and narrative by targeting not only the ISI but the state itself. In the book, the 'New Arthashastra', it is written that the interests of the state are more important than local, collective or individual interest. In the same book, a definition of national interest by Hans Morgenthau has been given which says, "The main requirements of the nation state are to protect its physical, political and cultural identity against threats from other states".

Some groups are using insulting narratives which have provided space to their followers to sow seeds of hatred. They are trying to incite the army as an institution to rebel against its top brass with the aim to create division between higher and lower ranks. Targeting state institutions and dragging them into politics is highly uncalled for as the armed forces have nothing to do with politics. COAS General Bajwa already made clear, while meeting opposition leaders on September 16, 2020 that we are not interested in politics, this is your job and you have to do it yourself.

Recently, accusations on the army and ISI's top brass have been made by mentioning their names, for the first time in the history of Pakistan. The ISI is one of the world's best-known intelligence agencies and rose to fame after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since then, the ISI is pivotal in defeating terrorism and conspiracies against Pakistan. The ISI's main task is to neutralise the threat from India from the east and also India-sponsored threats from the west. The ISI is a strategic asset of the



TARGETING STATE INSTITUTIONS

country which gives timely information and warning to the government about emerging threats from across the borders. The ISI acts as the first line of defence of the country and has successfully unearthed terrorist networks and sympathisers from across Pakistan. The ISI has defeated the foreign sponsored war on terror in erstwhile FATA, Swat and Balochistan and has rendered invaluable services for the defence of the motherland.

Recently COAS General Bajwa's speech at the Islamabad Security Dialogue was misreported and twisted by some journalists and political media brigades that Kashmir was not mentioned in the speech. Kashmir was mentioned thrice in his speech and he urged India to come forward to resolve the Kashmir dispute. He categorically said, "It is important to understand that without the resolution of Kashmir dispute through peaceful means, the process of sub-continental rapprochement will always remain susceptible to derailment due to politically motivated bellicosity". Misrepresentation of the speech is deliberate by anti-Pakistan and anti-army elements to please their handlers.

Putting our house in order was referred to in the context of economic prosperity, improvement in education, health facilities and above all, unity in a polarised political society. The Pakistan Army is a disciplined organisation and Islam remains its strength. In the army, soldiers are never asked about their school of thoughts. The second factor is love for the country that is Pakistan, that is in the mind always. There is no concept of being a Punjabi, Sindhi or a Gilgiti etc or the region you belong to. A soldier of Pakistan Army thinks as a soldier of Islam and Pakistan. In the army, from a soldier to a general, everybody is committed to the

orders of his superior. There is no question of why, but to do or die.

The Pakistan Army is not in politics since 2007 when General Musharraf stepped down. The Pakistan Army is not and will not be in politics as it is with democracy and will be with democracy. At times, electronic and print media carry inflammatory stories and allegations against serving and retired general officers with misleading headlines, biased reporting based on yellow journalism to malign and defame the institution. Such propaganda undermines the army's credibility and attempts are made to make it disputed among the people. Those hatching conspiracies cannot be well-wishers of the country, and are committing treason by targeting the army's top brass under the cover of freedom of speech.

The Pakistan Army never dictates the media to toe their viewpoint. In the past, the former DG ISPR challenged media owners or journalists who were told to report by the army to disclose it on air. The media is considered as the fourth pillar of state and plays a dominant role in shaping public opinion and setting trends. As a fourth pillar of state, the media has to strengthen national integration and boost the morale of troops and counter hostile propaganda mostly by Indian media which continues to spew anti-Pakistan venom. There is a famous quote, "There will always be an army in your country, if it's not yours, then it will be your enemy's". Stand with your armed forces for keeping the future of Pakistan secure and prosperous.

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43. The Taliban — The Future Choices

The future holds a tight situation for Afghanistan with violence spilling over its borders into neighbouring countries

Faisal Ali Raja

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The Biden administration is reviewing the Afghan peace process with circumspection and caution. We may, therefore, see a different American exit strategy. Already, strong statements have been exchanged between the new US administration and the Taliban and the complexity of the issue should be seen through the lens of US-China international competition. Unfortunately, all stakeholders have been fixated with the post-peace phase leaving an implementation void in the process' current key requirements, which has been consistently exploited by spoilers. Moreover, the two main international players involved have conflicting objectives. One wants to finish the longest war overseas with the presence of a strong government of its liking while the other aspires for a regional development plan with Afghanistan at its core. The clash of these objectives has opened new possibilities for those previously sidelined on multiple pretexts. These elements are now exploiting the US thinking to confront the Chinese hegemonic ambitions through creating favourable groupings of democratic countries to retard Chinese development plans. A counter encirclement of China and its partners is also in progress. Interestingly, the internal political situation of the regional countries also fails to mitigate the security concerns inside Afghanistan. So now what choices are available to the Taliban if US commitment of troop withdrawal is not met? How does

Taliban leadership cease the opportunity and defy the adversarial oddity against them? What is the Taliban's strategic thinking post-May 2021?

There are three primary choices before the Taliban which function to maintaining a monopoly of violence in Afghanistan. First, the Taliban can unleash deadly attacks across Afghanistan. This may not only jeopardise Afghan peace but also block possibility of its resumption in the near future. The spoilers of peace shall be the main beneficiary of this as they can project their agenda to highlight the Afghan government as the key legitimate player in the peace process. This can only be achieved if spoilers manage to garner intelligence-based actions against strategic Taliban targets with sustained effort. A protracted conflict is probable in such a scenario with low military-high intelligence US personnel presence in the country. A security cartelisation is envisioned with the local intelligence apparatus strengthening at district and province level. These hubs can then feed the Afghan government for action against Taliban hideouts. However, such a choice reinforces cohesion and dispels disunity among rank and file of the Taliban district, regional and provincial structures.

Second, the Taliban can employ pressure tactics through other stakeholders involved in the peace process. They may also conduct targeted attacks on US assets inside Afghanistan, increasing regional and international rivalries with the possibility of enhancing intelligence and other US military support apparatus in the country. The Taliban also gain through diversifying their networking among regional countries



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for assistance. As a result, they get more physical and non-physical space for refuge, retaliation and resilience. The choice keeps the Taliban in a strong position with active sympathetic support of selective regional players.

Third, the Taliban may agree wholeheartedly to share power with the Afghan government in future along with minimising attacks against Afghan national forces. Such a choice can seriously expose the intra-Taliban faultiness to spoilers of peace. The latter then exploits the factionalism among the Taliban groups and tries to augment confusion and solidify dissension. Such a choice is not at all in the Taliban's favour.

In short, the future holds a tight situation for Afghanistan with violence spilling over its borders into neighbouring countries.

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44. Economic Security within National Security

Dr. Usman W. Chohan

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The first Islamabad Security Dialogue (ISD) was conducted in mid-March 2021 with the aim of drawing upon national and international thought-leaders to discuss how Pakistan's national security calculus should more accurately reflect the nation's multidimensional and interrelated security challenges. The structure of the dialogue, divided into five thematic sessions, reflected the need to incorporate a wider matrix of socio-security challenges, and a recognition that Pakistan must engage proactively on all fronts to attain a greater degree of co-integrated security against hybrid threats.

Two of the sessions, economic security and human security, centred around what once may have been categorised as non-traditional security domains. But in the contemporary global context, shaped by "wicked problems" of climate change, globalisation, population growth, rising non-state actors, and cyberactivity, among various other threats; it was important to point out that economic security and human security are urgent and elevated priorities. The ISD served as an ideal platform to emphasise to a wider audience how these priorities are being recalibrated, given how the matrix of global threats itself is becoming more complex, fluid, and interrelated.

Session 2 of the Islamabad Security Dialogue, for which I served as moderator on behalf of the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), was titled "Economic Security at the Core." It consisted of five speakers from Pakistan

and the United States, who collectively brought a rich set of diverse perspectives on how to develop and assure economic security for Pakistan and the wider world. Although each speaker drew upon their own subject-matter expertise, their combined contributions highlighted several areas of commonality, thereby reinforcing the idea of interrelatedness among concepts that lie within the umbrella term of "economic security."

The foremost takeaway from Session 2 was that economic security should be a central component in any overarching national security strategy, and that our government's emphasis on placing economic security at the core is not just a positive step but a necessary one. Yet in the same way that "national security" is a multidimensional phenomenon, the concept of "economic security" itself comprises an equilibrium among many moving parts. In other words, a nation's power, influence and economic security are deeply intertwined, as noted by the keynote speaker H.E. Razzaq Dawood, and so a holistic understanding of the economic vulnerabilities and their complex relationship is necessary to understand the risks posed to national security.

A second important takeaway was that globalisation continues to represent an important driving force that shapes the economic security (or lack thereof) for all nations. Yet the global economy is transforming, and Pakistan must transform to adapt to a state of globalisation that is itself in flux. The eminent American professor Miles Kahler focused his remarks on this changing nature of globalisation, highlighting how a variety of exogenous factors, including non-state actors and the policies of major powers, weigh upon the economic security of any country. As such,



new modes of globalisation will serve as the backdrop in which Pakistan's economic security will be designed.

A third important takeaway from the session was that regional connectivity is an important stepping-stone for economic security. As was emphasised in the remarks of two notable panelists, Shamshad Akhtar and Haroon Sharif, regional connectivity should be an important goal for any economic security strategy. The converse is also true: economic security lays the precondition for regional integration, which is why cross-border infrastructure connectivity and financial exchange is critical in promoting elements of economic security such as trade and investment. As Haroon Sharif rightly observed, future regional connectivity will not just be based on physical infrastructure, but on information- and knowledge-based connections as well. Pakistan's challenge in regional connectivity has in large part been that its neighbours, due to internal strife or their ideological enmity, haven't offered a conducive environment within which to expand regional connections. However, Pakistan-China cooperation serves as an increasingly valuable counterexample to what is possible in the Asian Century, even in an under-connected region such as South Asia.

A fourth and no less important takeaway regarded the importance of energy policy and of climate change's impact on the modes of economic production. The eminent Harvard professor Joe Aldy informed our session by shedding light on the importance of sustainability in energy policy and in climate action. Pakistan is a particularly climate-vulnerable country, and it has also faced an energy deficit, leaving it to fend against two significant

economic headwinds simultaneously. However, both can be addressed through farsighted measures that include a larger weight on renewables in our energy mix. Economic security in the 21st century cannot be attained without such investments that are mindful of climate vulnerability and energy reliance, which is why Pakistan must be proactive in undertaking a climate-resilient and energy-efficient economic strategy.

Beyond these important takeaways, a significant portion of Session 2 highlighted the challenges that Pakistan's economy now faces, and there is no shortage of adversity in what Pakistan must overcome to realise its economic security. Yet the tenor of Session 2 was one of optimism: what Pakistan confronts as economic headwinds also provide a set of meaningful opportunities. If these obstacles are surmounted and converted into opportunities for economic empowerment, then Pakistan would not just assure its economic security, but also bolster its larger national security. This is why economic security can and should sit at the core of our national security strategy, as the findings of the Islamabad Security Dialogue's Session 2 sought to convey.

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45. The Conversation We Never Had Before

floodgates of extremism reopen in the region, the state has to build this dam

Farrukh Khan Pitafi

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As a powerful blast rocked Quetta's beautifully built Serena hotel, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility, one was reminded of our commitment to fight extremism and terrorism by all means necessary. It seems only yesterday that the vandals from the same terrorist organisation had butchered our children in APS Peshawar and the country had for once come out of its denial and vowed to defeat the menace of terrorism. A 20-point National Action Plan (NAP) that emerged out of top-level deliberations as a consensus document had committed to combating both the hardware and the software of terrorism including the underlying extremist tendencies. Two men, the then army chief and the PPP's co-chairman, Asif Ali Zardari, reportedly played an important role in the consensus-building exercise. The kinetic operations that followed need no elaboration. Operation Zarb-e-Azb and later Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad went a long way in degrading and uprooting terrorist infrastructure. While the armed forces and the intelligence agencies played their part, the civilian side's performance was a mixed bag.

Why is this discussion important today? Because once again the region stands at the crossroads. The Biden administration has announced that it will withdraw troops from Afghanistan on September 11, with or without a lasting solution to the country's myriad problems. Pakistan has already

presented a detailed dossier to the UN and various influential actors documenting India's constant sponsorship of terrorism and export of destabilising ideologies to Pakistan. Some of the details like a Punjab National Bank receipt of a wire transfer to anti-Pakistan miscreants based in Afghanistan have been independently corroborated by the FinCen leaks. There are reports of the TTP factions regrouping on the other side of the border. In such a situation constant vigilance and implementation of the NAP seem the need of the hour. You may not be able to control what happens within the boundaries of other nations but you can certainly do something about what happens at home. This piece tries to address the software side of the problem.

More than one clause of NAP focuses on the issues pertaining to the narrative against terrorism and extremism. Clause 5, for instance, speaks of strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism, and intolerance. Clause 11 declares a ban on the glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media. Clause 14 vows to take measures against the dissemination of terrorist and extremist propaganda on the internet and social media. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks and the unanimous adoption of the action plan, these clauses were quite visibly being adhered to. The TTP's spokesman, for example, stopped or was made to stop making phone calls to live television transmissions and talk shows. Similarly, anchors who were using endism and eschatology to sympathise with the terrorists suddenly started talking about something else. But what happened next



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was quite intriguing. When they absolutely had to mention the kinetic operations against terrorism the otherwise chirpy anchors would transform into these boring automatons and in a soporific voice parrot only one line before losing interest: “Operation Zarb-e-Azb kamyabi se jari hai (operation Zarb-e-Azb is progressing successfully)”. When they had to talk of terrorism, they would churn out word salads that inevitably ended up decrying the murder of citizens by the proscribed organisation but economic terrorism. What is economic terrorism, you ask? Well, using obscure conspiracy theory devices like John Perkins' Confessions of an Economic Hit Man, they would make everything about corruption and about the politicians they did not like. Make no mistake. I am all for fighting corruption. Only that a scourge that has killed over 80,000 citizens and ruined the lives of countless deserves your undivided attention. Attempts to undermine the counter-terrorist, counter-extremist campaign by hijacking the key terms can mean only one of two things. Either you lack the sense of perspective, the sight of the bigger picture, or have sympathies for the guilty party and therefore deliberately misdirecting the conversation. Whatever the reason, this called for a strong counter-narrative against terrorism and extremism. And given the quality of education in this country, many of us emphasised the need for one.

Following these calls succeeding governments have tried to come up with something. But before this, you have to understand the key mistakes that drove a wedge between the state and its people. When General Musharraf received the fateful call after 9/11, the conditions he

faceted meant he had very little wiggle room. Consequently, he could not engage in the dialogue necessary to convince an unnerved nation that what the country was doing was not against Islam and was for the country's greater good. Because he had absolute power there was little the country's powerful clergy could do openly about it. But it certainly felt abandoned and slighted. Meanwhile, the absence of an elected parliament meant that people's representatives were not there to be taken into confidence which in turn could have had convinced people that there was no threat to their faith. A low-level intellectual insurgency ensued which moulded the electronic media which was soon to be free. Instead of confronting the trend Gen Musharraf's political successor just gave in to the trend. General Raheel Sharif's tenure marked a concerted effort but the media effectively steered the conversation away to Karachi and elsewhere where the definition of miscreants did not offend the religious sensibilities of the media pundits.

If you want to know how easy it is to deconstruct the extremist narrative there is a simple example. It took Pakistani clergy over a decade to reach a crucial point: that since suicide was haram in Islam, suicide bombing could not be halal. The simple point. But to arrive here what you needed was the commitment of the political brass. Imagine how many lives could have been saved if this consensus had arrived in time. The state of Pakistan, while working with the clergy came up with Paigham-e-Pakistan (Message of Pakistan), a thin volume building consensus on the rebuttal of terrorism. But here is the problem. In case you have not noticed the forces of chaos have left no stone unturned to create



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more problems for the Pakistani state. This means that with every passing day another latent national fault line will be weaponised and will erupt. A piece of paper, a single document, will be insufficient to fight these challenges. You need a fully empowered, highly well-informed, and liberally funded civilian and transparent think tank or a research body to chart out the future course, build consensus, and combat propaganda with better arguments.

Why should a country which has over 50 news channels have to worry that nobody sees its position? Why should a state with a 96% Muslim population have to fear that its position on the majority religion would be misinterpreted? The media and state religion should be the country's assets, not deficits. And people's civil liberties ought not to come under pressure because of any of this. Before floodgates of extremism reopen in the region, the state has to build this dam. Sadly, it is a conversation we haven't even started yet.

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46. Violent Extremism

Mian Rauf

Published in the Nation April 25th, 2021

Rampant religious extremism and sectarianism are wrecking Pakistan today. The religiously frenzied features of Pakistani culture, politics and society are remnants of the long and dark shadow of General Zia-ul-Haq's eleven years of Islamist rule that structured the entire state as a theatre of religion.

Zia's regime was a setback for a faltering democratic process and ushered in an era of religious obscurantism that affected every facet of domestic and foreign policy. He saw Islam as a part of revolutionary process to overhaul Pakistan. But in the last four decades, there has been a complete erosion of the moral values of our society.

The current unrest erupted across major cities in Pakistan after TLP Chief Saad Hussain Rizvi was detained by security forces in Lahore as a "pre-emptive measure" ahead of the party's April 20 deadline to the government as the PTI government had promised TLP last November that they would take up the matter of the French ambassador's expulsion from Pakistan with parliament in protest against the publication of blasphemous images in that country.

The siege of various cities of the country by mobilised religious bigots has once again challenged the writ of the state. The entire state looked to be powerless against extremist mobs who openly challenged the state's writ. This manifestly represents the strength and influence of religious fundamentalists in Pakistan. The way the administration has collapsed in the face of mob violence is alarming and puts the responsibility of forces in question. It also underscores the state's ability to deal with rising religious extremism.

Religious organisations in Pakistan have a significant influence over particular segments of society, which they can mobilise for their objectives. They draw their strength from their connection to a sizable segment of the society through which they exert pressure on the state to adopt extremist policies.

The role of religious organizations in making Pakistan an Islamic state is well known; their subsequent success in pressuring Z A Bhutto to declare Ahmedis non-Muslims and include clauses in the 1973 constitution to enforce Sharia law is well known. Later, in 1983, General Zia accepted their demand of passing the Hudood Ordinances, which restricted women's rights.

The growing influence and importance of Islamists helped ambitious and bigoted politicians to benefit from the powerful card of religion. The result is a state divided on ethnic, cultural, linguist, sectarian and provincial lines. The state's appeasement policy and pandering to the demands by reactionary forces has emboldened them and made them confident of their power to bring the country to halt.

Extremism is the biggest enemy of the nation, which is not only weakening the already deteriorating governance system in the country but is also undermining national dignity and Pakistan's global image. Given the current religious insecurity, Pakistan has to redesign its narrative and soft policies towards religious bigots and extremists in order to stabilise the state.

It is incumbent upon the state to ensure the supremacy of the constitution and rule of law, which is an effective way to uphold the state's writ. State institutions should not avoid going against bigots who are able to sabotage peace and stability.

The writer is a freelance columnist.



47. Uniting the Muslim Ummah against Islamophobia

Muhammad Zahid Rifat

Published in the Nation April 26th, 2021

The Muslim Ummah is facing three major problems; the burning issue of Kashmir, Palestine and the mounting threat to Muslims in the form of increasing Islamophobia—a menace justified in the name of the freedom of expression in the West.

Prime Minister Imran Khan talked about Islamophobia at least twice during last couple of days while addressing a function and addressing the nation from Islamabad. He called for unity amongst the Muslim Ummah and suggested that all 50 Muslim states unanimously boycott trade with any western country where blasphemy is committed and Islamophobia is practiced at an official or civilian level. Even boycotting products of any country that promotes Islamophobia will be like hitting its economy and will be more effective than merely halting diplomatic relations.

Apparently, this is a gigantic task which the PM has taken upon himself and assumed the role of the leader of the campaign. It is a positive move in the right direction as the collective voice of the Islamic world will certainly carry more weight and impact than that of Pakistan alone.

In all fairness, PM Imran Khan can very easily be ranked to be amongst the first leaders of the Islamic world to raise the issue of Islamophobia at an international level and continues to raise his voice for effectively combating this problem by calling upon the Western countries and

their leaders to show respect to the sentiments and beliefs of the Muslims.

Tackling the menace of Islamophobia was the main theme of his address at the 14th Summit of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) held in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, in June 2019, within months of him coming into power.

This was followed by his maiden address to the 74th UN General Assembly session in New York in September 2019 when he mentioned that trends of nationalism, increased global tensions and giving rise to racial and religious hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities had accentuated Islamophobia. He further explained that Muslims continue to be targeted with impunity in many countries and that our shrines are being destroyed, our Prophet (PBUH) insulted and the Holy Quran was being burnt all in the name of freedom of speech. It was on this occasion that the PM called upon the world to declare an ‘International Day to Combat Islamophobia’ and build a coalition to fight this scourge which, most unfortunately, divides humanity.

In his virtual address to the 75th UN General Assembly session in September 2020, the PM called for willful provocations and the incitement of hate and violence to be universally outlawed. He repeated his demand of the declaration of an international day to combat the menace of Islamophobia.

Continuing his efforts to highlight the evil impact of Islamophobia in the western world, the PM addressed letters to the leaders of all Muslim countries in October and November 2020 wherein he had asked



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for collective action by the Muslim Ummah against Islamophobia. He has also been raising the issue of Islamophobia on other international forums including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO).

The intense diplomatic efforts of Pakistan have started showing a positive response from the Muslim Ummah as a key resolution was adopted by the OIC recently as well. It authorised the OIC Permanent Missions in New York to jointly table a resolution in the UN General Assembly for designating March 15 as the 'International Day to Combat Islamophobia'.

Furthermore, the resolution urged OIC Member States to organise and support various high-visibility events aimed at effectively increasing awareness at all levels about curbing Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred. Monitoring the phenomenon of Islamophobia was encouraged according to the resolution and the UN Secretary General was to initiate a global dialogue on countering rising Islamophobia and promoting inter-faith harmony.

Needless to say that, as pledged by the PM, Pakistan will continue to utilise all available avenues at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels to persistently and effectively counter Islamophobia.

It is a long drawn battle but a step in the right direction has been taken. The continuous efforts by the entire Muslim Ummah in this regard may start showing some signs of impact sooner or later.

Pakistan's missions and embassies abroad, particularly in the western countries, also need to be actively involved with the intelligentsia, public leaders, media people and elected representatives and tell them repeatedly and emphatically that if the Holocaust is not mentioned and talked about in the West, Islamophobia is not acceptable either.

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48. 5G Warfare in Pakistan

M Ali Hussain Dogar

Published in the Nation April 29th, 2021

Since its inception, Pakistan has confronted multifaceted national security threats and one such threat is the one posed by fifth generation warfare. A combination of multiple conventional and unconventional tools, 5G warfare is a military strategy of employing political warfare which includes dissemination of misinformation to accomplish strategic, operational and tactical objectives. A blend of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare, 5G warfare is waged in social and cognitive realms by state and non-state actors.

Subversive in nature, 5G warfare is making Pakistan vulnerable to cyber challenges such as data espionage, information theft, cyber warfare and terrorism. Both state and non-state actors employ these warfare tactics to bleed Pakistan and to coerce and shape its policies to their advantage.

5th generation warfare poses challenges to Pakistan on both external and internal fronts owing to the presence of non-state actors including TTP, ISIS and other Indian-backed sectarian organisations, which create anarchy and chaos through exploitation of ethnic and sectarian fissures, while state actors pose threats internally through political subversion, coercive deterrence and intervention.

In the diplomatic domain, Pakistan is being portrayed as an epicentre of terrorism and an endorsee of insurgencies in other countries. FATF is a prime illustration of how malicious propaganda sways different actors and has direct implications not just for the economy but for security as well.

Economically, CPEC is subjected to misinformation and efforts are being made to bastardise this corridor of economic prosperity by disseminating disinformation regarding its route and increasing trust deficit among provinces. India has been simultaneously and adaptively employing a fused mix of conventional small weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour to vandalise the project. At the same time, the United States is utilizing economic pressure to impede the work of CPEC, and local cliques at the behest of foreign powers have been commissioning internet-enabled propaganda.

Misuse of 5G warfare also threatens the democratic principles of the state, while making narratives and policy implementations worthless at the same time. 5th generation war is irredeemably changing the dimensions of future warfare. Its potential of achieving supra-combinations; tendency to blur the warfare restricted boundaries and capability of transitioning the mode of traditional diplomacy, while curbing the role of modern combined mechanised force have compelled nations to upgrade and redesign their traditional policy framework. This enigma demands modern and non-militarised antidotes. Changing contours of future warfare require reformation in the prevalent national security approaches.

Therefore, the conceptualisation and contextualisation of 5G warfare is imperative to evade doctrinal lag. A long-term strategic perspective of security must be taken, and focus must be shifted from a pure military dimension to conflict resolution. Secondly, the elements of national power must be transformed, not by



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mere reorganisation of governmental apparatus, but by a redefinition of forms and functions. Thirdly, given that the National Action Plan has political consensus and a broad framework of involvement of all the elements of national power, it should be implemented in totality.

Lastly, policymakers have to be exposed to the best information regarding science, technology and innovation. Undoubtedly, this type of war cannot be fought through traditional military means and it requires an ardent use of science, diplomacy and non-conventional military technologies. This war has to be fought through the right tools, knowledge and diplomacy sans brute military force, while adopting comprehensive strategies, which are substantial at this crucial time.

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49. Dilemma of a Security State

The inherent fear of insecurity results into a channelised vision which forces it to pick its enemies in the darkness

Faisal Ali Raja

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A security state is the product of historical friction and a series of unexpected results leading to its emergence on the global stage. The inherent fear of insecurity results into a channelised vision which forces it to pick its enemies in the darkness. The securitisation of every aspect of its national polity produces unnecessary hindrance to its economic, political and social development. The security apparatus becomes prominent overshadowing every section of society. Even non-physical space is saturated with conspiracy theories which project a threatening future for the state. A semblance of known or unknown threat is the only driving force which defines tasks execution and their implementation. The media also highlights security-based issues which overshadow news related to social and cultural activities. The available literature is heavily loaded with security matters making it essential for young minds to grasp the sensitivity of security at an early age. This holds their thinking perpetually hostage to the state's security in terms of its importance and preference.

A security state uses security as a rallying point to unite different organs of the state. Such a method may present multiple challenges for civilian institutions as they grapple with their perceived objectives through the lens of state security. A narrow margin of security syndrome also exists in such a state which is a product of its conventional force inferiority or

geographical depth inadequacy or demographic mediocrity. It forces its security apparatus to strengthen itself even if it has to divert resources from other areas. Any parity condition contains an inherent destabilisation factor which disturbs the equilibrium and insecurity sets in with full control. The security apparatus monitors the development mechanism in other organs of the state and does not let them deteriorate to a certain level. However, during acute security intervals the institutional degeneration may surprise the security apparatus as the state suffers internal disturbances.

There are four possible outcomes of a security state. First, the state may become dysfunctional such that it becomes a failed state in which security apparatus sustains its integrity but can only narrowly maintain internal law and order. Second, certain power centres on the basis of ethnic, sectarian or social characteristics appear in the state. If similar attributes take place in the security apparatus, then the state disintegrates. Third, the state passes through a long-confused period wherein the security apparatus maintains its superiority over other state organs. In such a scenario a group(s) may cease political power. Four, a benevolent leadership emerges within the security apparatus which focuses on the economic development and prosperity. Such a scenario presents an all-inclusive approach in which it encourages other state organs to deliver through monitoring, assistance and support.

The transformation of a security state into a welfare state cannot happen unless it first makes a radical shift in its strategic thinking. The state should focus on how to



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come out of its insecurity sphere and reconnect with its past in a different way which produces regional harmony. There are two ways through which such a change can be realised. The public starts demanding their protection and well-being including financial support and equal opportunities of survival. As a result, the citizens pressurise the security apparatus to change its course of action. In another scenario, a leadership emerges with a network of like-minded subordinates in the security apparatus which overcomes its intrinsic security culture and dictates terms and conditions for bringing a change in its outlook and perspective.

Hence chances of a security state to be morphed into a welfare state are minimal as it keeps living in perpetual fear.

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50. The Good Fight

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

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The consequences of war are assessed in the context of human losses and value of damaged property. Cultural, sociological and psychological impacts are often missed.

As per The Pakistan Economic Survey 2017-18 we sustained a loss of \$126.79 billion to terrorism leading to displacement that threatened tribal-cultural integrity and altered demographic patterns. Operations in the tribal areas and Swat displaced 2.7 million to 3.5m people. In Swat, the displaced sought refuge in Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda. Local hospitality revived Pakhtunwali. Displacements tested philanthropic instincts. Operations in Fata and Swat forced migration to Karachi, Islamabad, D.I. Khan, Kohat, Peshawar, Charsadda, Abbottabad and Bannu affecting the peace indexation and socioeconomic indicators of these districts.

Post 9/11, there were property purchases by migrants in Peshawar's walled city, diluting the Hindko-speaking presence. Displacement forced the rich tribal culture towards a transition led by technological innovations. Democratisation resulted in de-tribalisation and inconvenience for women and children. It enabled the youth to distinguish between collective and individual responsibility but also impeded rights to education, health and vote.

Militants attacked many educational institutes while the insertion of Article 25-A in the Constitution reflects the state's realisation of education's importance. Militancy also upset anti-polio efforts.

Did we capitalise on our opportunities?

To establish military courts and merge Fata with KP three constitutional amendments were made but strengthening ATCs remained a low priority. The 25th Amendment is not just a geographical merger. It's a plan to strengthen national integration, rule of law and human rights and a realisation that delaying reforms can provide space to violent non-state actors. To deter intrusion, border fencing began in 2017, with 85 per cent so far completed. Cross-border attacks from Afghanistan fell from 82 in 2019 to 11 in 2020.

Terrorism badly impacted tourism — during its peak five-star hotels in Karachi, Peshawar, Gwadar and Islamabad were attacked. Improved peace in Karachi and CPEC areas led to 80pc annual hotel occupancy rate. Police Order 2002 was debatably amended and terrorism negatively impacted the pace of police reforms. Security challenges spawned specialised units that further militarised the police. Security threats made CT the top priority — with a negative effect on crime prevention and detection. A surge in kidnappings, bank robberies and extortion was recorded. Fortified police stations and reduced foot and mobile patrolling widened the gulf between police and community but the martyrdom of 7,069 police officials brought the two closer.

Surveillance of proscribed persons and groups is an added task. The courts, media and human right groups plugged the loopholes in the process. Presently, 79 groups are proscribed. In November 2018, 8,374 persons were on Schedule IV; the number today is 3,597, showing improved CTD scrutiny. The mushrooming of



THE GOOD FIGHT

electronic media post-9/11 led to competition for ratings and glorification of terrorism. The National Action Plan barred this and the media improved its coverage of terrorism.

The ‘war on terror’ complicated matters. Issues like ‘collateral damage’, disappearances, targeted killings etc were widely covered but objective analysis was lacking. Human rights litigation registered an upward trend. A commission was constituted to deal with enforced disappearances. Since its inception, 6,944 cases were registered till Jan 31, 2021 and 4,822 disposed of. To compensate a family of a missing person, the Islamabad High Court ordered monthly compensation. In 2018, IHC termed the suspension of cellular services for security reasons illegal but in 2020 the Supreme Court ruled they could be suspended in “special circumstances”. For compensation for civilian victims of terrorism, Balochistan and Punjab enacted laws. Other provinces should follow suit.

Sadly, our LEAs are fighting 21st-century encrypted communications with 20th-century legislation. Though enhanced encryption was introduced to protect privacy this allowed criminals and terrorists to communicate secretly. The Constitution’s Article 140-A pertains to LGs and devolution. But while combating extremism, LGs remained underutilised. Besides kinetic measures, enactment of laws, institutional development and capacity building were priorities but synchronisation was weak.

Despite its security challenges Pakistan was the fifth largest contributor in 2018 to UN peacekeeping missions with 6,218 troops. In 2004, it was given Non-Nato Ally status by the US and since 2006 it has been elected a member of the UNHRC five times.

Every adversity exposes institutional and procedural weaknesses but also offers opportunities to reconsolidate positions and revamp institutions. The question is, did we capitalise on our opportunities?

*The writer is author of **Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace**. Tweet [@alibabakhel](#)*



SOCIAL COHESION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, VIOLENT EXTREMISM

51. Social Cohesion to Counter Terrorism, Violent Extremism

Sana Malik

Published in the Express Tribune May 22nd, 2021

In today's world, terrorism and violent extremism are complex multi-faceted issues that transcend national borders. Unlike terrorism, there is no universally accepted definition of violent extremism. International organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO do not follow a single definition. The USAID qualifies violent extremism as "advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives", whereas violent extremism is considered to be a broader term even if the two may be used interchangeably. Simply put, terrorism is the "use of violence to create fear for political, religious or ideological reasons". Terror is intentionally aimed at civilians to achieve the greatest attainable publicity for a group, cause or individual.

The phenomena of violent extremism and terrorism have been permeating the world over. The use of violence has a very profound and direct impact on humanity, which means it knows no border, nationality, or religion. It has devastating consequences for its victims whose right to life, liberty, security, and personal integrity has been compromised. This makes it a human rights issue which not only has individual cost, but can also jeopardise international community, peace, and security and threaten socio-economic development. The work to counter and combat the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, therefore, should be based on how to integrate all segments of society.

In order to devise counterterrorism strategies, it is important to consider the push and pull factors of violent extremism and terrorism to administer more focused and meaningful preventive efforts. Push factors are structural within the society whilst pull factors are psychological that may render individuals to become more vulnerable to adopting violent extremist behaviour. Push factors are conditions conducive to violent extremism and terrorism and the structural context from which it emerges such as socio-economic disparities, marginalisation and discrimination, poor governance, violations of human rights and delays in conflict resolution, and radicalisation in prisons. Whereas, pull factors are individual motivations and processes, which transform ideas and grievances into violent extremist action such as individual backgrounds, collective grievances and victimisation stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention, distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies, ethnic and cultural differences, and leadership and social networks. It is important to note that none of these drivers can be considered in isolation since multiple factors are involved. Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to better prevention policies.

The most important aspect of preventing extremism is integration and inclusivity of all segments. In the US, for instance, many social rituals like Halloween are celebrated throughout the year. Owing to prevailing cultural norms, economic opportunities and equality under law, the US seems to achieve integration of people belonging to different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds.



SOCIAL COHESION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, VIOLENT EXTREMISM

It doesn't mean that there is complete harmony because social disparities do exist. As far as immigrants are concerned, within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, and Iranian Americans are just Americans with a single national identity card and the same rights and obligations. This is in stark contrast to immigrants in Europe who may feel like second-class citizens, which may inflame feelings of hatred and are misguided in their search for a sense of belonging, triggering religious, ethnic, and ideological differences.

In Pakistan's context, issues of ethnic diversity unfortunately caused division instead of creating harmony. Pakistan is a country with a unique ethnic and religious diversity. Though all citizens are equal under the law, not all ethnic and religious identities are given adequate representation according to the Constitution which means that they come into conflict and feel an imbalance in the society. Ethnicity has emerged as the most significant issue in Pakistan and in creating a national identity out of diverse regional, religious, and linguistic loyalties. Pakistan's security landscape thus remains volatile and complex due to ethnic tensions coupled with the web of terrorist and militant groups present in the country. These have repercussions not only for internal linkages but also give rise to external conflict with powerful forces in the region.

Pakistan needs programmes to address the underlying violence in communities by moving beyond the labeling of youths as victims or perpetrators of violence to engage them in peace-building efforts, giving them ownership of their efforts, and providing them opportunities to encourage

the use of music, sport, media and IT for peace projects that promote tolerance, conflict resolution, reconciliation and interfaith harmony.

Social integration through targeted educational programmes is key in the fight against terrorism. In Pakistan, the education system is not on a par with the international system – a matter of grave concern. There is a lack of access to quality education making young Pakistanis targets of extremist groups. Net primary enrollment rates remain low; there are three parallel educational systems (private, public, and madrassas), resulting in a lack of equal opportunities for all students. The education system suffers due to inadequate investment from government, corruption, lack of institutional capacity, inadequate number of trained teachers and poor curriculum. To counter violent extremism and terrorism, the government needs to allocate sufficient budgets for education, increase private-public partnerships, introduce modern subjects in madrassas, build capacity of teachers, reform curriculum, improve teaching aid materials and give incentives to improve enrollment and retention.

Another group to consider for integration is perhaps the disenfranchised, poor and unemployed. This is because those out of jobs and in need of financial assistance may get recruited and form potential militias of political violence. Poverty can cause resentment and force many to turn to violence to express their outrage towards social inequality. In the Middle East, many citizens do not have jobs, which causes a lower standard of living. This forces people to become angry as they lose the ability to achieve what others may, creating internal



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conflict within certain areas or groups, making it more likely for terrorism to occur. When people are dissatisfied with the state of their lives and living standards, they are more likely to turn to extreme measures or become ideal candidates for terrorist organisations to recruit.

Other factors, which may marginalise or cause lack of integration and assimilation in society can be political factors such as government repression. Undemocratic societies cause people to suffer repression. Studies show that terrorism has a strong link with social injustice propagated at the hands of governments and people may resort to violence to fight against political wrongdoings.

It appears that terrorism is a global phenomenon, which transcends national boundaries and does not occur in a social vacuum, that it is caused by interaction between an individual, society and the state. Social disintegration can alienate individuals and groups so they may resort to terrorism to satisfy their grievances. Social cohesion is required to combat violent extremism and terrorism to perpetuate a sense of ownership in deterring people from exploring options and resorting to violent extremism and terrorism. This, however, needs to be practised globally where international cooperation is sustained and a universal rights-based approach is incorporated in building capacities to leave no one behind in efforts to counter terrorism and to promote peaceful and inclusive societies.



52. Banning for Peace

Muhammad Ali Babakhel

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BANNING the TLP under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997, raises questions. Is proscription — a counterterrorism tool to challenge the legitimacy and fundraising capabilities of extremist groups — viable? Is there a link between proscription and reduction in terrorist attacks? What are the appeal and review procedures?

Even before 9/11, proscription has been pivotal to state ambition in times of conflict, though its use has been more symbolic than substantive. The Act of Proscription, 1746, barred people in Scotland from owning weapons and wearing kilts. In 1970, Canada passed the War Measures Act and declared the separatist Front de Liberation du Quebec unlawful. Post 9/11 has seen proscription pick up pace as states ban militant groups in the global fight against terrorism.

It is a pre-emptive measure to deter paramilitarism, prosecute would-be terrorists and confiscate groups' assets. Since it curtails freedom of association and speech, proscription has drawn the attention of the media, judiciary and human rights groups. It violates the principle of *nulla poena ie* people should be punished for what they have done, not for who or what they are. Voices are getting louder for making parliamentary scrutiny more credible to guard against arbitrary proscription.

Proscription is a sign of rejection of militant groups by governments and an attempt to deprive extremists of publicity. In some cases, this hasn't worked — for the IRA, it

was a source of greater publicity. Authoritarian use of powers by states have also been criticised — Australian judge Kitto said this about proscription powers: “You cannot have punishment that is preventive.”

Proscription must go beyond naming and shaming.

Under Section 11B of the ATA, Pakistan can ban a group on reasonable grounds including information received from credible sources. Section 11C provides the right of review; a banned group may file an application within 30 days of such an order and the centre shall decide the matter within 90 days. In case of refusal, an appeal may be filed in a high court within 30 days. Under Section 11E, the government shall seal offices, seize literature and prohibit the printing or dissemination of press statements and conferences of a banned group. Upon proscription, its office-bearers, activists and members shall not be issued passports and arms licences, nor provided loans or credit cards by banks. The group shall submit its income and expenditure details and disclose all funding sources.

Since 2001, Pakistan has banned 79 groups including 27 sectarian and 19 sub-nationalist ethnic groups. But many groups resurface with new names. Ansar al-Islam, an Iraq-based militant group, had 13 alternative names; in Pakistan 10 groups re-emerged with 25 different names (they were later proscribed).

Detection and surveillance of activists need improved capacity, trained manpower, financial resources and well-defined coordination among agencies. Few states



BANNING FOR PEACE

prescribe a specific duration for proscription. A review is carried out to ascertain if a group has met delisting criteria.

Terrorist organisations have given birth to splinter groups, making identification, surveillance, and tracking of financial resources harder. Globalisation has made membership accessible to those inspired by their militant ideology. In some cases, militants remain affiliated with several groups, creating problems for law enforcers. After 9/11, proscription did not remain just an internal security issue; it was also included in the foreign policy agenda.

The debate on the proscription powers of states and international government organisations has intensified post 9/11. The EU maintains its own list of persons and groups, reviewing it regularly. In the US, the secretary of state designates the list of foreign terrorist groups.

In the UK, the home secretary may ban a group with terrorism links; so far 76 international groups have been banned. A group can appeal, but it's for the secretary to accept or reject the application.

An appeal may be made to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. The 'exiled government' of Tamil Eelam filed a case against the home secretary, saying the Tamil Tigers were no more engaged in terrorism. But the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre advised they remain banned. In the UK, the People's Mujahedin of Iran is the only group to have successfully applied for de-proscription. The latter must be boosted through judicial, legislative and executive oversight. Many say proscription should be a judicial rather than an executive process.

Proscription shouldn't be confined to naming and shaming. Categorising such groups as active, dormant, sectarian, ethnic, international and regional, and exchanging information with states, tracking financial linkages, improving cyberspace detection, public cooperation and better judicial and parliamentary oversight will raise transparency and human rights standards.

*The writer is author of **Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace**. Tweet @alibakhel*



53. The Future of Afghanistan

Asif Durrani

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Let us face the facts; the Taliban want a military solution for the simple reason that the US-led coalition has recognized the locus of the Taliban without conditions.

Now, those insisting that the Taliban may agree to come to terms with the Ashraf Ghani government are either too naive to not know what the militia is up to or they want to buy time for a safe departure.

For Ashraf Ghani, presiding over a dispensation bereft with rifts amongst various interest groups, creating a unified stand would be a tall order if not an impossibility. His helplessness was visible when the Americans kept him at bay while negotiating their withdrawal plans with the Taliban at Doha. Like his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, Ghani remains a titular head of state – sarcastically referred to as the ‘Mayor of Kabul’.

Whatever state machinery and financial resources President Ghani could command have only added to disorder, corruption and nepotism. The state administration, whether at the centre or in the provinces, could easily flout his orders. His appointed ministers or governors refuse to step down for the simple reason that warlords in the country are holding sway over the state apparatus. If a compromise fails between the Taliban and the Afghan government, the country plunging into a civil war would be a foregone conclusion.

The Taliban will have to address scores of challenges if they consider themselves a major stakeholder or a ‘government-in-waiting’. The Taliban's refusal to a ceasefire during negotiations, without a plausible reason, offers a glimpse of future

events that may unfold with the American pullout.

The Taliban's logic is rooted in the premise that a ceasefire would discourage their fighters, who may leave the movement in desperation or join Daesh/ISIS. It may be a plausible explanation for the continuation of war or insurgency but does not stand the logic of the peace process, especially when their primary condition of foreign troop withdrawal has been met.

Second, by not subscribing to a ceasefire, the Taliban may be losing local and international support as a major stakeholder. Also, their explanations about civilian casualties are not accepted. For instance, despite denial about their involvement in the massacre of over 80 young schoolgirls in the Dashte Barchi School in Kabul last month, Afghan society did not accept the Taliban's explanations.

Third, the real test for the Taliban will begin once they come into power by force or become part of a reconciliation government. While they may control domestic criticism by intimidation or coercion, they will have to respect the international norms and commitments to which Afghanistan has been a signatory. Otherwise, they are well aware of the past experience when – except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – no other country recognized their government.

Fourth, given past experience with the Taliban's harsh rule in implementing Shariah, they will be expected to make their future plans public so as to address the general concerns of the people and the international community. In this regard, declaration of their policy on women's rights would be crucial in determining the international community's perception of the militia.



THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

For the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, withdrawal of US/Nato troops would entail greater responsibilities. In an interview with BBC 4, on May 5, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated the US would remain engaged with Afghanistan even after withdrawal by assisting the country "economically, development assistance, humanitarian, supporting its security forces." However, he bluntly alluded to the Afghans and their immediate neighbours, including Pakistan, enjoying a free ride on the "US, NATO and other partners". In an implied warning, Blinken has been demanding that Afghanistan's neighbours share greater responsibility to ensure that the peace process moves smoothly.

For Pakistan, it has been an unending cliffhanger for the past four decades. From 'front-line status' following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the Mujahideen's chaos, to the Taliban's rise leading up to 9/11, and again becoming a 'front-line state' against the 'war on terror', the country has been badly bruised in socio-cultural terms and in economic progress. Even if Pakistan may play a neutral role in the entire game, its protestations are taken with a pinch of salt. Pakistan's role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table is praised to the extent that President Biden expects Pakistan to "do more" during the US troop withdrawal by September 11.

There has been talk of Pakistan giving bases to the US after the withdrawal. American media is persistent in its stories to that extent, quoting unnamed Pentagon sources. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has already denied the speculation in unequivocal terms in parliament. However, a slew of factors would keep Pakistan from granting bases to the Americans, foremost being the trust deficit deeply entrenched in

Pakistan, especially after the Indo-US strategic partnership has concretized. Except for the economic realm, Pakistan would be reluctant to enter into any deal with the US which involves security issues or its emerging goodwill in the neighbourhood.

Finally, Pakistan would be weighing its options in the coming weeks and months as the situation in Afghanistan unfolds. Statements emanating from Afghanistan – whether President Ghani's article in 'Foreign Affairs' on May 4, his interview with Der Spiegel, or his National Security Advisor Hamdullah Mohib's uncharitable remarks about Pakistan – have poisoned an environment already infested with distrust and acrimony. Pakistan's apprehensions about Indian machinations to keep the second front open through Afghanistan is well known and widely shared with the concerned quarters at the regional and international level.

The best course for Pakistan would be to keep a strict vigil along the borders, maintain an equal distance with all Afghan groups and forge a consensus amongst Afghanistan's neighbours of complete neutrality and promotion of peace and stability in the war-ravaged country.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and UAE. He currently works as senior research fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).



OPINION: PAKISTAN IS READY TO BE A PARTNER FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WE WILL NOT HOST U.S. BASES

54. Opinion: Pakistan is ready to be a Partner for Peace in Afghanistan, but we will Not Host U.S. Bases

Imran Khan

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Pakistan is ready to be a partner for peace in Afghanistan with the United States — but as U.S. troops withdraw, we will avoid risking further conflict.

Our countries have the same interest in that long-suffering country: a political settlement, stability, economic development and the denial of any haven for terrorists. We oppose any military takeover of Afghanistan, which will lead only to decades of civil war, as the Taliban cannot win over the whole of the country, and yet must be included in any government for it to succeed.

In the past, Pakistan made a mistake by choosing between warring Afghan parties, but we have learned from that experience. We have no favorites and will work with any government that enjoys the confidence of the Afghan people. History proves that Afghanistan can never be controlled from the outside.

Our country has suffered so much from the wars in Afghanistan. More than 70,000 Pakistanis have been killed. While the United States provided \$20 billion in aid, losses to the Pakistani economy have exceeded \$150 billion. Tourism and investment dried up. After joining the U.S. effort, Pakistan was targeted as a collaborator, leading to terrorism against our country from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and other groups. U.S. drone attacks, which I warned against, didn't win the war, but they did create hatred for

Americans, swelling the ranks of terrorist groups against both our countries.

While I argued for years that there was no military solution in Afghanistan, the United States pressured Pakistan for the very first time to send our troops into the semiautonomous tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, in the false expectation that it would end the insurgency. It didn't, but it did internally displace half the population of the tribal areas, 1 million people in North Waziristan alone, with billions of dollars of damage done and whole villages destroyed. The “collateral” damage to civilians in that incursion led to suicide attacks against the Pakistani army, killing many more soldiers than the United States lost in Afghanistan and Iraq combined, while breeding even more terrorism against us. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province alone, 500 Pakistani policemen were murdered.

There are more than 3 million Afghan refugees in our country — if there is further civil war, instead of a political settlement, there will be many more refugees, destabilizing and further impoverishing the frontier areas on our border. Most of the Taliban are from the Pashtun ethnic group — and more than half the Pashtuns live on our side of the border. We are even now fencing this historically open border almost completely.

If Pakistan were to agree to host U.S. bases, from which to bomb Afghanistan, and an Afghan civil war ensued, Pakistan would be targeted for revenge by terrorists again. We simply cannot afford this. We have already paid too heavy a price. Meanwhile, if the United States, with the most powerful military machine in history, couldn't win the war from inside Afghanistan after 20



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years, how would America do it from bases in our country?

The interests of Pakistan and the United States in Afghanistan are the same. We want a negotiated peace, not civil war. We need stability and an end to terrorism aimed at both our countries. We support an agreement that preserves the development gains made in Afghanistan in the past two decades. And we want economic development, and increased trade and connectivity in Central Asia, to lift our economy. We will all go down the drain if there is further civil war.

This is why we have done a lot of real diplomatic heavy lifting to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, first with the Americans, and then with the Afghan government. We know that if the Taliban tries to declare a military victory, it will lead to endless bloodshed. We hope the Afghan government will also show more flexibility in the talks, and stop blaming Pakistan, as we are doing everything we can short of military action.

This is also why we were part of the recent “Extended Troika” joint statements, along with Russia, China and the United States, unambiguously declaring that any effort to impose a government by force in Kabul would be opposed by us all, and also would deprive Afghanistan access to the foreign assistance it will need.

These joint statements mark the first time four of Afghanistan’s neighbors and partners have spoken with one voice on what a political settlement should look like. This could also lead to a new regional compact for peace and development in the region, which could include a requirement to share intelligence and work with the Afghan government to counter emergent terrorist threats. Afghanistan’s neighbors would pledge not to allow their territory to be used against Afghanistan or any other country, and Afghanistan would pledge the same. The compact could also lead to a commitment to help Afghans rebuild their country

I believe that promoting economic connectivity and regional trade is the key to lasting peace and security in Afghanistan. Further military action is futile. If we share this responsibility, Afghanistan, once synonymous with the “Great Game” and regional rivalries, could instead emerge as a model of regional cooperation.

Imran Khan is the prime minister of Pakistan.



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