

# **Elements of Violence in Jeay Sindh Tehreek (JST) and Balochistan National Movement (BNM): A Comparative Analysis**

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## **Abstract**

Ethno-national movements, on the whole, start with some grievances which if left unattended may aggravate and provide a platform for public mobilization. Once such rallying takes place and people start following the calls of main leaders who raise these issues continuously, the passive response of the government becomes a moot point among the members of these ethnic based national movements. Lack of political far-sightedness and immaturity hamper resolution of such issues which often take the shape of a localized struggle. As these movements become prominent at provincial and national levels, the political class joins them vociferously and its reverberations in support of the just calls of the movement leaders are heard in provincial and national assemblies. The key demands, though genuine on multiple counts, are then used as bargaining chip for political leverage and negotiations. Once a political party, formed on the basis of ethno-national struggle, is squeezed on different grounds it may turn violent on account of multiple factors often leading to situations where public disturbances are created and sustained for longer period of time. In the paper, two different ethnic based irredentist movements have been studied to observe the underlying factors which have pushed some of their leaders to insurgency, violence, turbulence and lawlessness. The study provides a yardstick which can be readily used in order to judge whether a movement will remain non-violent or resort to disorder in future.

**Key words:** Nationalist, Movement, Violence, Force, Insurgency, Political

## **Introduction**

Soon after independence, unrest persisted in different parts of the country

bordering on various socio economic and cultural based identity issues<sup>1</sup>. Two different ethno-national movements have been selected for study on account of their geographical location and violent course of action during their propagation and projection. These include Jeay Sind Tehreek (JST) and Balochistan National Movement (BNM)<sup>2</sup>. Each of these ethno-national movements has its own territorial limitations and unique environment leading to adoption of brutal means which may or may not be envisaged at the time of their conception and establishment. Moreover, different types of violent ethnic, social and political movements have also been studied in order to see whether any pattern exists for providing a specific comparison base.

There are four main stages of development through which a movement transforms into a violent force. First, when the movement starts losing the heterogeneous character in terms of large and diverse participation, its decision making processes and protests also change drastically. The leaders then feel that violence is not immoral<sup>3</sup>. Second, the role played by

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<sup>1</sup> Shaikh Ayaz, "A Leaf from History: A History of Ethnic Violence", *Dawn*, October 30, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> Here it is pertinent to mention that the Balochistan National Movement (BNM) refers to different ethno-political dispensations in the province which include Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochsitan Liberation Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB), Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Balochistan Student Organization – Azad (BSO-A), United Baloch Army (UBA) etc and does not carry any relevance to a political party formed by Ghulam Mohammad Baloch under the same title. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad got his early education at Soro (Mand, Balochistan) where he was influenced by Fida Ahmed Baloch, a famous member of Balochistan Student Organization (BSO). He had been affiliated with Baloch national struggle since 1992. He was detained on a number of occasions by security forces in the province. He played an important role in the release of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative, John Solecki, who was kidnapped in 2009 from Quetta. He established Balochistan National Movement (BNM) in 2004 and remained its head till his killing in 2009. His death entailed severe law and order incidents across the province.

<sup>3</sup> Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence, eds., *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-States Actors in Conflict*, (London: The MIT Press, 2010), 149.

security forces also determines when or for how long the movement may remain non-violent<sup>4</sup>. A sudden harsh attitude of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and brutal tactics employed by the forces can push an ethno-nationalist movement's senior command or certain elements therein towards violence. Third, different methods of protests employed by such a movement enhance chances of its being falling into a peaceful course of action. The less diverse the protest base, greater is the probability that an ethnic movement may not remain nonviolent since the leaders perceive that violence is a better option<sup>5</sup>. Lastly, if the repression inflicted against such movements translates into militarization or throw them in complete disarray then chances of their turning to violence also increase to a greater extent.

Five important parameters have been defined to conduct the comparative analysis of these movements. First, the participatory base of these ethno-national movements has been categorized into low, medium and large in terms of its active and passive members<sup>6</sup>. Second, the geographical region where acceptability of the ethno-national movement is clearly apparent has

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 150.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 147.

<sup>6</sup> These benchmarks have been discussed with different police officers especially those posted in Sindh and Balochistan provinces. They maintain that in order to make a meaningful comparison we need both qualitative and quantitative parameters. These factors are based on their recommendations and suggestions. During the discussion they also alluded to different reasons why they think these areas are essential for such type of study. Four reasons were cited by them. First, they think that such a comparison pattern is possible and very much practical. Second, they believe that such an analysis may bring out the true picture of terror in Sindh and Balochistan provinces and highlight the overlapping areas where elements of violence in these two ethno-nationalist movements converge together or diverge from each other. Third, such an exercise can carry concrete recommendations for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to chalk out plans for action against such violent person(s) in a proactive manner. Lastly, the local, provincial and regional nexus of multifarious agents of violence may also come under spotlight during such an exercise.

been termed as low, moderate and high. Third, the state reaction and its subsequent response further propel them to use different types of weapons and tactics which are bracketed as simple, simple-complex and complex. Fourth, number of demands accepted by the government on account of variegated protests launched by the senior members or leaders of these movements is also differentiated into three categories. Lastly, number of incidents of violence or terror in which a member or members of these movements are involved over a considerable period of time<sup>7</sup>.

In the end, we have made certain recommendations which can provide a framework of active engagement of these ethno-national movements on different levels.

### Literature Review

Mathew Joseph maintains that ethno-national-movements exhibit majority of violent acts in the world. It can be divided into two main categories with one based on manifestation of cultural identity and the other on geographical boundary concentration. He further elaborates that efforts to assimilate ethnic groups in mainstream politics have largely been a futile

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<sup>7</sup> The data has been partly taken from police officers and partially viewed from online sources on terrorism. The Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) in Sindh and Balochistan have provided active assistance along with Crimes Branch of Sindh Police in gathering and interpretation of the data. The primary data pertains to cases registered against different JST factions and their conviction. Moreover, number of killings of JST field commanders and/or leaders or members has also been obtained from them. The data indicates geographical concentration of various JST groups especially JSMM and JSQM along with method of their operation and target selection. The officers of Crimes Branch Sindh also allude to the external influence on JSMM whose key leaders have been hiding either in Afghanistan or trying to obtain assistance from other neighbouring countries. The data also points towards the nature of activities of members of these groups and according to the police officials the activists keep on changing their memberships among different splinter groups of JST. Sometimes they become affiliated with Jeay Sindh Students Federation (JSSF) and at times they appear among rank and file of the JSMM or JSQM respectively.

exercise<sup>8</sup>. Moshe Gammer says that a nexus exists between severe socio-economic conditions, high religiosity and group grievances with ethnic mobilization<sup>9</sup>. A.Guelke states that problem with ethnic-movements is not solely based on minorities seeking separation from a state but can be strongly linked with the attitude of dominant and majority groups<sup>10</sup>.

Luis De la Calle develops an argument that nationalist violence is a product of unresponsive political elites and nationalists to attract supporters through unlawful means. He elaborates how Basque nationalists turn violent whereas Catalan nationalists remain non-violent during their struggle. Moreover, a number of attractive options are available to nationalists when they do not find legal remedy to their problems. These factors coupled with state repression help in emergence of radical violent sub-groups which attract considerable membership with passage of time<sup>11</sup>.

Wendy Pearlman indicates that a cohesive movement can remain non-violent whereas those which disintegrate often produce violence on account of mutual competition. In such movements hierarchical structures are too weak to dictate terms to its members<sup>12</sup>. Charles King asserts that violence is on the rise after the end of superpower competition. He explains the breakup of different states along with rise of ethnic cleansing

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<sup>8</sup> Mathew Joseph C., eds., *Understanding Pakistan: Emerging Voices from India*, (Routledge Publishers, 2017), 53-54.

<sup>9</sup> Moshe Gammer, eds., *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post Soviet Disorder*, (Routledge Publishers, 2008).

<sup>10</sup> A.Guelke, *The Challenges of Ethno-Nationalism: Case Studies in Identity Politics*, (Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2010), 1-3.

<sup>11</sup> Luis De la Calle, *Nationalist violence in Post-war Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Wendy Pearlman, *Violence, Non-Violence and Palestinian Movement*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3-8.

groups in African countries<sup>13</sup>. Eiko Maruko says that violence has been a function of pressure tactics, ideology and a systemic deep-rooted-episodic historical cycle. She also talks about violence specialists in Japanese culture who are completely entwined with national politics<sup>14</sup>.

Nick Brooke talks about nationalists in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. He then differentiates these movements on account of violence and non-violence. He explains how Irish Republican Army (IRA) uses terror to achieve a political objective whereas in Wales and Scotland political means are adopted to arrive at political ends<sup>15</sup>. James Hughes maintains that right to self-determination and an effort to maintain territorial integrity of Russian Federation leads towards secessionist tendencies among main Chechen ethnic nationalist groups<sup>16</sup>. Beata Huszka says that framing of political rhetoric and discourse is an important indicator whether a movement will remain violent or non-violent<sup>17</sup>.

Charles D. Brokett et al elaborate underlying factors contributing towards violence including socio-economic grievances, false consciousness and political opportunities. They even establish correlation between state repression and mass political activity with the end result that state use of monopoly of violence may or may not result into violent political response. The protest-repression dynamics is also explained in the

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<sup>13</sup> Charles King, *Extreme Politics: Nationalism, Violence, and the End of Eastern Europe*, (Oxford University Press, 2010) , 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> Eiko Maruko, *Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The violent politics of modern Japan (1860 – 1960)*, (Cornell University Press, 2015).

<sup>15</sup> Nick Brooke, *Terrorism and Nationalism in United Kingdom: The Absence of Noise*, (Springer International Publishing, 2018), 3-8.

<sup>16</sup> James Hughes , *Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad* , (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 15-16.

<sup>17</sup> Beata Huszka, *Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflicts: Debate Framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns*, (Routledge Publishers, 2013) , 1-3.

research<sup>18</sup>. Kavin E Grisham discusses phases of conflicts and transformation whereby a movement can drift from militancy to militancy-cum-politics and finally to a purely political field. He also delves upon contentious politics and how does it impact the collective political struggle leading towards violence and guerrilla warfare<sup>19</sup>.

Mehmet Orhan describes the conditions under which political violence takes root in one of the most democratic countries in the Middle East. Three types of movements have been elaborated including Radical Turkish Left movement, Islamist movement and Kurdish movement respectively. The leaders of these movements have challenged the state power in different manner with Radical Turkish Left movement has limited itself to latent violence within a span of thirty years (1960-1990) whereas Islamist movement has remained non-violent and is still challenging the state through passive means. Nonetheless, Kurdish movement has gone through different phases and is today characterized with terrorism in the country. The study sheds light on the elements of political violence in Kurdish movement, formation of its actors and their subsequent line of actions. The author has tried to touch upon political violence in three categories namely social movements, conflicts and war or terrorism<sup>20</sup>.

Chares Demetriou et al spell out how radicalization takes root among the members of political movements pushing them towards violence and highhandedness. The authors clearly distinguish it from guerrilla warfare

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<sup>18</sup> Charles D. Brokett and Sidney Tarrow, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2-10.

<sup>19</sup> Kavin E Grisham, *Transforming Violent Political Movements: Rebels Today, What Tomorrow?*, ( Routledge Publishers, 2015), 28-31.

<sup>20</sup> Mehmet Orhan, *Political Violence and Kurds in Turkey: Fragmentations, Mobilizations, Participations & Repertoires*, (Routledge Publishers, 2016), 1-11.

and maintain that state has a critical role in emergence, development and decline of political violence. They also clarify how the competition among political elements leads towards radical thinking which in turn pushes them towards political violence<sup>21</sup>. Daniel Patrick indicates that the end of totalitarianism and persistence of ethnicity hold the key to political conflicts in years to come<sup>22</sup>.

Charles Tilly et al maintain that three important themes are defined in terms of contentious politics. First, it always occurs in clusters. Second, once contention starts in certain key localities it diffuses to other places. Lastly, contention produces different waves which may be termed as political movements, social movements, revolutions, insurgencies and civil wars<sup>23</sup>.

Ali Riaz et al make clear that violence is the main feature of South Asia which has been used by state, non-state actors and public as a form of resistance. Out of the political violence, emerges religion-inspired extremism, ethnic movements and ideology-based hostilities<sup>24</sup>. Ravinder Kaur argues that violence has been perpetrated in the name of religion and ethnicity. Resultantly, the founding fathers of three countries namely Nehru, Jinnah and Senanayake would not be able to recognize their present day independent states. He then explains ethno-national movements started

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<sup>21</sup> Chares Demetriou, Lorenzo Bosi and Stefan Malthaner,eds., *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and Escalation of Political Conflict*, (Routledge Publishers, 2014), 140-144.

<sup>22</sup> Daniel Patrick , *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*, (Oxford University Press, 1993)

<sup>23</sup> Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, (Paradigm Publishers, London, 2005), xii-xiii.

<sup>24</sup> Ali Riaz, Zobaida Nasreen & Fahmida Zaman, *Political Violence in South Asia*, (Taylor & Francis, 2018).

by Tamils in Sri Lanka, Sikhs in India and Shias in Pakistan<sup>25</sup>.

Upinder Singh points out that violence has traditionally been used to reshape political strategies in India<sup>26</sup>. Joseph Thomas expresses that movements of sixties and seventies employed violent tactics when encountered by extreme repression. Violent means in name of self-defence was perpetrated in western countries and these practices were in vogue in mid-seventies. Many radical political groups emerged who eventually engaged the states militarily leading towards tactical moderation of violence during political protests in eighties. The cycle of violence culminated in nineties with emergence of new actors of violence who confronted state repression and fought their way to a semblance of normalcy. The author asserts that political violence is deeply rooted in ideological, geographical and historical basis. The political violence is the collective attack within a political community against a political regime<sup>27</sup>. Laural Weldon makes a point that social movements indicate democratic representation despite the absence of formal mechanisms<sup>28</sup>.

### Basis of Research

The raison d'être of taking up this study is to analyze the underlying factors by which two different ethno-national movements in distinct areas are targeting ethnic populations in urban and rural centres of Pakistan. Moreover, the circumstances under which some of the elements of these

<sup>25</sup> Ravinder Kaur, eds., *Religion, Violence and Mobilization in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 7-10.

<sup>26</sup> Upinder Singh, *Political Violence in Ancient India*, (Harvard University Press, 2017), ix-xi.

<sup>27</sup> Joseph Thomas, *Social Movements and Violence*, (Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 2001), 38-48.

<sup>28</sup> S.Laural Weldon, *When Protests make Policy: How Social Movements Represent Disadvantaged Groups*, (University of Michigan Press and Arbour, 2011), 1-5.

movements turn more violent than the others are also examined and debated.

The leading factors which can pacify these ethno-national movements and make them nonviolent following a purely political path have also been discussed at length. The state response in their reintegration into social fabric and the current tactics employed by them need to be further scrutinized and surveyed. Furthermore, we have also inspected the essence of transformation of ethno-political movements into armed violence in the political arena. Given the unique situation of the region and with an active war theatre in the neighbouring country, we want to see how such situation impacts these movements and puts a restraint on state response in acute political agitations.

### **Methodology**

It is a qualitative and quantitative research paper in which interviews have been conducted with different police officers serving in Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). These officers form a focus group through which we have deduced first-hand experience of violence based actions of the elements of two ethno-movements and state response to it.

These officers have remained posted in those districts where footprints of the elements of these ethno-national movements are quite prominent and the officials have direct knowledge about the organizational structure of different splinter groups affiliated with these movements, their mode of operations, recruitment processes and coordination with other violent groups. Moreover, they are also privy to the registration of cases against the leaders/members of these movements and have supervised the

investigation, interrogation and interviewing of the elements involved in multiple violent acts.

Apart from it, online sources of terrorism have also been explored thus providing us important avenues for data collection on the bench marks devised for comparison between elements of violence of these movements.

### **Jeay Sindh Tehreek (JST)**

The genesis of Sindh nationalist movement dates back to the initial post-independence years against One Unit concept envisaged by the government at that time<sup>29</sup>. The different stages of JST evolution are enumerated below:

#### *GM Sayed and other Nationalists*

The Jeay Sindh Tehreek (JST) was established by Ghulam Murtaza Sayed in 1972<sup>30</sup> although seeds of its foundation were laid in early 1960s. Jeay Sindh Student Federation (JSSF) was also formed in 1966<sup>31</sup>. Born in 1904 at Sann (Jamshoro), Sayed joined active politics in 1929 when he was elected vice president of Karachi Local Board. In early 1932 he moved to Hyder Manzil, a bungalow in the vicinity of Soldier Bazar in the cosmopolitan city. He formed a couple of political parties soon after independence such as Sindh Progressive Party (1947) and Sindh Awami Mahaz (1953) respectively. He was detained in his house under different politico-military regimes. His abode became a hub of anti-One Unit movement in the province. He also invited Sheikh Mujib to Hyder Manzil

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<sup>29</sup> "Flash back: One Unit: A dark chapter in our history," *Dawn*, October 16, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Making of the Sindhi identity: from Shah Latif to GM Sayed to Bhutto," *Dawn*, September 15, 2015.

<sup>31</sup> Tahir Amin, *Ethno National Movements of Pakistan*, (Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), 64.

to show his support for the cause of Bengali nationalism in 1970. He also assisted Mujib in the preparation of his Nishtar Park public meeting during the latter's stay in Karachi. Among other leaders who frequented at his place include Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, MA Khuhro, Shaikh Abdul Majeed Sindhi, Ali Mohammad Shah Rashdi, Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Ibrahim Joyo and many others. Moreover, his abode was used as the headquarters of Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) in 1990s as well<sup>32</sup>.

#### *GM Sayed vis-à-vis ZA Bhutto*

GM Sayed was a staunch pro-Pakistani who supported Pakistan movement but turned against the very ideology owing to heavily loaded Punjab based politicking in the early years of independence. Sayed's rivalry and hate for Z.A Bhutto was an open secret as he believed that the latter was working for the elitist politics which had been weakening the foundations of the country. The JST gave another touch to Sindhi nationalism and as a result the movement focused on getting an independent homeland for Sindhis on basis of their distinct ethnic composition, culture, language, heritage, natural resources and geographical area<sup>33</sup>. The idea of Sindhudesh was thus coined to attract maximum public support on the issue.

#### *Disintegration of JST and its Untrained Lower Cadres*

Lack of training of lower cadres of JST resulted into its disintegration into

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<sup>32</sup> Priha A Syed, "GM Sayed historic Hyder Manzil to be demolished for plaza," SAMAA TV, July 5, 2019.

<sup>33</sup> Priha A Syed, "GM Sayed historic Hyder Manzil to be demolished for plaza," SAMAA TV, July 5, 2019.

smaller groups which continued till the death of JST founder in 1995<sup>34</sup>. An unsuccessful attempt was made to put these groups under Jeay Sindh Supreme Council (JSSC) which too could not produce positive results. One of the splinter groups of JST, Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM), has been involved in sabotage activities including bomb blasts, cracker attacks and other violent means with multiple cases registered against its members/leaders in different districts in the province<sup>35</sup>. Similarly, Sindh Taraqqi-Pasand Party (STP), established by Dr Abdul Qadir Magsi, which believes in non-violent means and a pro-parliamentary-approach although certain elements of STP are in favor of armed struggle to achieve the objectives, was once part of Jeay Sindh Student Federation (JSSF) during early 1980s<sup>36</sup>.

#### *Relationship between JSMM and JSQM*

JSMM chief, Shafi Muhammad Barfat, parted ways with Dr Magsi in late 1990s on basis of latter's proclivity towards pro-parliamentary stance. JSMM was followed by other factions including Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) which drew attention on account of effective shutter down strike calls on various issues in the province<sup>37</sup>. However, police crack downs on the members of JSQM have led to loss of its support base in the province. Many elements in JSSF blamed their leadership for being complacent on ethno-nationalist politics and leading a carefree life without effectively

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<sup>34</sup> Hanif Samoon, "Romance of Sindhu Desh fast fading away as workers desert nationalism," *Dawn*, August 17, 2017.

<sup>35</sup> "Seven JSMM activists indicted in terrorism case," *Dawn*, November 14, 2018.

<sup>36</sup> Muhammad Hussain Khan, "Qadir Magsi urges JSMM to give up armed struggles in Sindh," *The Dawn*, December 3, 2014.

<sup>37</sup> Amar Guriro, "Mystery of the missing persons," *The News*, December 21, 2014.

advocating the key ethnic issues<sup>38</sup>.

On 17 January, 2019, one hundred and fifteenth (115) birth anniversary of GM Sayed was celebrated in which Sindh United Front (SUF), Awami Jamhoori Party (AJP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM), Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) along with Jeay Sindh Liberation Front (JSLF) participated. Though they eulogized Sayed's struggle for a pluralistic and peaceful society in Sindh but all these groups failed to converge on a single point agenda<sup>39</sup>. Apart from tribal feuds taking place on regular intervals in the second largest province of Pakistan, armed gangs and sectarianism have also taken roots in the interior Sindh where elements of erstwhile JSMM are operating under fake identities<sup>40</sup>. A Freedom March was organized in 2012 in Karachi to commemorate the services of martyrs of JSQM leaders and workers. It continued for few years before new factions started appearing in the main body of JSQM<sup>41</sup>.

#### *Factors pushing JST factions towards Violence*

There are four important aspects which contributed towards violence in Jeay Sindh Tehreek. First, a lot of factions appear soon after the formation of JST. As a result of it, members with both feudalistic back ground and working class came into the mainstream<sup>42</sup>. A kind of tussle between them

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<sup>38</sup> Hanif Samoon, "More party members quit Jey Sindh Quami Mahaz," *The Dawn*, March 22, 2018.

<sup>39</sup> Qurban Ali Khushik, "GM Sayed described a founding leader of Pakistan," *Dawn*, January 18, 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Making of the Sindhi identity: from Shah Latif to GM Sayed to Bhutto," *Dawn*, September 15, 2015.

<sup>41</sup> Hassan Mansoor, "JSQM 'Freedom March' ends peacefully," *Dawn*, March 24, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Sohail Sangi, "Analysis: Sindhi nationalist stands divided," *Dawn*, December 4, 2014.

leads towards further fragmentation and disintegration of the movement<sup>43</sup>. The presence of Sindhi prime minister at the time of formation of the JST might have also eclipsed its objectivity and pushed some disgruntled factions towards violence and armed struggle. Moreover, these groups must have the example of armed Bengali nationalism before them which ultimately resulted into carving out an independent country from East Pakistan. Hence these elements were simply toeing the example of *Mukti Bahini* in their struggle for formation of Sindhudesh<sup>44</sup>.

Second, the movement occupied a political space in post 1971 period when a natural room was available for such activity. GM Sayed's inherent disliking for Bhutto also minimized chances of attracting PPP workers towards JST and cashed in on the available political vacuum during Bhutto's trial and his subsequent execution on court orders<sup>45</sup>. Hence, it failed to get an impressive political momentum in post 1977 scenario.

<sup>43</sup> According to Mr. Javid Akbar Riaz, former Deputy Inspector General of Police, Larkana (2018-19), majority of the members of these groups come from middle class like teachers, masons and menial workers. However, their lethality and reach have been curtailed due to infighting and lack of room provided to them by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The leaders of PPP have traditionally been avoiding Sindh card, except in acute situations, so that JST or factions thereof may not get any benefit out of it. Moreover, there are certain elements of different Sindhi tribes such as *Jatois*, *Bijaranis*, *Mehrs*, *Sanjranis*, *Umranis* etc settled in Sindh and Balochistan provinces, and hence have become an active linkage between splinter groups of JST and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The main leaders of different factions of JST have either gone abroad or moved to undisclosed locations where they cannot supervise their groups properly. The DIG also alludes to a tacit collusion between JST and its different factions with Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in limited pockets in Hyderabad and Karachi but that too borders on financial benefits and personal gumption rather than on a clear understanding of political ideology or ethnicity. According to him only two incidents of cracker attacks were reported in Larkana division on the eve of General Elections 2018 which again point towards their reduced capability to carry out any major act of subversion. The emergence of Rasool Bux Palejo has also attracted many members of JST and they have joined his party on one pretext or the other.

<sup>44</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Smoker's corner: Back to GM Sayed?" *Dawn*, March 10, 2012.

<sup>45</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Making of the Sindhi identity: From Shah Latif to GM Sayed to Bhutto," *Dawn*, September 15, 2015.

Third, as the state response becomes more acute and severe, and as cases were registered against the members or elements of different factions of the movement, a disparate course of action was adopted<sup>46</sup>. Fourth, the movement penetrated into the educational institutions and youth started participating in it. Different factions of JST staged violent means to register their responses on provincial issues. Many young activists parted ways with main stream factions of JST as they believed that the veteran leaders are either complacent or not doing enough to propagate the movement's key points in an effective manner. Many even accused their leaders for becoming passive in face of state repression and highhandedness<sup>47</sup>.

### **Balochistan National Movement (BNM)**

The Balochistan National Movement takes on different shades which can be divided into four distinct phases. These phases have been elaborated below:

#### *Preservation of Independence of Kalat*

The first phase started when Kalat was annexed into Pakistan in 1948<sup>48</sup>. Earlier, three other princely states<sup>49</sup> namely Kharan, Las Bela and Makran

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<sup>46</sup>Ghazi Salahuddin, "Sorrows of Sindh," *Indus Asia Online Journal*, March 23, 2014, (accessed on June 27, 2019)

<sup>47</sup> "Sindh Government orders police to crack down on nationalists," *The News*, December 2, 2013.

<sup>48</sup> Abdul Majeed Abid, "The question of Kalat," *The Nation*, December 21, 2015.

<sup>49</sup> The Balochistan Archives maintain that at the time of partition nearly 15 princely states fell in the territorial ambit of Pakistan whereas remaining 550 were situated within the geographical boundaries of India (Bharat). In pre-partition India these princely states constituted 40 percent of the geographical area of united India and contributed to about 23 percent of its total population. Moreover, four out of 15 princely states were in Balochistan at the time of independence.

had acceded to Pakistan<sup>50</sup>. However, the accession was resented by Khan of Kalat<sup>51</sup> and other Baloch leaders. The merger of Kalat into Pakistan and imprisoning of key leaders alienated different tribes and their elders. The Kalat Assembly even resisted its merger into Pakistan<sup>52</sup>. As the constituent assembly initiated One Unit plan, the Baloch leaders opposed it as they feared that it would eclipse their identity and characteristics. Hence, the first phase can be termed as the preservation of independent identity of state of Kalat. It continued till the early years of 1960s when Parari movement was launched to oppose military and naval bases in the province and Marris, Bugtis and Mengals took leading part in it<sup>53</sup>.

#### *Reformation of Baloch Insurgency*

The second phase started in post 1971 debacle, when a natural power vacuum was created after fall of Dhaka. The Baloch insurgency ravaged for four years which was tackled militarily through political manoeuvring as its base was wide in terms of participation and geographical expansion. It was finally ended in year 1977 with fall of political regime in the

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup> The Balochistan Archives indicate that nearly sixty Baloch tribes are present in Balochistan with seventy *sardars* overlooking the tribal day to day matters. Among prominent *sardars* include *Marris*, *Bugtis*, *Mengals Jamalis*, *Rinds* etc. Nonetheless, Khan of Kalat holds a supreme place among all the *sardars* of Balochistan. He is the leader of national *jirga* which is constituted to decide major incidents of tribal feuds and disturbances in the province. He is considered to be Khan of all Khans in the area. The tribal system was set up during the reign of Mir Chakar Khan Rind. The Brahvi speaking Khan of Kalat was subdued during British era in the subcontinent when his powers were severely curtailed. Though he used to decide inter-tribal contentions and British intervened only when they felt threatened due to some major incident of violence in the region. Presently we have 35<sup>th</sup> Khan of Kalat living in exile in United Kingdom. Prince Mohammad, his only son lives in Quetta and is married in *Bugti* tribe. Both father and son seem to be at loggerheads with each other.

<sup>52</sup> Sheikh Aziz, "A leaf from history: Reclaiming Balochistan peacefully," *Dawn*, October 5, 2015.

<sup>53</sup> Gloria Caleb, "Decades of unease with the center," *Dawn*, July 13, 2006.

country<sup>54</sup>. The Baloch Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) and Baloch Student Organization (BSO) were established during this period.

#### *Evolution of Middle Class based Insurgency*

The third phase started in 2001 and it resulted into renewal of old Baloch nationalist organizations including Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). It was the first time that decision making in a national movement came into the hands of middle class and was no longer confined to Baloch sardars<sup>55</sup>. Though the BLF has been targeting security forces since 1968, nonetheless, these attacks took a different shape in post 2006 scenario when Allah Nazar was released from prison. The latter is head of BSO (Azad) which he founded in 2003<sup>56</sup>.

A spate of terror attacks have been conducted against varying selection of targets including security forces, public, ethnic population, journalists etc. It has also resorted to kidnapping of locals for intimidation and coercion. In 2017, fifteen bullet ridden bodies of Punjabis were found in Kech district who were being smuggled illegally to Europe through Balochistan which was subsequently claimed by BLF. Apart from it, the organization was also involved in killing of Chinese in the province especially in Gwadar and its environs. The insurgency is still going on especially in Baloch areas with assistance of local population and other terror outfits<sup>57</sup>.

Looking at historical evolution of such nationalists, the strict state measures have somehow controlled the insurgency; nonetheless, it has

<sup>54</sup> Ravi Shekhar Narain Singh, *The Military Factors in Pakistan*, (Illinois: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 192.

<sup>55</sup> Dr. Younas Ahmar, "Why is the current Baloch national movement different from the rest," *Dawn*, November 6, 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Tariq Khosa, "Ballot or the Bullet?" *Dawn*, April 15, 2013.

<sup>57</sup> Tariq Khosa, "Ballot or the Bullet?" *Dawn*, April 15, 2013.

transformed it from an-elite-based-grievance movement to a purely middle-class-based insurgency. The fact that Allah Nazar Baloch first established BSO (Azad) before taking over BLF, speaks volumes about the required focus of the present provincial government and LEAs operating in Balochistan<sup>58</sup>.

### *Explosive mix of Religion and Insurgency*

The religious seminaries have been playing a critical role for last two decades in the province. Balochistan has the highest per capita seminary density in Pakistan<sup>59</sup>. However, emergence of religious extremist organizations in Balochistan has given it a different flavor. A series of attacks against Hazaras in and around Quetta resulted into massive protests against *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ), a violent extremist and anti-Shia group<sup>60</sup>.

The border area between Iran and Pakistan has also become turbulent due to cross border incursions from both sides. An upbeat in the border situation has been observed in recent years where religious nationalist groups like *Jaish al-Adl* (JA) are active. It was also discovered that a kind of nexus was developing between BLF and religious extremist groups for cooperating in attacks execution and targeting<sup>61</sup>. The political government has taken a number of initiatives to solace ethno-nationalist groups through reconciliation process which needs to be consistently implemented and reviewed to get any positive outcome from it.

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<sup>58</sup> Mahvish Ahmad, "Balochistan: Middle-Class rebellion," *Dawn*, June 5, 2012.

<sup>59</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Religion, Nationalism and Insurgency in Balochistan," *Dawn*, July 14, 2019.

<sup>60</sup> "We are the walking dead: Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan," *Human Rights Watch*, June 29, 2014.

<sup>61</sup> This fact has been narrated by the police officers who were posted in Balochistan and have conducted investigation of terrorism related cases in the province.

### *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Baloch Insurgency*

The CPEC project has given a different dimension to the overall security dynamics of the province. BLF vows to target these projects as they believe that it will turn them into minority and are against the interest of Baloch population<sup>62</sup>.

### **Analyzing elements of violence in JST**

The JST was initially a peaceful movement and its founder wanted to operate and educate the masses without amassing street power for violence. The slow alienation of low cadres of JST and its subsequent disintegration may be cited as the leading reasons of violence in the movement. Many die hard members of the JSQM abandoned it after they found out that the senior command had compromised on the chief demands and agreed to settle their differences with state on account of complacency and passive attitude. Dr Abdul Qadir Magsi, chairman Sindh Taraqqi-Pasand (STP), has been advocating caution on the state response and he professed non-violence even if severe repressive action is perpetrated by the state. He stepped down from STP Chairman in 2018 citing massive rigging in the elections<sup>63</sup>.

### **Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA)**

Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA) or Sindh Liberation Army (SLA) surfaced in 2002 in Sindh proclaiming to be affiliated with JSMM and was

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<sup>62</sup> Khurram Iqbal, "Significance and Security of CPEC: Pakistani perspective," *China Institute of International Studies*, No. 66, (September 14, 2017).

<sup>63</sup> Sanjay Mathrani, "STP Chairman Qadir Magsi stepped down," *Daily Times*, July 31, 2018.

involved in a multiple terror activities<sup>64</sup>. For example, on December 26, 2010, the railway services were suspended in which four persons were injured when a track was struck by two explosions in Hyderabad. It was followed by similar explosions on railway tracks in other cities of the province<sup>65</sup>.

#### *Role of Shafi Muhammad Barfat*

Shafi Muhammad Barfat, leader of JSMM, belongs to Jamshoro and is believed to be hiding somewhere in Afghanistan and providing necessary guidance to SDLA. The operation chief of SDLA is reportedly Darya Khan who is leading the sabotage activities. Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA) is comparable with Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in terms of its objectives and goals. It vows to keep Sindh an independent territory since it has its own ocean, agriculture, minerals and other natural resources.

#### *Area of Operation of SDLA*

The area of operation of SDLA encompasses both urban and rural districts including Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Karachi, Jamshoro, Shaheed Benazirabad, Mirpur Mathilo, Sangar, Naushero Feroze, Sukkur, Ghotki, Larkana, Kotri, Tando Hyder, Badin, Thatta, Shahdat kot, Ranipur, Moro, Dorki, Khairpur, Dadu and Qazi Ahmed respectively. If we categorize the type of targets chosen by the group, we can include transportation/communication networks, financial/business institutions, foreigners,

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<sup>64</sup> Muhammad Hussain Khan, "Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army claims twin blasts targeting Rangers in Larkana," *Dawn*, July 31, 2016.

<sup>65</sup> "Blasts on Railway tracks posing new threats," *Dawn*, December 27, 2010.

educational institutions and private citizens/property<sup>66</sup>. In 2014, Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) announced a province wide strike which got positive response from interior Sindh and urban areas as well. The strike was initiated in the back drop of nabbing eighteen persons involved in cracker attacks on multiple targets in Sindh. Moreover they also protested against Pakistan Protection Ordinance along with killing of members of JSMM in police encounters<sup>67</sup>.

#### *Scrutinizing Attacks by SDLA*

The period can be divided into two phases. The first phase starts from 2002 and ends in 2006. The second one sets-in in 2010 and continues till 2018.

#### *Analysis of Attacks (2002-06)*

From 2002-06 nearly 120 cracker attacks, bomb blasts and other acts of sabotage were reported in Sindh province. Most of these acts were aimed at destroying the railway tracks and transmission lines. In one of such incidents, two police men along with a journalist were wounded in Nawabshah when a railway track was blown with a bomb. The police responded to the explosion at the site and while inspection another bomb went off resulting into the injuries<sup>68</sup>.

#### *Analysis of Attacks (2010-17)*

A total number of 61 major attacks have been documented from 2010-17.

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<sup>66</sup> “National Consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism, a center of excellence of the US Department of homeland security” *Global Terrorism Database*, University of Maryland, 2018.

<sup>67</sup> “JSMM called for Sind-wide strike draws mixed response,” *Dawn*, April 10, 2014.

<sup>68</sup> “Three hurt in blasts near Nawabshah,” *Dawn*, August 17, 2004.

Most of these attacks (55 percent) took place in 2012. A gory retaliatory attack was reported in Nawabshah in 2012 when five gunmen killed six passengers and wounding many in an act of indiscriminate firing in a Punjab bound bus near Qazi Ahmed. Subsequently, the death toll increased to nine. Reportedly the gunmen after the act announced that they had avenged the killing of Muzaffar Bhutto and other JSMM leaders who died in custody of law enforcement agencies<sup>69</sup>.

The last known main attack was conducted in July 2017 in Steel Town area of Karachi when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strike resulted into damaging of road infrastructure with no casualties reported. It was later revealed that Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SDLA) was involved in the incident and they wanted to target the Chinese engineers' convoy on the road<sup>70</sup>. It has given a different dimension to their choice of targets<sup>71</sup>.

The geographical area of operation suggests that SDLA is more active in interior Sindh as compared to its northern or southern districts. This clearly suggests that the presence of SDLA is quite wide spread and sparse encompassing southern most districts like Thatta and an array of northern districts bordering Balochistan as well.

#### *Lethality of Attacks by SDLA*

An overview of elements of violence in JST and its subsequent factions indicate that they lack the wherewithal to launch an impressive attack against the state and its institutions. Their most lethal attacks were reactionary and in retaliation to killings of its members and leaders. They

<sup>69</sup> "Bus attacked near Nawabshah, seven killed," *Dawn*, May 25, 2012.

<sup>70</sup> "Chinese engineers escaped IED blasts in steel town," *Dawn*, July 11, 2017.

<sup>71</sup> Imitiaz Ali, "Chinese engineers working on power plants hurts in bomb blasts," *Dawn*, May 31, 2016.

are pretty much confined to their respective areas of operations in terms of geographical limitations which again points towards extent of their local tentacles and networking. Barring few exceptions, majority of their leadership is in Sindh though their movement is restricted and they operate tactfully like leaders of main irredentist Baloch groups who are believed to have support from outside the country. Moreover, many violent groups in JST are eclipsed by Sindh Awami Tehrik (SAT), launched by Rasool Bux Palejo who tried to indoctrinate the Sindhis with his own brand of nationalist politics<sup>72</sup>.

### **Analyzing elements of violence in BNM**

There are five main-stream insurgent groups active in Balochistan namely Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), United Baloch Army (UBA) and Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) respectively. These groups operate in different areas drawing tribal and local support through various cross-section of Baloch society.

Apparently BLF is the only group which claims to have support of Balochi middle class whereas other groups are being spearheaded either by Baloch sardars or their relatives. The BLF leader has expressed his desire to cooperate with other insurgent groups as well. Apart from it, many other smaller insurgent groups are present in the province including *Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar* (BRAS) which cooperate with other groups frequently for different tactical operations. We need to discuss each one of them in terms of their mode of selection of targets, numbers, tactics and

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<sup>72</sup> Shaikh Aziz, "Palejo-a leader of unique political legacy," *Dawn*, June 8, 2018.

operations<sup>73</sup>.

### Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)

BLF has used complex means of tactics for its attacks inside the province. It has employed both kinetic and non-kinetic means to take up arms against the state to continue the insurgency. Among these tactics include Improvised Explosive Device attacks, bomb blasts, ambush assaults, rocket propelled attacks, kidnapping and targeted killings. Nearly 43 main attacks have been documented, believed to be carried out by BLF since 2007, in which military installations, military convoy, police stations, police posts or police vehicles have been targeted. Majority of these incidents took place in Kech, Buleda, Gwadar, Tump, Mashkai, Pasni, Parwan, Awaran, Turbat, Mand, Quetta, Khuzdar, Parom and other places in southern Balochistan<sup>74</sup>. In one of the deadliest attacks in 2015, twenty laborers belonging to Punjab were gunned down in a pre-dawn attack in Turbat. Apart from military and police targets, they have been focusing on damaging government properties for coercion and intimidation. BLF, along with Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), is one of the strongest insurgent groups in the province<sup>75</sup>. Currently, Allah Nazar Baloch leads the group.

### Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)

BLA was initially led by Baalach Marri who was subsequently replaced by his brother Harbiyar Marri in 2007. The Latter is in exile and operates from outside to control the group. The latest attack on the Chinese

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<sup>73</sup> Nazeena Sayed Ali, "Situationer who's who of Baloch Insurgency," *Dawn*, June 01, 2015.

<sup>74</sup> "National Consortium", *Global Terrorism Database*.

<sup>75</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Twenty laborers gunned down in Turbat," *Dawn*, April 12, 2015.

Consulate in Karachi was also conducted by BLA last year, claimed by its field commander Aslam Baloch who was subsequently killed in Afghanistan<sup>76</sup>. The group has conducted attacks on varying types of targets including transportation, business, police, government, military, utilities, private citizens and their properties and educational institutions as well. Twenty-five major attacks documented by local police and levies forces since 2005 indicates that it operates in districts such as Turbat, Bolan, Dera Bugti, Mach, Kalat, Quetta, Khuzdar, Harnai, Hub and Karachi<sup>77</sup>. In June 2015, BLA blew up Quaid Azam Residency in Ziarat in which one policeman was also killed. As per reports four men on motorcycles entered the residency and destroyed the building. Many old materials along with wooden structure were destroyed during the incident<sup>78</sup>. Recently it has been declared a terrorist entity under Specially Designated Global Terrorist category<sup>79</sup>.

### **United Baloch Army (UBA)**

The group surfaced with the leadership of Mehran Marri who formed it after having cultivated differences with Harbiyar Marri. In other words it's a breakaway faction of BLA. The group is active since 2011 and used multiple means to achieve its targets. It has focused on private citizens, property, military, police, utilities, educational institutions, transportation and businesses. It operates in a wide area including districts Sibi, Dera Bugti, Quetta, Mastung, Lehri, Dera Murad Jamali, Dasht, Kohlu, Nushki

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<sup>76</sup> Saleem Shahid,"Banned BLA leader killed in Kandahar suicide attacks," *Dawn*, December 27, 2018.

<sup>77</sup> "National Consortium", *Global Terrorism Database*.

<sup>78</sup> "Quaid residency blown up by BLA," *Dawn*, June 16, 2013.

<sup>79</sup> Kamran Yousaf, "US declares Balochistan Liberation Army a terrorist group," *The Express Tribune*, July 2, 2019.

and Mach respectively<sup>80</sup>. UBA attacked two passenger buses in Mastung in 2015 in which nearly 22 people were killed and scores were injured<sup>81</sup>. Similarly another attack in Sibi on Jaffarabad Express claimed 16 lives<sup>82</sup>. These attacks were condemned by BLA and BRA as they feel that these tactics are counterproductive.

### **Balochistan Republican Army (BRA)**

Formed in 2007 with Brahamdagh Bugti as its leader, BRA operates in Dera Bugti, Dera Murad Jamali, Kech, Naseerabad and Jaffarabad. It aims limited targets including military, police, private persons, transportation and utilities<sup>83</sup>. It employs different types of violent means including IEDs, landmines, grenades, small combat arms and rocket launchers. Nearly ten major attacks can be attributed to BRA including an attack on security forces convoy in Kech district in 2015 in which eight personnel expired and scores were injured. A similar attack in 2014 on a security convoy claimed nine lives as well. Though limited in resources and numbers, the group has a significant imprint in the area around Dera Bugti.

### **Lashkar e Balochistan (LeB)**

Bahwal and Javed Mengal are considered to be the main leaders of the group whereas the former is stationed in London<sup>84</sup>. Formed in 2009, LeB has been operating in central part of the province including districts Hub, Loti, Turbat, Dera Bugti, Mastung, Kachlak, Karachi and Lahore. Among

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<sup>80</sup> "National Consortium", *Global Terrorism Database*.

<sup>81</sup> Saleem Shahid "Gunmen storm two coaches near Mastung, butcher 19 passengers," *Dawn*, May 30, 2015.

<sup>82</sup> Syed Ali Shah, "Sibi train blast death toll reaches 16," *Dawn*, April 8, 2014.

<sup>83</sup> "National Consortium", *Global Terrorism Database*.

<sup>84</sup> "DOPEL: Database of people with extremist linkages", accessed June 17, 2019, [https://www.dopel.org/dopel\\_analysis.htm](https://www.dopel.org/dopel_analysis.htm).

its chief targets include police, transportation, educational institutions, private citizens and property, utilities, military and government structures<sup>85</sup>. At least nine major incidents of terror have been reported since 2009. Its main recruitment tool is tribal affiliation and Balochistan Student Organization-Azad (BSO-A) which also provides human resource base to other insurgent groups as well.

### **Comparing Baloch Insurgent Groups with SDLA**

SDLA when compared with Baloch insurgents groups provides some overlapping areas in terms of tactics, weapon choice, target selection and recruitment mode. However, a stark difference is observed in terms of non-kinetic means, lethality of attacks, cooperation and coordination with other groups in operation execution and completion.

Moreover, tribal affiliation provides another different flavor to the battle hardened Baloch groups. The geographical spatiality between SDA and Baloch groups is also quite differentiating.

#### *Wide range of Target Selection*

The Baloch insurgent groups are more adept in target selection which is indicative of their trainings and mutual cooperation with each other. As a result their choice of target varies on a wider spectrum with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the one end to ambushing security forces in central and southern districts of Balochistan on the other.

They have even ventured to attack Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar in

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<sup>85</sup> “National Consortium”, *Global Terrorism Database*.

broad daylight with heavy presence of security personnel in the area<sup>86</sup>. They have also resorted to killing of Punjabis and Pashtuns on basis of ethnicity and in retaliation of encounters of their members and field commanders.

#### *Proficiency in Weapon Handling*

The Baloch insurgent groups are quite proficient in use of different weapons including short and long range arms for engagement. The SDLA has been using bombs or crackers to inflict damage to transportation or communication networks and in rare cases they have employed closed armed combat weapons to kill passengers on basis of ethnicity to avenge deaths of their leaders.

#### *External Assistance Factor*

Interestingly majority of leaders of Baloch insurgent groups operate from outside. Many of them have taken refuge in London, Afghanistan and other European countries on one pretext or the other. Whereas selective SDLF leadership is believed to be in Afghanistan and is in contact with members and/or field commanders of the group.

#### *Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Tactics*

The tactics employed by Baloch insurgent groups fall in both kinetic and non-kinetic categories. They have launched a vigorous campaign on social media against military and local administration. Moreover, they have extended the battleground to cosmopolitan cities of Europe and adopted innovative non kinetic measures to highlight the issues through pasting

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<sup>86</sup> "Five people killed in Gwadar PC attack; Army concludes clearing operation," *Dawn*, May 12, 2019.

banners on public transportation and hotel entrances<sup>87</sup>. Such tactics have not been adopted by SDLF. Interestingly in both cases many voices can be heard who advocate non-violence and are part of the current political reconciliation process.

#### *Systematic Co-ordination and Co-operation*

In Balochistan, National Party held power for almost two and a half years and tried to calm down the insurgency in tone and tenor<sup>88</sup>. Where as in Sindh, presence of Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the arch rival of JST, has not let it grow out of its basic structure. The best opportunity for JST was when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was imprisoned but it could neither initiate any reconciliation nor come up with a rapprochement with senior members of PPP<sup>89</sup>.

Furthermore, the raging magic of Rasool Bux Palejo especially in central Sindh never provides JST any room for transferring its message to local population. The latter was a man of his own making and he tried to introduce a local ideology rather than export it from an alien land. He therefore nurtured an indigenous narrative and followed a path of non-violence without giving credence to any of the acts of violence of JSMM or JSQM.

In Balochistan, all insurgent groups not only conduct joint trainings but have also approached religious extremist organizations for support and coordination.

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<sup>87</sup> Naveed Siddiqui, "British High commissioner summoned over malicious Anti Pakistan slogan on London cabs," *The Dawn*, November 3, 2017.

<sup>88</sup> Syed Ali Shah, "Three political parties to form collation government in Balochistan," *Dawn*, May 17, 2013.

<sup>89</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Making of the Sindhi identity: From Shah Latif to GM Sayed to Bhutto," *Dawn*, September 15, 2015.

Therefore, the extent and level of collaboration between Baloch insurgent groups is superior to that of SDLF<sup>90</sup>.

#### *Effectiveness of Human Resource Mobilization*

The BSO-A provides recruitment input to many groups whereas Jeay Sindh Student Federation (JSSF) in central area are unable to match with the pace of human resource requirement of JST and its different factions or cannot indulge themselves impressively in mass mobilization. Lately a demonstration by JSFF was staged in front of press club Karachi for lifting of ban on students union in Sindh and give due rights to its people<sup>91</sup>.

#### *Political overtures to Insurgent Groups*

The government has offered a number of packages for pacifying the disgruntled ethno-political elements in Balochistan but no such offer has been made for Sindh where a continuous low intensity spell of sabotage

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<sup>90</sup> According to SSP CTD Balochistan, there exists no material evidence of cooperation, coordination and training of different violent ethno-nationalist groups on a single platform nonetheless ample intelligence is present which suggests that these groups are actively engaging with each other in target selection and its pointation thus extending human and logistical assistance in operation execution especially in areas where accessibility of one group is limited or curtailed. The external and internal material aid is essential to carry out attack against law enforcers and military establishments. Recently, Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Dawood Jan Ahmedzai, while forming a council of Independence of Balochistan, boasts that he has active support of many like-minded/friendly countries who would cooperate and help him in achieving the end objective of the council. According to the police official, there are many factors indicating the clear intervention of foreign powers in Balochistan. First, Kulbhushan Jadhav the Indian spy agent, was arrested from Mashkel near Chaman border in 2016 who was specifically tasked to perpetrate anarchy in the province by extending maximum support to different insurgent groups. Second, the Chinese are developing Gawadar as part of CPEC project and India wants to establish Chabahar (Iran) port city for the very purpose so that it can siphon off maximum benefits of the trade. Moreover, India is also looking for an alternate route of trade with Afghanistan so that current leverage of Afghan-Pakistan transit trade can be minimized.

<sup>91</sup> Saher Baloch, "Footprints: Kill and dump in Karachi," *Dawn*, December 14, 2014.

continues for quite some time now<sup>92</sup>.

### JST-BNM Comparison Matrices

We have developed two matrices for JST-BNM comparison in which ten variables have been labelled including Numbers, Weapon Handling Expertise (WHE), Target Selection (TS), Outside Support (OS), Internal Dissent (ID), Mutual Cooperation (MC), Geographical Area (GA), Kinetic (KAs) and Non Kinetic attacks (NKAs) respectively<sup>93</sup>.

Groups	Numbers	TS	WHE	OS	HRM
JSQM	Low	Simple	Low	Not Known	Low
JSMM	Moderate	Complex	Moderate-Complex	Low	Moderate
BLA	Moderate	Complex	High-Complex	High	Moderate
BRA	Moderate	Complex	Low-Complex	Moderate	Low
UBA	Moderate	Complex	Low-Complex	Moderate	Moderate
BLF	High	Complex	High-Complex	Moderate	High
LeB	Moderate	Simple	Low-Complex	Low	Low

*Matrix 01: Comparison among different Sub Nationalists Groups on Numbers, TS, WHE, OS & HRM*

In Matrix 01, BLF stands out from the rest of the groups in terms of Numbers, Target Selection, Outside Support and Human Resource Mobilization. The main reason is that its top leadership operates from within the province and rarely ventures into neighbouring countries for refuge. Moreover, it has effectively engaged the youth and locals in carrying out different operations in Baloch areas. Apart from it, it has

<sup>92</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Plan for peaceful Balochistan approved," *Dawn*, August 7, 2015.

<sup>93</sup> Here it is essential that we define these variables properly. The numerical strength ranges from low, moderate and high (less than 500, between 500 and 1500, beyond 1500). Similarly if the members of a group can choose multiple targets then they fall in the category of complex otherwise they are simplex in terms of their choice of targets. The weapon handling expertise is also divided into four categories namely, Low, Low-Complex, Moderate-Complex, and High-Complex respectively. On the similar lines, Outside Support and Human Resource Mobilization have been divided into Low, Moderate and High groupings.

shown its desire to work with other Baloch insurgent groups for cooperation and coordination.

In a video interview in 2015, Allah Nazar Baloch debunked the news of his death and vowed to work with other insurgent groups to achieve their common objectives<sup>94</sup>.

Groups	Internal Dissention	MC	GA	NKAs	KAs
<b>JSQM</b>	High	Low	Medium	Low	Low
<b>JSM</b>	Moderate	Low	Medium	Moderate	Moderate
<b>BLA</b>	Low	Moderate	Large	Moderate	Moderate
<b>BRA</b>	Low	Moderate	Large	Moderate	Moderate
<b>UBA</b>	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
<b>BLF</b>	Low	High	Moderate	High	High
<b>LeB</b>	Low	Low	Moderate	Low	Low

*Matrix 02: Comparison among different Sub Nationalists on ID, MC, GA, Kinetic/Non Kinetic Attacks*

In Matrix 02, the Internal Dissention denotes the level of disintegration within a group and/or formation of sub groups or splinter groups from a main sub nationalist structure. The dissension is highest in JST sub groups as compared to BNM related factions. Similarly mutual cooperation is defined when these groups seek assistance from others in conducting different terror operations. The non-kinetic attacks are those made in an irregular manner and through utilization of internet-social media based techniques.

Again, BLF surpasses all other groups in terms of kinetic/non-kinetic attacks. According to a study, BSO-Azad utilizes social media (Facebook) most effectively among all groups in Pakistan<sup>95</sup>. Moreover, these matrices suggest that insurgent groups thrive on public cooperation and support. A

<sup>94</sup> "Pakistan's Most Wanted Balochistan Fighter is Alive", *NMF News*, November 30, 2015, video.

<sup>95</sup> Jehanzeb Haque, "Banned outfits in Pakistan operate openly on face book," *Dawn*, September 14, 2017, accessed July 25, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335561>.

group whose leadership also comes from the local population can not only survive for longer period of time but also execute most complex attacks against the LEAs. BLF seems to fall in this particular category.

### **Implications of violence for non-violent ethno-national struggles**

Drawing conclusions from these violent ethno-national movements one can record their implications of apparently non-violent sub-national struggles. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) is one of such political dispensations which has so far been nonviolent and has opted for the political path for its struggle for the rights of Pashtuns. Though there are visible possibilities of outside support to PTM on multiple levels nonetheless they seem to keep their struggle as nonviolent as possible since any element of violence may trigger a severe state action against them. The recent incident at a check post at Khar Qamar also points towards the same episode which ultimately resulted into registration of terrorism cases against its key members with multiple arrests<sup>96</sup>.

The success of these violent ethno-national movements is still not exemplary and in some cases many insurgent groups have either disintegrated or joined ranks of other violent structures. Moreover, nonviolent movements have relatively higher chances of survival than that of violent ones as heavy finances are involved along with persistent resolve of its leaders.

Finally, non-violence has a kind of soft power associated with it. Such power is going to define the future national movements and their

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<sup>96</sup> Francesca Marino, "The changing narrative of Pak Army against PTM," ANI, May 26, 2019.

acceptability among nations<sup>97</sup>.

### Conclusion

Ethno-national movements, in the age of social media based activities, have complex structures. A dynamic approach is, therefore, needed to attract, assimilate and encourage its command to shun the differences through resolution of their key demands. The leaders and members of these movements should be properly engaged by local politicians by providing them sufficient space for political activity and activism. Such movements need to be encouraged to coexist with mainstream national narrative through participation in economic, educational, social, cultural and sporting activities. Lastly, in case of any violence, a legal course of action is essential to deal with the elements involved in sabotage and lawlessness.

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<sup>97</sup> Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Future of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement,” *The Arab News* (Pakistan Edition), May 7, 2019.